It seems that Pakistan’s current approach to counter-unmanned aerial systems (C-UAS) involves disparate systems – both soft-kill and hard-kill – trying to stop quadcopters and loitering munitions. Moreover, the employment of C-UAS, currently at least, seems localized, but with limited upward connectivity to a broader system.
This matters because in a state-on-state conflict, the drone threat is not a localized problem as it might be in counterinsurgency (COIN) and counter-terrorism (CT). Rather, enemy states will use drones as a piece of a wider attack strategy, which could manifest in many different ways, from large-salvo strikes through a large number of loitering munitions to mixed-salvos employing both drones and missiles.
So, the threat necessitates having a strategic picture, even though tomorrow’s threats might be smaller, lower-cost, and simpler than ever. Moreover, lacking that strategic picture – and the systems to manage one’s sensors and counter-drone effectors (be it soft-kill or hard-kill) – not only leads to leakage (thereby resulting in significant damage to one’s key assets), but also to the depletion of advanced surface-to-air missiles (SAM) and/or other high-cost, high-value effectors on low-cost threats. Or, alternatively, it could lead to situations where a specific local area cannot leverage superior effector options due to the inability to alert other systems of its soft-kill or hard-kill attempts.
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