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2024 Pakistan Day Parade Recap

Quwa Premium April 7, 2024
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On its annual Pakistan Day parade, the Pakistani military showcased a number of its newly inducted hardware, including new air defence equipment, main battle tanks (MBT), and artillery systems.

Heavy Industries Taxila (HIT) Haider MBT

The Pakistan Army (PA) debuted its new ‘Haider’ MBT, which is a variant of the NORINCO VT4 built by Heavy Industries Taxila (HIT). HIT rolled out its first Haider in March of this year under a ‘pilot project’ in collaboration with NORINCO. The Haider/VT4 is a central piece of the PA’s armour modernization efforts, with reports pegging a procurement run of up to 679 units.

Though HIT is leaning on NORINCO for inputs, it is not solely assembling the tank from knock-down kits. There is a measure of local input involved. For example, the entire gun mechanism is indigenous, with 97% of the 1,129 parts involved being locally sourced. HIT is also localizing the electronic sub-systems, including the fire control system, gun control system, and optronics.

Indigenous Short-Range 3D Phased-Array Radar

The Pakistan Air Force (PAF) revealed its first locally produced radar, i.e., the ‘short-range air defence radar’ (SRAD). Though the PAF marketed the SRAD as a National Aerospace Science and Technology Park (NASTP) solution, the SRAD’s development predates NASTP. The SRAD is reportedly among five new ground-based short- and medium-range radars under development in Pakistan.

The SRAD’s debut shows that domestically designed solutions are playing a growing part in Pakistan’s defence modernization efforts. In this case, the PAF is using its original radar systems to further close its low-altitude coverage gaps, augmenting the newly procured TPS-77 MRR, YLC-18A, and upgraded Mobile-Pulse Doppler Radar (MPDR) systems in the role.

Pakistan has at least one additional short-range radar under development, i.e., the ‘G-RAD’ S-band active phased-array 3D radar. The G-RAD will have a range of 100 km against targets with radar cross-sections (RCS) of 1m2. The G-RAD may be paired with a short-range anti-air warfare (AAW) system, e.g., point-defence missile systems (PDMS), anti-air guns (AAG), or directed energy weapons.

In addition to expanding the PAF’s situational awareness, these original radar programs could play a role in the country’s future air defence programs. There is an effort underway to develop and produce surface-to-air missiles (SAM) in house, which may utilize these radars for targeting purposes.

Fatah-Series of Surface-to-Surface Missiles (SSM)

Pakistan is making new in-roads in its ballistic missile technology. Until 2021, the bulk of its ballistic missiles were strategic weapons, like the Shaheen-series. However, from 2021, the PA began fielding guided artillery rockets, starting with the 140 km-range Fatah-1. This signalled an evolution in the PA’s doctrine as it essentially inducted a stand-off range precision-strike capability through the Fatah-1. In January, the PA tested a longer-ranged (400 km) SSM called the Fatah-2.

Both the Fatah-1 and Fatah-2 were shown at the parade, and the visuals confirmed an earlier analysis of Quwa of the Fatah-2 being a larger missile requiring a two-cell launcher. In contrast, the Fatah-I is deployable from an eight-cell launcher.

The officials announcing the event also confirmed that new versions of the missile – i.e., Fatah-3 and Fatah-4 – are in development. The Fatah-3 will have a range of 450 km, while the Fatah-4 will provide a range of 700 km. Thus, the Fatah-series seems to be an entire family of new ballistic missiles.

Recent statements from the CEO of Global Industrial and Defence Solutions (GIDS), Asad Kamal, indicated that the Fatah-series leverages new technologies compared to Pakistan’s other ballistic missiles. For example, Kamal stated that the Fatah-2 flies up to the upper hemisphere and, in turn, separates from its propulsion system to become a “supersonic glide vehicle.”

Interestingly, Kamal’s statements suggest that the Fatah-2 could be capable of counter-anti-ballistic missile (ABM) measures through mid-course flight maneuverability or course changes. This could be an evolution of the systems developed for the Nasr tactical ballistic missile (TBM), which also offered “in-flight maneuverability” capabilities. However, unlike the Nasr TBM, it seems that the PA will use the Fatah-series for primarily conventional strikes, not to deploy miniaturized nuclear warheads.

In technological terms, Asad Kamal’s mention of a “supersonic glide vehicle” implies that Pakistan is working towards high-speed maneuvering warheads. It may try scaling its learnings from the Fatah program to its strategic ballistic missiles, thereby leading to hypersonic glide vehicles (HGV). Another possibility could be that the Fatah’s glide vehicle system is a result of preexisting HGV research.

New Air Defence Systems

The PA and PAF showed their newly inducted surface-to-air missile (SAM) systems, highlighting the extensive work both service arms put into their air defence systems in recent years.

The Army’s HQ-9/P long-range SAM made an appearance. Inducted in 2021, the HQ-9/P offers a confirmed range of 125 km. The HQ-9/P complements the LY-80, which the PA inducted in 2017. Interestingly, the event announcers stated that the PA’s LY-80 systems now have a range of 70 km, confirming that the previously revealed ‘LY-80EV’ is the improved HQ-16 variant, which was revealed in 2016 (see Quwa’s analysis on the Army’s air defence system for more details).

The PAF’s HQ-9BE long-range SAM also made its public debut. According to the announcers, the HQ-9BE offers a range of up to 300 km and altitude reach of 30 km. Interestingly, these specifications are different from those on CASIC’s official materials, which state that the HQ-9BE has a range of 260 km and altitude reach of 27 km. The Spada 2000-Plus also made an appearance, but the event officials stated that it has a range of 40 km, rather than the 25+ km found on MBDA’s material. The PAF did not showcase the HQ-16FE, but it confirmed inducting the system (learn more about the PAF’s decade-long development programs on Quwa’s new quarterly report).

Project ‘PFX’

During a solo demonstration flight of the JF-17 Thunder multirole fighter, the parade announcers said that the PAF has “embarked on [the] design and development of [an] indigenous fighter aircraft under the banner of ‘PFX,’ the flagship national project of strategic significance.”

Interestingly, the announcers did not mention the JF-17 as part of the PFX. However, past PAF material regarding the PFX have shown it in relation to the JF-17. Thus, it is unlikely that the PFX is a new/clean-sheet fighter program. Rather, it seems that the PFX is a continuation of the JF-17, either a new block or, potentially, an effort to manufacture the fighter on a turnkey basis by buying the Aviation Industry Corporation of China (AVIC)’s share in the program.

There are several reasons why the PAF may need to take full ownership of the JF-17.

Firstly, AVIC does not need to market the JF-17 as it has a more capable solution in the J-10CE (which the PAF also inducted) and a more affordable lightweight fighter option in the L-15B (which the PAF is interested in). In fact, AVIC has seen more success with the L-15B than it has with the JF-17. In reality, the JF-17 serves a niche requirement, and the countries that would need such jets the most actually have their own projects (e.g., Tejas and FA-50). Thus, a small market with many options does not give AVIC much flexibility in terms of driving profitable sales. Moreover, AVIC now has the systems it needs to engage higher value markets, like the Middle East and North Africa, through the J-10CE and J-31.

Thus, the resources AVIC is putting behind the JF-17 are basically in support of the PAF. In the future, AVIC could start charging higher premiums for its workshare input. Raising the cost of the JF-17 would incentivize the PAF to acquire additional J-10CEs instead of acquiring new Thunders. Therefore, the PAF may be under pressure to take ownership of the JF-17 so as to prevent issues on AVIC’s side when it comes to supporting the Thunder over the long-term.

Secondly, taking full ownership of the JF-17 would enable the PAF to readily produce new airframes as well as carry out structural life extension programs (SLEP) for its existing fleet. When fiscal means become scarce, the PAF will have a go-to solution that draws on lower cost indigenous resources (e.g., labour, production facilities, etc.) rather than costly imports. Without the ability to produce new JF-17s, the PAF would be at the mercy of its foreign suppliers, notably China. The PAF could also integrate its choice of electronic subsystems (e.g., radar) and munitions, thereby giving it autonomy in how to configure its aircraft with homegrown as well as Turkish and European solutions.

That said, properly localizing the JF-17 could require a significant measure of net-new development work. To effectively carry out weapons integration, for example, the PAF would need to build a strong understanding of the flight control system. This process of learning the flight control system may, in effect, require the PAF to develop an in-house capacity to produce the technology. The PAF may also need to localize other inputs of the JF-17, such as its mission computers.

Hence, terming the JF-17 ‘PFX’ as a significant undertaking would make sense. Though the PFX would be a JF-17 variant, the work required to developing an original variant is significant in scope. If the PAF is genuine in its intent to develop the PFX, it would basically be carrying out an indigenization effort of the JF-17. This would result in net-new aerospace capabilities that do not currently exist in the PAF or, for that matter, in Pakistan as a whole. Unfortunately, the PAF’s track record with such large-scale projects up to this point has not been fruitful (e.g., it did not properly manage Project AZM). Thus, the ‘PFX’ initiative could also end up as another defunct project.

Ultimately, one must recall why the PAF pursued the JF-17 in the first place. China did not have any cutting-edge multirole fighters available for export, and the West was inaccessible due to political or cost issues. Hence, the PAF needed a low-cost multirole fighter to replace its legacy platforms while enabling it to freely add new air warfare technologies, such as beyond-visual-range (BVR) missiles. It achieved those goals and the PAF acquired the 150+ units it originally planned for.

Today, however, the Chinese offer cutting-edge solutions – i.e., the J-10CE and J-31 – and, therefore, the urgency of the JF-17 has diminished. In fact, when the PAF ordered its first 20 J-10CEs, it reduced its JF-17 Block-III order to 30 aircraft, and, up to this point, remains non-committal towards acquiring the remaining 20 out of the originally planned 50 units. This clearly shows that the PAF will prioritize the more capable solution, even an import, over the JF-17. Thus, the viability of a new fighter program – including new-build JF-17s – emerging from the PFX is questionable.

That said, the JF-17 is the PAF’s backbone fighter, and will remain so for several decades. In fact, the PAF would prefer keeping these aircraft in service for as long as possible, especially given the existing maintenance, logistics, training, and non-recurring engineering (NRE) overhead (resulting from new munitions integration, such as cruise missiles). The ‘PFX’ could develop into a long-term sustenance program for the JF-17, enabling the PAF to keep its fleet active into the 2030s and 2040s. In addition to localized subsystem upgrades, Pakistan Aeronautical Complex (PAC) could manufacture all of the necessary spare parts, carry out SLEP, and other measures to keep the fleet active.

In terms of new fighter procurement, Quwa believes that the PAF will procure off-the-shelf fighters – specifically the J-10CE and possibly the L-15B – from AVIC through the 2020s and 2030s. There was a scenario where if fiscal resources were limited, the PAF would procure additional JF-17s. However, this avenue is becoming increasingly untenable.

First, AVIC’s incentives clearly align with promoting the J-10CE and L-15B, and its work on the JF-17 is largely for the PAF. Otherwise, it has not gained any other significant traction, and is unlikely to do so. There is greater – and more revenue-rich – market potential in the J-10CE and J-31 as non-Wester, ITAR-free high-performance fighters are rare, yet the demand for those designs is growing.

Second, by inducting the J-10CE, the PAF has invested in new operating overhead and, as such, it has an incentive to leverage it through additional units. The PAF even trimmed its JF-17 Block-III order to help fund the J-10CE acquisition, thereby showing a clear preference. The PAF could work through its fiscal limitations by leveraging small batch orders, loans, and other benefits from AVIC. In turn, AVIC would have an incentive to provide support for J-10CE orders if it means shutting down its JF-17 work (thereby freeing resources for other programs).

Third, sustaining the existing JF-17s (through the PFX program) as well as investing in new surface-to-air missiles (SAM) and drones could help alleviate the need to replace old fighters with new fighters. For example, the air defence/point-defence roles traditionally taken up by the F-7PGs could go to the PAF’s medium-range and long-range SAMs, like the HQ-16FE and HQ-9BE, respectively. Likewise, the stand-off weapon (SOW) deployment work of the Mirage III/5 could be taken up by the newly acquired Bayraktar Akıncı unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV). Basically, the PAF does not need fighters to fill every capability gap, it can leverage other – and potentially lower cost – assets.

Hence, as long as the PAF can prevent the JF-17 fleet from rapidly shrinking (via a sustenance program in the PFX), it could be content with incrementally building its J-10CE fleet through small batch orders of 12-16 units over a 10-12-year period. The PAF has reached a point where large-scale replacement programs (as one would see in early Cold War-era jets like the MiG-21) are unnecessary. It has a fleet of multirole fighters; hence, the focus should be on preservation. Those aircraft will retire at a much slower rate than legacy F-7Ps, which makes small batch orders of J-10CEs relatively sustainable.

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