Beyond Gaza: The Real Strategic Reason Pakistan Just Joined the US Peace Board Quwa Premium

In June 2026, President Donald Trump invited Pakistan’s Chief of Army Staff (COAS), Field Marshal Asim Munir, to a private luncheon in the White House. 

Pakistan’s security leadership likely viewed the meeting as a positive response to the government’s earlier efforts to reframe Pakistan as more than a regional interlocutor to American policymakers. In this vein, Pakistan had promoted its potential as a minerals extraction and refinement hub to American investors, clearly signalling its willingness to integrate into the U.S. supply chain (which itself is designed to counteract China).

However, this author was skeptical of the actual economic potential of Pakistan’s minerals and, instead, suggested that a fundamental change in the nature of US-Pakistani ties was unlikely, as noted below:

U.S. interest is strategically grounded but operates within broader geopolitical constraints. While this resource focus offers a valuable channel for dialogue and potential cooperation, particularly on supply chain security and related economic development, expecting it to swiftly or wholly transform the multifaceted and historically complex American-Pakistani relationship is likely unrealistic. 

Instead, this author argued that if there were to be a shift in Pakistani-U.S. relations, it would be built on an older, more traditional U.S. policy interest – i.e., to stop focusing on India and, instead, involve itself in issues in Afghanistan and the Middle East.

In June 2026, the U.S. had called on Pakistan to help mediate the Israeli-Iranian War, but this author theorized that Washington could call on Pakistan to focus more broadly:

However, the U.S.’s vision for Pakistan could potentially involve more than solely Iran and, potentially, be a call to Rawalpindi to ‘look West’ in both its immediate security concerns and its long-term direction.

In other words, Washington likely wants Pakistan to focus its energies on Afghanistan and Iran so as to ensure both countries remain stable and favourable to U.S. interests. Moreover – and more importantly – the U.S. wants Pakistan and India to normalize their ties, potentially by formalizing the Line of Control as the international border between the two countries.

A ‘look West’ doctrine would require normalization with India and, consequently, a gradual shift towards managing security and stability on the western front.

From that point forward, Pakistan went through a series of events, each affirming that its security leadership is not only focusing more on the Middle East but perhaps prioritizing it as its primary area of focus. These events included signing the Strategic Mutual Defence Agreement (SMDA) with Saudi Arabia, a rapid escalation in tensions with Afghanistan, a series of high-level agreements with the Libyan National Army (LNA), a trilateral defence agreement (drafted) with Saudi Arabia and Türkiye, and rumours of arms sales to Sudan, among other steps that have shifted attention to the Middle East – and away from India. 

What does Pakistan’s entry into the ‘Board of Peace’ actually mean for its defense budget and its border with India? We analyze the real economic potential — and the specific US demands — hidden behind the headlines.