On March 28th, the Indian Ministry of Defence (MoD) signed a Rs 62,000 crore (about $7.3 billion USD) deal to procure 156 new Light Combat Helicopters (LCH) – or “Prachand” – attack helicopters from Hindustan Aeronautics Limited (HAL).
Under the contract, 90 Prachand attack helicopters will be allocated to the Indian Army (IA), while the Indian Air Force (IAF) will induct 66 units.
Subscribe to Quwa Premium for Timely South Asian Defence News
Click Here
On paper, the design and specifications of the LCH are directly comparable to any other attack helicopter of that size, including the Turkish Aerospace Industries T129 ATAK and the Aviation Industry Corporation of China (AVIC) Z-10ME.
However, the LCH’s optimization for high-altitude operations is noteworthy. Neither the IAF nor IA would have inducted the platform had it not been a credible solution for Kashmir, Ladakh, and other such environments. Both the IAF and IA are rigid in how they define and stick to their respective requirements. Had the LCH failed, the Indian MoD would not have signed off on such a major contract. Instead, the IA and IAF would have pushed HAL to improve the system.
This order will likely push the Pakistan Army (PA) to focus on three key areas: First, it will continue expanding and improving its air defence capabilities. Second, the PA will likely reprioritize the procurement of new attack helicopters to both supplant the AH-1F/S Cobra and, potentially, expand its own rotary attack fleet. Third, there may be a greater focus on the threat of IA integrated battleground (IBG), which will see a significant capability boost via a large attack helicopter fleet.
The first area – i.e., air defence investments – could see a growth in short-range air defence systems (SHORAD), particularly mobile systems like the FM-90. The LCH will pose a threat to the PA’s armour and infantry formations as well as artillery and rocket positions. The latter could drive further medium-range surface-to-air missile (SAM) procurement, potentially leveraging domestic programs like the LoMADS or FAAZ SL. Overall, air defence investment would constitute a responsive move, one aimed at mitigating the impact of the LCH.
The second area – i.e., prioritizing attack helicopter procurement – would match or emulate India’s procurement. However, the goal is not to match India unit-to-unit, nor to somehow leverage attack helicopters to directly counter the LCH. The point of new attack helicopters is to expand the PA’s own CAS coverages, particularly in high-altitude and high-temperature desert terrain. It requires a relatively large fleet to support both conventional operations and counterinsurgency (COIN) roles.
The PA had originally sought to acquire 15 Bell AH-1Z Viper and 30 TAI T129 ATAK attack helicopters from the U.S. and Turkiye, respectively. However, both programs fell through due to a chill in US-Pakistani defence ties. The Viper program collapsed due to America withdrawing the availability of aid as a means to fund the purchase, while the ATAK failed due to the U.S. withholding export licenses for its engine.
However, the original plan offered an idea of how the PA approached its own attack helicopter needs, which sought two systems that excelled in hot-and-high areas. In this sense, the Viper formed the ‘heavier’ capability, while the ATAK, which weighed around 5 tons, was a lighter weight complement. Textron officials told Quwa that the Viper was selected in great part thanks to its durability in sandy environments, i.e., a reference to the PA’s interest in using the AH-1Z in anti-armour operations.
The ATAK, on the other hand, was aggressively tested for high-altitude operations, endurance, and tolerance in high-temperature conditions. The high-altitude aspect indicates that the PA also wanted to use attack helicopters in areas like Kashmir as well as its porous border with Afghanistan. The heat tolerance aspect indicated the potential use of the ATAK in anti-armour operations in the east, perhaps to augment or support the Viper. Finally, endurance was tested to see how the ATAK managed in areas with limited infrastructure, which may necessitate long flights and storage in facilities without dedicated ground support equipment.
In response to the Viper and ATAK programs failing, the PA indicated that it would seek a Chinese alternative, the Z-10ME. However, it is unclear if Pakistan signed a contract (though numerous rumours claiming so did arise from 2020). But as of this point, the PA has not inducted any Z-10ME units, though this may change.
Quwa Plus
Finish the Story. Get the Full Picture.
Unlock independent journalism and deeper analysis that help you make sense of Pakistan’s key defence and policy developments without relying on shallow or foreign-framed coverage.
Join ($29.99/Year) Already a subscriber?Sign in
