Analysis: India’s Withdrawal from the FGFA Program Plus

On 20 April 2018, IHS Jane’s reported that the Indian Air Force (IAF) had formally ended its involvement in the Fifth Generation Fighter Aircraft (FGFA) it had started with Russia in 2007.[1] Official confirmation has yet to come from New Delhi, but reports of the IAF’s discontent with several key aspects of the Sukhoi T-50/Su-57 PAK-FA – i.e. the platform from which the FGFA was to be derived – had trickled through the past year. The IAF’s concerns include dissatisfaction over the PAK-FA’s radar cross-section (RCS)-reduction work (i.e. stealth) and the quality of its onboard electronics, most notably the radar.[2]

This is a significant event in that it alters the long-term value of bilateral Indian-Russian defence relations. Granted, there are still numerous big-ticket programs poised to reach fruition, not least a joint-production program involving the Kamov Ka-226T and continued cooperation on T-90-series main battle tanks (MBT). The continuation of the IAF’s Su-30MKI program – i.e. ongoing support and potentially upgrades – is also a potential area of interest between Moscow and New Delhi.

However, fighter aircraft are arguably the biggest-ticket items in that they not only have to be bought in sizable numbers, but will amount to several hundred million dollars – each – in acquisition and long-term support costs. By closing the door on the FGFA the IAF has effectively closed the door on Russia securing a new wave of fighter orders – and in turn, a leading revenue-generator for Moscow – in India.

India’s Problems with the FGFA

India signed onto the FGFA in 2007. Pegged as the “largest joint project” in the history of Russia and India’s defence relations, the FGFA’s development alone was to reach a cost of $8 to $10 billion US. In 2010, both India and Russia signed a $295 m preliminary design contract. This was joined in 2013 with a contract to  formally develop the FGFA as a variant of the PAK-FA – i.e. tailor the PAK-FA to the requirements of the IAF.[3] It was thought that the IAF would gradually supplant its Su-30MKIs with the FGFA, benefitting from both a deep level of transfer-of-technology (ToT) and economies-of-scale through leveraging the fighter requirements of both countries. In totality, the FGFA would have arguably dwarfed all prior Indo-Russian defence programs in its scale and cumulative economic value.

However, the IAF had repeatedly voiced concerns over what it perceived as deficiencies in the PAK-FA’s core design (which would have impacted the FGFA). These issues revolved around insufficient work done to reducing the PAK-FA’s RCS, a less-than-adequate onboard electronics suite and a call for new turbofan engines. Overall, the IAF reportedly required as many as 50 specific changes to the PAK-FA to align it with its expectations for the FGFA. These requirements included 360-degree radar coverage, engines capable of providing supercruising (i.e. fly at supersonic speed without afterburning the engines) and reducing the airframe’s RCS (especially of the side and rear of the airframe).[4]

However, the IAF was evidently weary of the progress United Aircraft Corporation’s (UAC) Sukhoi bureau was claiming with the project. Instead, a combination of less-than-adequate subsystems (being tested) along with Moscow’s tentativeness over its own procurement commitments (currently committing to 12 early production models) apparently tested the IAF enough to have it pivot away from the FGFA.[5]

Besides the technical issues, New Delhi was also doubting whether it would acquire sufficient ToT to fully produce and support the FGFA independently. Russia would not fully commit.[6] New Delhi basically wanted to avoid a repeat of the Su-30MKI; HAL assembled the aircraft, but remained unable to manufacture its spare parts or undertake maintenance, repair and overhaul (MRO) without Russian inputs.[7] Besides failing to propel the Indian aviation industry (as originally hoped), it also compromised the IAF by keeping its Su-30MKI fleet’s serviceability rate to around 50% in 2014.[8]

India’s Goals: Parity, Development & Economic Gain

By reading into India’s apparent criticisms of the PAK-FA, one can also identify its long-term objectives: First, to maintain technological parity with major powers – not least China, but as a general principle vis-à-vis the U.S. and Europe. Second, to develop its domestic aviation industry in all spaces – i.e. being at the center of major development and manufacturing aerostructures, electronics and engines. Third, to accrue significant long-term economic gain by flipping its domestic arms procurement into technology exports.

The first element – i.e. technology – is self-evident in the IAF’s requirements. Having secured the Dassault Rafale and poised to either add more – or another comparable fighter such as the Boeing F/A-18E/F Super Hornet – the IAF should understand the necessary leap between an existing ‘4.5’-generation jet and a genuine ‘5^th’-generation design. The PAK-FA reflected the former (i.e. ‘4.5’ generation) instead of pushing to the latter (i.e. ‘5^th’-generation) – i.e. offer significant RCS reduction, use new technology advancements (e.g. innovate on composite materials, gallium nitride-based transceivers, artificial intelligence, etc) and create new synergies (e.g. interoperability between manned and unmanned aircraft).

Granted, one might argue that the PAK-FA is sufficient to handle China’s existing crop of next-generation fighters – i.e. J-20 and FC-31. However, unlike Russia, China has a deeper research and development (R&D) effort – along with the requisite fiscal strength and scale to sustain it – to advance its fighter development work. India will face a continually rising threat element from China, one that could see China emulate the leading technology trends it can observe in the US and Western Europe. It would be folly to assume that China will simply stop its efforts at the J-20 and FC-31; rather, one should expect new fighters, eventually.