Pakistan Looks at Expanding Space Development Plus

In its budget for the 2021-2022 Public Sector Development Programme (PSDP), the Pakistani government is looking to allocate funds to study the feasibility of the following space development projects:

• Establishment of Pakistan Space Centre (PSC).
• The Pakistan Satellite Navigation Program (PSNP).
• Development of a spaceport (i.e., a satellite launch vehicle site).
• Pakistan Multi-Mission Communication Satellite (Pak-Sat-MM1).
• Pakistan Remote Sensing Synthetic Aperture Radar Satellite (PRSS-S1).
• Pakistan Optical Remote Sensing Satellite (PRSS-O2).

The government is conducting the feasibility studies through the Space and Upper Atmosphere Research Commission (SUPARCO). These programs are tentative in scope because they are currently limited to only assessing project feasibility and/or defining system requirements.[1]

Despite the uncertainty, Pakistan’s intent to pursue each of these programs date back to at least 2010.

For example, under ‘Space Vision 2040’, SUPARCO had revealed that it would launch at least three remote sensing satellites (RSS) and, ultimately, supplant its older satellites with new systems. The original timeline for launching the follow-on RSS units was in 2012-2020. SUPARCO evidently had to delay its timelines, but it seems that the current PSDP allocations are working towards the original plan.

Currently, Pakistan has one RSS satellite in space, i.e., the PRSS-O1, which China launched from its Jiuquan Launch Site Center (JLSC) on 09 July 2018. The PRSS-O1 is equipped with an electro-optical (EO) payload.

In tandem to the PRSS-O1, SUPARCO also sent up an indigenously developed satellite – i.e., the Pakistan Technology Evaluation Satellite (PakTES-1A). Though SUPARCO terms the PakTES-1A as an RSS, it is unclear how it fitted the PakTES-1A. But in 2017 and 2018, Pakistan imported equipment from the Space Advisory Company (SAC) in South Africa; SAC is known for providing EO equipment for satellites.

Pakistan Space Centre (PSC)

In terms of the PSC, the Pakistani government announced its plans to launch the organization in 2018. The PSC’s main function will be to design, develop, and manufacture satellites. When Pakistan announced the formation of PSC, it also revealed two major satellite programs in the pipeline at the time:

• PRSS-O2 with the ability to capture images with a “sub-meter” resolution.
• Pakistan Navigation Satellite System for both “civilian and strategic” purposes.

The interesting aspect of PSC is that its study is not solely funded by Pakistan. Rather, the 2021-2022 PDSP report shows that 62% of the funding is coming from ‘foreign aid’. This latter funding element could be a mix of loans, grants and/or investment from China. If China is gaining a stake in PSC, then that would mean PSC is not a traditional Pakistani state-owned enterprise (SOE), but a jointly-owned enterprise.

Besides delivering funding support from China, structuring PSC in a way that is different from SUPARCO could allow for a more effective organization. Pakistan’s other SOEs suffer from numerous obstacles that prevent R&D growth and indigenous product development. Chief among these blockers to growth are the leadership and management cultures of these SOEs, which stem from the rigid, top-down control by the military. If China is a major stakeholder in PSC, then there is a chance PSC will fundamentally differ in how it operates compared to Pakistan’s other SOEs, especially those run by the military.

In theory, the PSC is supposed to serve an important role. Satellites have a relatively limited lifespan, and that will force Pakistan to regularly replace derelict units with new systems. With a diverse satellite types in play, Pakistan cannot afford to constantly import these systems. In fact, doing so could generate outlays of $200-300 million US per year if all of Pakistan’s intended satellite types come into play, e.g., navigation, EO-based imaging, SAR-based imaging, and satellite communications (SATCOM).