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After a Decade of Growth, the Real Test for Pakistan’s Navy Has Just Begun Quwa Premium
Exactly a decade ago, in an article titled, “Is it finally the Pakistan Navy’s turn?,” we argued that a substantive modernization phase for Pakistan’s naval forces was not just overdue, but strategically essential.
The growing importance of Pakistan’s maritime interests, coupled with the widening disparity with the Indian Navy (IN), demanded a rapid response. History is a harsh teacher; a weak navy was a critical vulnerability India exploited in 1971, with crippling effects on both of Pakistan’s Eastern and Western wings, resulting in the loss of the former.
That 2015 article, as it turned out, foreshadowed the most ambitious growth phase in the Pakistan Navy’s (PN) history. Key possibilities we outlined materialized with remarkable fidelity: the acquisition of new multi-role corvettes (the Babur-class), the indigenous design of a new frigate displacing around 3,500 tons (the Jinnah-class), and the induction of modern maritime patrol aircraft to replace aging platforms. We correctly identified the potential for new systems like the CAMM-ER surface-to-air missile (SAM) and the deployment of a sea-launched cruise missile via the Babur platform (now the Harbah-NG).
The following is an excerpt from the 2015 article:
The frigate [Quwa had recommended using a Chinese concept originally, but the PN chose the MILGEM] was designed to have a displacement of 3500 tons and can be equipped 8 AShM, two triple-cell ASW torpedo tubes, a point defence missile system (PDMS) to intercept incoming missiles and as many as 32 VLS cells.
These VLS cells could be used by a medium-range SAM such as the Chinese HHQ-16, the PLAN’s mainstay medium-range SAM system. Alternatively, the Navy could also look at the French MBDA Aster-15, British-Italian MBDA Common Anti-Air Modular Missile (CAMM) [the CAMM-ER would go on to fit the Babur-class frigate, Jinnah-class frigate, and potentially Zulfiquar-class frigate via a mid-life-update).
In comparison to the Pakistan Navy’s current surface fleet, the inclusion of six such frigates would be a major force-multiplier. Not only would they be more than suitable replacements for the Type-21 and FFG-7 frigates, but they would greatly improve the Navy’s combat capabilities across numerous areas, not only AAW. While this depends on the size of the VLS cells, but the PN could theoretically use a new frigate program as a means to deploy a specially-modified Babur LACM [this would eventually become the HarbahNG], fully extending Pakistan’s strategic strike capabilities to the maritime theatre, both underwater (via submarines) and on the surface.
As I had noted earlier, the reported $4-5bn figure covering the China-Pakistan submarine deal may have merit, but if taken in the context of possibly including frigates. Four to six truly modern and fully capable multi-mission frigates [later confirmed to be four Type054A/P frigates] … can fit within the reported figure.
Today, the fruits of that period are evident. The PN is on a clear trajectory to operate at least 20 major surface combatants, one of the region’s most formidable submarine fleets, and a new, indigenous long-range maritime patrol aircraft (LRMPA), the ‘Sea Sultan,’ to supplant its P-3C Orions.
This initial phase answered the question, “Is it the Pakistan Navy’s turn?” with a clear “yes.” The next decade, however, poses a far more complex and critical question: “Can the Pakistan Navy keep its turn?”
The challenge is no longer about securing funding for new ships; it is about converting this hard-won fleet growth into durable, sustainable advantages in deterrence, operational availability, and cost control.
Simply adding hulls to the order of battle is not enough. The next phase of modernization must be one of consolidation, driven by doctrinal discipline, industrial smart-sourcing, and a ruthless focus on what truly matters in a high-stakes conflict. The path forward is not about building a bigger navy, but a sharper, more resilient, and – crucially – more affordable one.
The Need for Doctrine Discipline
The single most important principle that must guide the PN’s future is a strict adherence to its warfighting doctrine. For Pakistan, naval warfare is not about power projection; it is about sea denial and securing its maritime lifelines against a larger adversary. In this framework, submarines remain the decisive arm. The eight Hangor-class air independent propulsion (AIP) submarines will be the PN’s most important assets, meant to attrite enemy surface fleets and impose a prohibitive cost on any naval intrusion.
Everything else in the PN’s fleet must be optimized to support this central reality; for example, surface combatants must not be viewed as the main or leading warfighting assets. Rather, they are enablers with three primary roles: establishing presence in peacetime, plugging gaps in wartime, and actively enabling the decisive arms – the submarine force and land-based anti-access/area-denial (A2/AD) assets.
The Jinnah-class frigate is the perfect embodiment of doctrinal discipline. Some observers may note its modest size (~3,500 tons) and a seemingly average vertical launch system (VLS) loadout and question its ambition – this perspective misses the point.
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