Report: Pakistan’s Air Defence Systems

Prior to the 1970s, the PAF largely relied on ground-controlled interception (GCI). This is where it used surveillance radars (such as the British Type 21 and American FPS-20) to coordinate fighter aircraft to intercept air threats. While it also used anti-air guns (AAG), fighter interceptors were the PAF’s primary means of neutralizing intruding enemy aircraft.

However, the PAF was aware of the growing adoption of SAMs which, by the 1970s, pushed the PAF leadership to study a more robust air defence strategy. This led to the creation of Pakistan Air Defence Command in 1975 and, shortly thereafter in 1976, the launch of ‘Project Crystal’, an organized program for building an integrated GBADS.

Under Project Crystal, the PAF acquired 45 Mobile Pulse-Doppler Radars (MPDR) from the German company Siemens (since acquired/absorbed by Hensoldt), six control and reporting centers (CRC), and six AN/TPS-43 air surveillance radars from the United States. 

In tandem, the PAF paired its new radars with a number of SAM systems, namely the Thales Crotale series and, for a brief period of time, the Chinese HQ-2, which was based on the Russian SA-2.

While a significant step forward, the PAF’s air defence environment mostly centered on short-range air defence systems (SHORAD). It seemed that the PAF mostly used SAMs for defending facilities, like its air bases, not territorial defence. The latter would still be managed by fighter aircraft. 

During this period, both the PA and PN also began investing in SAMs. The PA had entirely focused on man-portable air defence systems (MANPADS), likely as a means to deal with low-flying aircraft, such as helicopters, targeting its infantry, armour, and artillery. In the 1980s and 1990s, the PA used a wide range of MANPADS, including the American FIM-92 Stinger, French Mistral, and Saab RBS-70.

Interestingly, the PN’s air defence program had taken off quite sharply in the 1980s when it leased four Brooke-class frigates from the United States. The Brooke-class frigate came equipped with the RIM-66 Standard-I SAM, a medium-range system capable of providing area-wide anti-air coverage. 

However, when the PN returned these frigates to the U.S., it was not able to replace the RIM-66 with a similar or comparable system. Instead, the PN acquired second-hand Type-21 frigates from the United Kingdom and, in turn, equipped half of them with the LY-60 short-range SAM from China. In effect, the PN’s anti-air warfare (AAW) capability regressed from area-wide coverage via the RIM-66 to basically point-defence. The PN finally managed to replace the RIM-66 via the LY-80-equipped Tughril-class or Type-054A/P multi-mission frigate it acquired from China from 2022. 

Pakistan’s limited air defence capabilities likely stemmed from two main factors. 

First, each service arm was focused on building its core offensive capabilities through major platforms, such as combat aircraft and submarines. The PAF, for example, wanted to replace early Cold War-era fighters, such as the Chengdu F-7 (i.e., Chinese-built MiG-21) and Dassault Mirage III/5 with multirole platforms loaded with contemporary technology. The centerpiece of this initiative was the JF-17, which likely took up the bulk of the PAF’s resources in the 1990s and 2000s. 

Second, Pakistan simply lacked options for effective medium-to-long-range SAMs. America and Russia were unwilling to provide solutions, and European items were generally too expensive. Thus, it is not at all surprising that Pakistan’s biggest investments in air defence coincided with China and Turkiye rising as adept solutions providers for radar and SAM technology.

In this backdrop, Pakistan had to use its limited resources where it understood it could get the greatest impact, hence the investment in major platforms, like multirole fighters, submarines, tanks, and artillery. There was likely a sense that operating modern platforms in large numbers (especially in the backdrop of nuclear weapons) would help deter India.