The One Fighter the Pakistan’s Air Force Needs More Than Stealth Plus Pro

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Now, the PAF must factor in the maintenance of this skin in terms of climate control, durability, facility management, and other factors. It will need to properly scope out the platform’s complexity and plan around it so as to induct and operationalize the fighter. While true for all fighters, a LO NGFA adds a layer of complexity because of its stealth attributes (which becomes both an inherent strength and a drawback).

Even if one concedes that the PAF is convinced of eventually inducting the J-35AE, the intermediary work of preparing for the platform – which will require testing the fighter in Pakistan for an extended period of time (akin to the Pakistan Army Z-10 tests) – has not yet taken place.

Second, the J-35A will likely have teething issues once it enters operational service with the People’s Liberation Army Air Force (PLAAF). In other words, the operational maturity is not there and technical issues could require iterative block-based improvements (analogous to the F-35 experience).

Next, the PAF will continue retiring large numbers of legacy fighter aircraft, from the Chengdu F-7PG to the Retrofit of Strike Element (ROSE) Mirage III/5s. Through the 2030s, conversations may also steer to replacing the oldest F-16A/B Block-15 and JF-17 Block-1 aircraft as well, with the former likely reaching the end of its OEM-specified lifespan of 8,000 hours and the latter reaching the end of its original 3,000 hour lifespan. Of course, from the 2030s, LO NGFAs like the J-35AE could become a factor and would likely be the go-to platform for replacing the older multirole fighters.

However, the PAF must also balance the high-cost nature of the J-35AE with its quantitative needs – i.e., a larger number of more affordable fighters will be sought. For the PAF, it’s not solely about maintaining a specific fleet size, but the reality that these previous generation fighters would be needed to feed into LO NGFA-centric operations.

The Necessity of a Medium-Weight Workhorse Fighter

In this context, the basic idea is that the LO NGFA could be tasked to penetrate and deprecate India’s integrated air defence system (IADS) system, while the medium-weight fighter fleet would deliver the bulk of ordnance mass to inflict damage on the targets the IADS layers were originally protecting.

The latter, it is not just a question of numbers, but sufficient combat radius and payload capacity as well, which removes the option of relying heavily on the JF-17. The JF-17 provides a payload capacity of 3,583 kg, which is functional for the strike role – i.e., the PAF could load it out with at least two 500 kg gliding PGBs, for example.

However, a caveat is the JF-17’s combat radius, which has not been disclosed. That said, the JF-17’s maximum take-off weight (MTOW) is known, and it is 12,383 kg. Therefore, the JF-17 is a lightweight fighter and, like its contemporaries in the Gripen C/D and Tejas, will, at best, have a combat radius in the range of 500-800 km (i.e., the maximum distance the fighter can fly to and return from). Thus, even in the strike role (which the JF-17 could be used for) the reach, at most, would extend to India’s northwest theaters. Hence, the PAF will not be able to reach India’s more eastern areas, which could become key launching points for long-range munitions/threats, for example.

In contrast, the J-10CE has a combat radius of 1,240 km – and that too minus air-to-air refueling (AAR). Thus, one can see that there is a tangible range difference between the lightweight and medium-weight fighter classes, indicating that the PAF’s investment in the latter does not necessarily conflict with the JF-17.

A previous Quwa analysis explored how pairing the JF-17 with the Range Extension Kit (REK) or AZB-series of precision-guided bombs (PGB) can lower ‘cost-per-attack’ (CPA) metrics compared to guided artillery strikes, but one must stress the inherent range and reach limitations of the JF-17 and REK/AZB-series as well.