Pakistan’s Anti-Access/Area-Denial Options (Part 3): ISR & Net-Warfare Plus

This article continues Quwa’s series on Pakistan’s anti-access and area-denial (A2/AD) options. The series builds on an observation that the Pakistan Navy (PN)’s efforts to expand its surface fleet, while a relatively significant effort, will not be enough to sustain credible sea-control capabilities in the Arabian Sea.

In part-one, Quwa outlined how Pakistan’s supplier pool is now capable of supplying low radar-observable fast attack crafts (FAC) and supersonic anti-ship cruising missiles (ASCM). In part-two, Quwa examined the utility of a quantitatively strong submarine fleet in building strong A2/AD through credible anti-submarine warfare (ASW) and anti-ship warfare (AShW), but through platforms that are not readily detectable.

Credible intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance (ISR) capabilities are an essential intermediary layer to enabling the A2/AD user to effectively target and engage its adversaries. Arguably, one can identify at least three ISR domains necessary for A2/AD: (1) long-range and over-the-horizon (OTH) object detection and targeting; (2) tactical situational awareness and (3) strategic situational awareness.

Combined, these domains aim to enable the A2/AD user to have a comprehensive insight or view of its areas-of-interest as well as the means to promptly identify and engage intruding targets. Prior to the PN’s surface and sub-surface fleet development, Pakistan had already been building ISR capabilities in each of these domains a decade, if not longer, in advance of current events.

In fact, the Pakistan Air Force (PAF) had touted its build-up of ISR as an integral feature to its counter-terrorism (CT) and counterinsurgency (COIN) efforts. However, the ISR domains necessary for A2/AD are significantly more expansive and Pakistan is now staging its efforts to materializing the required inputs. In fact, the drive, especially in terms of strategic awareness, is being channelled through domestic projects.