The Impact of Pakistan’s Harba dual-AShM and LACM Plus

Introduction

On January 03, the Pakistan Navy announced that it test-fired a new anti-ship cruise missile (ASCM) with land-attack capabilities, the “Harba.” The dual-ASCM/land-attack cruise missile (LACM) was fired from an Azmat-class fast attack craft (FAC), the PNS Himmat. Seemingly based on the Babur-series of LACM, the Harba ASCM is a sub-sonic, sea-skimming ASCM with an inertial navigation system (INS)-based mid-course guidance suite and active-homing terminal stage seeker. Pakistan did not disclose the specific seeker type it is using or the Harba’s range, though the land-attack mission could indicate a long-range mission that is commensurate with the Babur Version 2 ground-launch cruise missile (GLCM) or Babur 3 submarine launch cruise missile (SLCM). However, the Harba ASCM does provide Pakistan with its own anti-ship warfare (AShW) munition and another strategic deployment option, joining the Babur 3 SLCM.

By deploying the Harba ASCM from aboard an Azmat FAC, a 500-ton surface combatant inherently lacking in a long-range surface surveillance and tracking radar to independently use the Harba ASCM to its fullest range, the Pakistan Navy has demonstrated that it has formed a network-enabled warfare environment – i.e. a system that connects the Azmat FAC to off-board sensors to provide situational awareness, targeting and mid-course guidance for the Harba ASCM fired from the Azmat FAC. Secondly, testing the Harba ASCM from the Azmat FAC shows that Pakistan has the ability and willingness to deploy potent long-range land-attack capabilities from low-cost – and potentially scalable in the future – launch platforms. The Harba is the first piece of Pakistan’s effort to improve its anti-access and area-denial (A2/AD) capabilities to guard its littoral waters, exclusive economic zone (EEZ) and sea-lines-of-communications (SLOC).

The Harba dual-ASCM and LACM

The Harba ASCM joins the Babur and Babur Version 2 GLCM, Babur 3 SLCM and Ra’ad/Ra’ad II air-launched cruise missile (ALCM) as among Pakistan’s stand-off range munitions. The Babur and Ra’ad-series, while capable of deploying conventional (e.g. high-explosive, blast fragmentation and/or penetrator) warheads, they are considered strategic weapons by the Army, Navy and Air Force. In other words, they are a means to deploy miniaturized nuclear warheads using a wide variety of platforms, including small platforms such as combat aircraft and submarines in the case of the Ra’ad/Ra’ad II and Babur 3, respectively.

Pakistan did not specify if the Harba ASCM will have a strategic role (though it is plausible if it is based on the Babur-series). There had been anticipation of a new ship-based ASCM following Pakistan’s Ministry of Defence Production’s (MoDP) disclosure of a ship-based launcher for an ASCM and LACM in its 2014-2015 yearbook. This launcher was due for completion by October 2018. Later, the design for the PNS Himmat and the fourth Azmat FAC, which is currently under-construction at Karachi Shipyard & Engineering Works (KSEW), had showed a 2×3 aft-positioned missile launch system instead of the 2×4 system for the shorter-range C-802A found on the preceding two Azmat FAC (i.e. PNS Azmat and PNS Dehshat) and the F-22P. In March 2017, Pakistan test-fired a long-range anti-ship missile from the shore that the Inter Services Public Relations (ISPR) said featured “advanced technology and avionics [for] … engagement of targets at sea.”

It should be noted that in April 2016, the Pakistan Navy had tested another shore-based ASCM designated “Zarb.” Observers believe that the Zarb was in fact the Chinese C-602, which would provide a heavier (i.e. 300 kg) warhead and longer range than the C-802A. In the absence of official confirmation from Pakistan, one could reasonably speculate that the Harba and Zarb are connected (i.e. C-602-derived). However, the Harba’s land-attack capability could also be taken as an indicator for a link to the Babur, especially as the Babur’s longer-range envelope would position the Harba as a credible land-attack threat. In this respect, the Harba could be derived from either the Babur Version 2 GLCM or the Babur 3 SLCM, which offer 700 km and 450 km in range, respectively. In either case, it is a large range improvement over the C-802A.

However, it is difficult to determine which of the two platforms could have been selected for the Harba. Theoretically, the Babur 3 could make sense from a standardization standpoint as it would mean the Navy need only maintain a single missile platform for its surface and sub-surface requirements. However, it is unclear how much standardization matters. For example, it is possible that the miniature propulsion (e.g. mini-turbojet or turbofan), flight control systems and mid-course INS guidance are the same between the Babur 3 and Babur Version 2, but that the difference stems from reduced airframe size (for fitting into submarine torpedo tubes, which could mean less room for fuel and, in turn, less range). Furthermore, the Babur 3 necessitates encapsulation for it to undertake underwater launch. If the encapsulation and/or de-encapsulation process cannot be done outside of the missile’s production facility, then the benefit of standardization between the surface and sub-surface missiles is limited. Why select the Babur 3 for the Harba and its lesser range if the Babur V.2 with 700 km can be had (and fit in the PNS Himmat’s launcher)?

Besides range, the second question is the utility of a sub-sonic ASCM in an age where supersonic-cruising ASCM – such as the CM-302 – are available. Through a sustained cruising speed of Mach 2 to Mach 3, a supersonic cruising ASCM substantially reduces the reaction time available to air defences to counter it, and even if it can counter it at close range (e.g. closer than 5 km), there is a risk that debris – driven by supersonic momentum – could itself be a tangible threat to the target’s electronics, such as radar and an electronics support measures (ESM) system. Genuine defensibility requires an air defence system that can provide long-range target detection and tracking (of a very fast-moving target) along with a surface-to-air missile (SAM) system that can travel at an equivalent or higher speed. The MBDA Aster 30 is a potentially suitable system as it has a range of over 100 km and speed of Mach 4.5 (the Aster 15, while shorter-ranged at 30 km can reach Mach 3.5).[1] The U.S. also has its own analogous solution – the Standard Missile 6.

In the case of the Pakistan Navy, the only substantive air defence system to come is the one accompanying the Type 054A frigate. Pakistan reportedly has one Type 054A on order with plans for an additional two ships in the same configuration as the Type 054As of the People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN). Official details regarding the HHQ-16/LY-80N on board with PLAN Type 054A are not readily available, though Army Recognition claims the LY-80N has a speed of Mach 3.[2]  For Pakistan, this may be the start of a credible shield against the BrahMos, though the HHQ-9, which reportedly can intercept a supersonic missile at up to 50 km (and aircraft at 125 km)[3], providing a longer range buffer compared to the LY-80N. However, based on the information available, this is not a factor in the foreseeable future, hence Pakistan does not appear to have a defensibility plan for the BrahMos. Thus, the focus would have to be on analogous capability using an off-the-shelf design, such as China’s CM-302 or CX-1.

That said, it would be erroneous to suggest that subsonic ASCM do not have a role. Rather, development of these designs is continuing, even in the West, but with an increasing emphasis on reducing the missile airframe’s radar cross-section (RCS), i.e. its detectability on radar, and infrared (IR) signature. In contrast to supersonic ASCM, which aims to reduce defensive reaction time through speed, a ‘stealthy’ sub-sonic ASCM aims to reduce defensive reaction by slipping through radar coverage nets. This would occur by not only trying to fly through a radar’s coverage gap – i.e. “radar shadow” caused by the curvature of the earth – but also through a small RCS airframe, ideally pushing the detectability threshold such that it would be too late to intercept by the time it is detected. Specific technical data is not available, but in general, sub-sonic ASCM could theoretically have the advantage of maintaining a longer sea-skimming flight profile. At low-altitude, there is greater air density, which for a supersonic ASCM could result in range and/or speed penalties if it flies at low-altitude for too long. The BrahMos, operates variably by initially cruising at higher altitude, and then dropping to sea-skimming at its terminal stage. In this respect, a capable air defence system could be alerted of the BrahMos’ entry earlier than a subsonic ASCM as the former is at a higher altitude, but the BrahMos’ markedly higher speed also makes it more difficult to track it as a target.

However, the above advantages of a subsonic ASCM are general descriptions. It should be noted that the navies of the West also define weapon systems for addressing threats from less-equipped countries. In the case of subsonic ASCM, the assumption in the U.S. and Western Europe may be that prospective foes will not have sufficiently capable radar sensor suites to detect stealthy subsonic ASCMs. Outside of NATO, there are few countries with AEW&C and over-the-horizon (OTH) radars for illuminating the gaps left by surface radars or possessing advanced point-defence missile systems (PDMS) with electro-optical (EO) trackers and high operating frequency targeting radars for tracking missiles. While Pakistan is progressing in terms of building its defensibility to subsonic ASCM threats, as is India, which is a concern for Pakistan and the long-term utility of the Harba ASCM. In tandem with continued subsonic ASCM development (e.g. continued RCS reduction and range increases), a supersonic ASCM ought to be sought, its absence is now an issue of parity wherein Pakistan neither has a defensibility program for supersonic ASCM while it also lacks an analogous capability. It would make sense to at least secure the latter as a deterrence.