Recently, the Ukrainian military retook Lyman, a major city in the Donetsk region, which Moscow annexed only days prior to Kyiv’s counteroffensive.
Until this point, a combination of precision strikes from land, well-trained infantry, and an effective use of drones and cruise missiles all contributed to Ukraine’s success. However, there is no doubt that the clear deprecation of Russia’s airpower has also been critical.
Although narratives like the “Ghost of Kyiv” fill headlines and drive conversations, Ukraine’s ground-based air defence systems (GBADS) were critical to restraining Russia’s air power. Reports peg some of Russia’s recent losses (i.e., including a Su-30SM and Su-34) to man-portable air-defense systems (MANPADS).
These losses seemed to have occurred due to several factors. Firstly, Ukraine’s medium-to-long-range air defence systems forced Russia’s combat aircraft to fly lower than they should. Secondly, Ukraine used its MANPADS to target the low-flying Russian aircraft.
This outcome suggests that a multi-layered GBADS can erode enemy airpower, if not create an anti-access and area-denial (A2/AD) situation. For its part, Ukraine is deftly deploying its GBADS assets, even though its largely reliant on older surface-to-air missiles (SAM) like older S-300 and Buk variants.
President Volodymyr Zelensky’s has been vocal about his country’s need for modern fighter aircraft. But through its skillful air defence deployments, Ukraine is, once again, imparting valuable insights for other countries to follow for their requirements in the coming years.
The Wartime Evolution of Ukraine’s Air Defence Environment
At the start of the war, the bulk of Ukraine’s GBADS assets comprised of legacy systems, particularly older variants of the S-300 long-range SAM, the Buk-M medium-range SAM, and the Igla short-range/MANPAD systems, among others. Mostly inherited from the era of the Soviet Union, these SAMs formed the bulk or mainstay of Ukraine’s air defence assets prior to war, and for much of the conflict up to this point.
Despite their use of older technologies – e.g., semi-active radar-homing (SARH)-based guidance – these SAMs have been relatively effective for Ukraine. In fact, in earlier stages of the war, Russia claimed that it had destroyed many of Ukraine’s SAM systems. However, despite those losses, Ukraine has been able to sustain A2/AD pressure on Russia’s air assets, especially at higher altitudes.
The effectiveness of Ukraine’s S-300s and Buk-Ms had forced Russia to fly its combat aircraft (including its marque assets like the Su-34) at lower altitudes. In turn, these aircraft were vulnerable to MANPADS. This is a significant achievement for Ukraine and, evidently, shows as it recaptures territory.
However, one cannot reduce Ukraine’s gains solely to its SAMs. In reality, other factors played a role too.
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