Analysis: Why is Pakistan Pursuing the TF-X Kaan Fighter? Plus

On 02 August, Turkish Deputy Defence Minister, Celal Sami Tüfekçi, revealed that discussions are underway on involving Pakistan in Turkey’s next-generation fighter aircraft (NGFA), the Turkish Aerospace Inc. (TAI or TUSAŞ) TF-X KAAN. Tüfekçi also shared that nearly 200 Pakistani engineers were already involved in KAAN.

If talks bear fruit, Pakistan could become the second foreign partner to join the KAAN program, following Azerbaijan, which officially committed itself to the fighter in July. For its part, the Pakistan Air Force (PAF) had shown interest in the TAI TF-X several times; in 2019, then Chairman of Pakistan Aeronautical Complex (PAC), Air Marshal Ahmer Shahzad, reportedly said: “Turkey’s T-FX is in line with what the PAF want.”

However, joining the KAAN at this point would mark a pivot to the PAF’s previous plans of pursuing a NGFA on its own via an in-house original project – i.e., Project AZM. The apparent collapse of Project AZM is not surprising as Pakistan lacks meaningful experience designing aircraft and a sufficient industrial base for the core inputs, such as aerostructures, turbofan engines, and electronics, among others. Moreover, Pakistan also lacks the fiscal capacity to drive an original NGFA program, at least alone.

Thus, the question of what Pakistan can substantively contribute towards the KAAN emerges, and rightfully so seeing the country’s dearth of fiscal and industrial resources. What does Turkey have to gain from letting Pakistan join the KAAN? Would Pakistan be an asset – or a liability?

In this two-part analysis, Quwa will examine why Pakistan could pursue the TF-X KAAN. In part-one, Quwa will discuss the potential production and R&D gains for Pakistan. In part-two, Quwa will focus on the idea of building conventional deterrence through the KAAN.