Why the Pakistan Air Force Must Rethink its Fighter Training Strategy Plus Pro

Recently, Hongdu Aircraft Industry Group (HAIG) test flew a new lead-in fighter-trainer (LIFT), a twin-tail, twin-engine configuration with swept-back wings and reinforced landing gear, designed for carrier landings and intended for the People’s Liberation Army Navy Air Force (PLANAF). This would be HAIG’s third trainer program, following the L-15 and K-8, the latter of which is in service with the Pakistan Air Force (PAF).

However, as of 2023, the PAF was also planning to procure the L-15B to meet its own LIFT requirements. Granted, the PAF’s perspective of dedicated LIFT aircraft swung in different directions at different points.

In the early to mid-2010s, the PAF leadership viewed LIFTs as relatively expensive for the training role and believed that it could leverage the twin-seat JF-17B instead. However, in 2018, PAF planners changed their minds, signalling that they not only wanted a dedicated LIFT but preferred one with a multi-mode radar, a tactical data-link (TDL) system, and afterburning engines.

By late 2023, the HAIG L-15B had arrived in Pakistan for testing, and since then, no reports have been made about a deal being signed. Did the PAF change its mind (again)? While a possibility, other priorities (e.g., growing the air defence system) were earmarked over the LIFT. However, this author contends that the PAF will pursue LIFT aircraft; the evolving nature of air warfare demands it now more than ever. Moreover, the emergence of new threats (e.g., drones and loitering munitions) and issues (e.g., persistent low-intensity threat landscapes on the Afghan border) may merit one.

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In effect, not only have the subsystems advanced to a new level from the mid-2010s, but the underlying concepts have changed as well. So, AHQ will need to decide: does it want to acclimate pilots to the newer HMI environment at an earlier level, or offload the work to operational conversion units (OCU) that also need to train pilots on the aircraft? If the latter, then it will place more of a burden on the OCU level and, in turn, increase the risk of delays in provisioning pilots to frontline units and, potentially, other risks tied to the OCU aircraft themselves (as the pilots would not be familiar with the 4.5/5th-generation workflows).

Overall, the LIFT training stage is not solely about acclimating pilots to fighter-like flight rigours, but also educating them on the new workflows that 4.5+/5th-generation aircraft require. For example, the AESA radar would work in conjunction with electro-optical tracking systems (EOTS) or an infrared search and track (IRST) system. It might also leverage data via electronic warfare (EW) arrays, off-board sensors (e.g., from drones and special mission aircraft), and other sources. This is just one of many new workflows; thus, realistically, how much of a burden can an OCU unit shoulder in training pilots on concepts?