On a show on Pakistan’s state-owned television network, PTV, two retired Pakistan Navy (PN) officials – Vice Admiral Ahmed Saeed and Rear Admiral Saleem Akhtar – discussed the PN’s ongoing acquisition of Hangor-class (S26) submarines from China.
Adm. Saeed highlighted that the Hangor air-independent propulsion (AIP)-equipped submarines (SSP) will be a “hybrid” piece in Pakistan’s wider deterrence posture. Basically, it will be a compromise between a purely conventional attack submarine and nuclear-powered boat, such as a nuclear-powered submarine (SSN) or a nuclear-powered ballistic missile submarine (SSBN).
In this context, the Hangor SSP will provide Pakistan a second-strike capability, but in Adm. Saeed’s view, it would still fall short of delivering an “assured” second-strike capability. However, Adm. Saeed stressed that the PN should gradually build an assured second-strike capability, ideally through an SSN or SSBN, if possible.
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From a technical standpoint, a nuclear submarine would have three overarching elements: First, a miniature nuclear reactor and its cooling, power management, and other submarine-focused inputs. Second, expertise in building a submarine with the requisite design know-how of a SSBN, i.e., a hull that can support a reactor and the dedicated nuclear payload. Third, the availability of SLCMs and SLBMs.
Pakistan can develop the weapons stack – i.e., SLCMs and SLBMs – domestically. It already has nuclear-capable cruise missiles, but its ballistic missile technology is also evolving. The Fatah-2, for example, is likely an example of Pakistan’s next-generation rocker technology, which may be leveraged for larger ballistic missile programs. Hence, a SLBM program is plausible. Alternatively, Pakistan could skip SLBMs and, instead, pursue a nuclear-powered boat equipped with SLCMs (i.e., a SSGN or nuclear cruise missile submarine).
The submarine design, development, and production capability may develop as the PN aims to become a “submarine-building navy.” Thus, Naval Headquarters (NHQ) likely has a goal to design and produce an original submarine, potentially in collaboration with the contractor that wins the shallow-water attack submarine (SWATS) program. This new submarine program would involve building a boat from the ground up in Pakistan. Though Pakistan would still rely on foreign suppliers for key inputs, such as steel, the program would help it build experience sourcing and integrating those resources. It could build upon and then leverage that knowledge for a larger nuclear submarine program.
The development of a miniature nuclear reactor is the key variable as it would require the greatest exertion of indigenous capabilities. In fact, one can argue that the reactor is the most ambitious extension of the nuclear program since the Khushab-series reactors. Interestingly, the PN may already have a basic idea of a miniature reactor through the MESMA AIP system powering the Agosta 90B. This design is mostly the same as France’s nuclear propulsion stack, but it is powered by the combustion of ethanol and oxygen. It is possible that NHQ had looked at the MESMA AIP as a basis for nuclear propulsion.
Ultimately, however, the decision of developing a nuclear submarine would not be left to the PN alone, but to the wider security leadership responsible for Pakistan’s strategic deterrence efforts. They may find the avenue to be too costly and risky. Therefore, the prospect of the PN acquiring a nuclear-powered boat is unlikely.
Pakistan May Build Upon ‘Hybrid’ Solutions
The PN will likely acquire a dedicated nuclear attack platform, but the high cost, complexity, and industrial needs of a nuclear-powered boat may force the PN to pursue a more elaborate “hybrid” model.
In this sense, the PN could pursue a larger conventionally-powered SSP with a dedicated capacity for strategic LACMs and SLBMs via a vertical launch system (VLS). Like the PN’s existing boats, the larger SSP would use a conventional AIP source, either Stirling or, possibly, fuel-cells (which require fewer moving parts and, in turn, help keep the submarine’s acoustic signatures low). The PN could also look at using lithium ion batteries to power electric motors for high speed mobility.
Therefore, the PN may not need a nuclear-powered boat to achieve a dedicated nuclear attack capability. It may be able to acquire this via a conventional design that has the requisite space for strategic weapons as well as inputs for long-endurance and high-speed engagements. In fact, this approach may also be less prone to life-cycle maintenance or hazard issues in a first-generation SSN/SSBN, hence lower risk.
The PN may also find it easier to acquire the necessary inputs to put this submarine together, such as the steel, electronics, AIP stack, the motors, and other subsystems. In fact, the PN could simply pursue a joint project in collaboration with either China or Turkiye (especially as the latter is developing a large conventional submarine).
If the PN wishes to acquire a dedicated submarine for the nuclear – or simply conventional – attack role, then Quwa is confident that NHQ will pursue it through a large conventional design. Therefore, the PN would likely build upon the ‘hybrid’ model for its strategic needs provided that the platform can support a dedicated SLCM and/or SLBM payload. In fact, the idea of using an SLBM from a conventionally-powered boat is not novel; South Korea has already achieved this capability.
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