On 21 January 2026, the Government of Pakistan formally announced its membership in the Board of Peace, an international body tasked with facilitating the Gaza Peace Plan.
Pakistan is one of several Muslim-majority countries – alongside Egypt, Jordan, the United Arab Emirates (UAE), Türkiye, Saudi Arabia, and Qatar – participating in the body.
The decision to join the Board of Peace has drawn domestic criticism and debate, but its merits or flaws notwithstanding, this move once again validates Quwa’s core thesis – i.e., Pakistan’s pivot to focusing on Middle Eastern security affairs.
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Pakistan’s participation in the Board of Peace and the Gaza Peace Plan is now perhaps the strongest sign of this shift. This is not to suggest that Pakistan would play a leading role in any of these Middle Eastern security issues. Whether Pakistan assumes an actual leadership role in any of these issues is beside the point; the point is that the Middle East should be a priority for Pakistan’s national security leaders.
However, this shift will undoubtedly trigger the historical tension – i.e., balancing the push to look West with the pull of addressing the Indian threat.
Will Pakistan Gain Anything?
Quwa had theorized that Pakistan could ask for support in building its conventional force deterrence (to deter India from instigating a conflict) in return for ‘looking West.’ However, it is unclear to what extent the U.S. is interested in facilitating this exchange…
Granted, the Middle East could emerge as a source of defence exports that, if sold at healthy margins, could help Pakistan fund big-ticket procurement. However, aside from a spate of Reuters reports from a narrow pool of reporters, there is limited evidence of these sales.
The alternative support mechanisms would involve either aid or loans from countries like Saudi Arabia and Qatar. Interestingly, there are signs that Qatar, at least, is entering the defence financing business, having backed a USD $1 billion loan for the sale of two new I-Class frigates from Turkish shipbuilder TAIS to Indonesia.
Thus, in theory at least, Pakistan’s involvement in Middle East security issues could, in various ways, lead to Gulf-backed loans and credit for arms procurement. This avenue would also allow Pakistan to engage Turkish vendors for solutions as well (as Ankara’s capacity to support such high-risk loans is limited; the Gulf could provide the liquidity). Interestingly, the trilateral agreement between Saudi Arabia, Türkiye, and Pakistan is worth following, as it could involve such arms sales mechanisms.
Likewise, the U.S. could potentially resume arms sales to Pakistan in limited domains, such as armoured vehicles, small arms, and upgrading some of the Pakistan Air Force’s (PAF) F-16 fleet (which the PAF can argue are critical for its capacity to interoperate and train with allied air forces in the Middle East).
That said, this shift towards the Middle East could also unravel fairly quickly, especially if Pakistan and India engage in another conflict. One would expect Pakistan’s political and military leaders alike to explicitly tie an increase in participation in the Middle East with a corresponding enhancement of Pakistan’s conventional deterrence capabilities. Whether this approach was taken and is in effect remains to be seen, but even when Pakistan did receive meaningful military aid (e.g., the 1950s and 2000s), India would often remain or re-emerge as the primary focus for one reason or another.
While arming Pakistan will be a contentious issue, it is likely that, at a minimum, the U.S. will also want India to focus less on Pakistan and, instead, ‘look East’ and ‘look North’ to focus on Pacific Asia and, more narrowly, China.
This shift necessitates normalization with Pakistan. Currently, neither Pakistan nor India have sufficient domestic political support for a complete thaw in ties. However, one can expect the U.S. to pressure South Asia’s nuclear neighbours to enter into some type of longer-lasting cold truce at least. Thus, this author expects that 2026 will also be a key year in which a U.S.-led effort to normalize Indo-Pak relations will begin.
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