Pakistan’s security forces killed five militants in an intelligence-based operation (IBO) in Pishin district, Balochistan, on 22 February 2026. The Inter-Services Public Relations (ISPR) described the targets as Indian-sponsored operatives belonging to what the Pakistani state designates as ‘Fitna al Khwarij,‘ and stated that one was a suicide bomber.
The forces seized weapons, ammunition, and explosives during the operation. ISPR stated that the militants were involved in attacks across the region, with follow-on sanitisation operations ongoing under the Azm e Istehkam campaign.
Prime Minister Muhammad Shehbaz Sharif commended the security forces on 23 February, framing the operation as part of a broader national effort against militant groups. National Assembly Speaker Sardar Ayaz Sadiq offered similar remarks, citing the forces’ role in what he described as restoring peace to Balochistan, Dawn reported.
Sustained Tempo on the Western Frontier
The Pishin IBO is part of a broader operational surge across Pakistan’s western provinces. A separate IBO in Dera Ismail Khan, Khyber Pakhtunkhwa (KP), killed four militants on the same day.
Earlier in February, Operation Radd-ul-Fitna-1 had resulted in what ISPR reported as 216 militants killed, indicating a sustained and escalating tempo of operations across both Balochistan and KP.
This pattern is consistent with what Quwa has tracked for over a year. In January 2025, Quwa reported that the Pakistan Army had carried out at least 15 COIN/CT operations in the first weeks of that month alone, with Kacchi and Zhob districts being focal points in Balochistan and Kurram, Karak, and Khyber in KP.
The current operational rhythm suggests that this tempo has, if anything, intensified.
Unlike the COIN/CT campaigns of the early-to-mid 2010s – which focused primarily on the Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) in the Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) – the current operations see Pakistan contending with both the TTP and Baloch insurgent groups, such as the Balochistan Liberation Army (BLA), simultaneously across a wider geographical area.
The COIN Trajectory: From Tumultuous Beginnings to Institutional Capacity
Pakistan’s current COIN/CT posture is the product of roughly two decades of institutional development. As Quwa’s multi-part ‘Shift to COIN’ series documented, the Pakistani military entered the post-9/11 era without dedicated COIN training, doctrine, or equipment.
Early campaigns like Operation al-Mizan (2002–2006) exposed severe deficiencies – from the lack of body armour and night vision equipment to the absence of inter-service coordination between the Army and Air Force.
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