Pakistan Navy News

After a Decade of Growth, the Real Test for Pakistan’s Navy Has Just Begun Plus Pro

After a decade of growth, Pakistan's Navy faces its real test: sustainability. The next phase is not about building a bigger fleet, but a sharper, more lethal one.

Photo of a Pakistan Navy MILGEM or Babur-class corvette.

Exactly a decade ago, in an article titled, “Is it finally the Pakistan Navy’s turn?,” we argued that a substantive modernization phase for Pakistan’s naval forces was not just overdue, but strategically essential.

The growing importance of Pakistan’s maritime interests, coupled with the widening disparity with the Indian Navy (IN), demanded a rapid response. History is a harsh teacher; a weak navy was a critical vulnerability India exploited in 1971, with crippling effects on both of Pakistan’s Eastern and Western wings, resulting in the loss of the former.

That 2015 article, as it turned out, foreshadowed the most ambitious growth phase in the Pakistan Navy’s (PN) history. Key possibilities we outlined materialized with remarkable fidelity: the acquisition of new multi-role corvettes (the Babur-class), the indigenous design of a new frigate displacing around 3,500 tons (the Jinnah-class), and the induction of modern maritime patrol aircraft to replace aging platforms. We correctly identified the potential for new systems like the CAMM-ER surface-to-air missile (SAM) and the deployment of a sea-launched cruise missile via the Babur platform (now the Harbah-NG).

The following is an excerpt from the 2015 article:

The frigate [Quwa had recommended using a Chinese concept originally, but the PN chose the MILGEM] was Instead of duplicating effort, the PN can establish a single maintenance, repair, and overhaul (MRO) center. This allows for the concentration of resources, the development of deep local expertise, and the procurement of a single set of specialized tools and testing equipment. Technicians become masters of one system, thereby leading to faster diagnostics and higher-quality repairs.

  • Economies of Scale in Procurement: Standardizing on a specific engine family transforms the PN from a small-batch buyer into a major customer. When procuring for a class of six or eight frigates plus through-life spares, the PN can negotiate from a stronger position. This leverage allows for not only better pricing but also the pre-purchase of critical long-lead items (like complete turbine units or gearboxes) in bulk, insulating the fleet from future production bottlenecks and price shocks.
  • Genuine Transfer of Technology (ToT): Scale is the key that unlocks meaningful industrial cooperation. An order for two dozen engines and their components gives the PN the leverage to demand ToT for local parts manufacturing and rebuild facilities. This could start with high-wear components like turbine blades, bearings, and injectors, and eventually progress to establishing a domestic facility for complete engine overhauls. This capability is a game-changer; it dramatically reduces the turnaround time for major engine work (from months of shipping to weeks in-country) and directly translates into higher ship availability).
  • 2. VLS and SAMs

    The principle of commonality is even more critical when applied to a warship’s offensive and defensive systems. The selection of the MBDA CAMM-ER for both the Babur-class and the upcoming Jinnah-class is a strong first step towards creating a standardized air defence ecosystem. However, to fully exploit this, the philosophy must extend to the launch system itself.

    The PN’s current trajectory will see it operate at least two different Vertical Launch Systems (VLS): the Chinese-made system on the Tughril-class (housing the HHQ-16 SAM), the GWS platform for the Babur-class and Jinnah-class ships, and apparently some other type for the Yarmouk-class OPVs. If the Zulfiquar-class is upgraded with the CAMM-ER, it would use either the GWS or the VLS used onboard the Yarmouk-class.

    This creates a critical operational seam. These VLS systems are not interchangeable, thus necessitating separate loading procedures, distinct maintenance protocols, and – most critically – a fractured and inflexible munitions supply chain.

    By consolidating around a single, common VLS family and SAM type for all future builds and mid-life upgrades (including a potential refit for the Zulfiqar-class), the PN would achieve a profound strategic advantage:

    • A Unified, Flexible Arsenal: A common system means common logistics. A single supply ship could re-arm any combatant in the fleet, from a corvette to a frigate. This allows a fleet commander to dynamically manage their most precious resource – missiles. Munitions can be consolidated and redistributed at sea, shifting air defence capacity to the ships heading into the highest threat axis, creating a more resilient and adaptable force.
    • Simplified Training and Expertise: The training burden on armourers and weapons technicians is halved. Expertise is deepened on a single system, reducing the probability of human error in high-stress loading and maintenance scenarios.
    • Future-Proofing the Fleet: Standardizing on a modern, modular VLS architecture is an investment in the future. It creates a “plug-and-play” capability. If, in 15 years, a next-generation long-range SAM or a new surface-attack missile is developed that is compatible with this VLS, integrating it becomes a relatively straightforward software and systems integration challenge, rather than a complex, hull-cutting industrial refit. This adaptability is essential for keeping the surface fleet relevant without resorting to costly, platform-by-platform modernization programs.
    • From Buyer to Partner: Beyond these operational gains, standardization alters the PN’s market position. Committing to a single VLS solution for a program encompassing up to a dozen warships transforms the PN from a small-batch buyer into a partner. This scale creates leverage to negotiate for the phased localization of VLS manufacturing through the long-term.

    Logistics as Strategy

    The doctrinal decision to equip the PN’s primary future combatants with a CODAG propulsion system is a choice for tactical responsiveness, but this speed comes at a steep, non-negotiable price: fuel consumption.

    Gas turbines, like the General Electric LM2500, are phenomenally powerful, allowing a 3,500-ton frigate to sprint at speeds exceeding 30 knots. But they can require more frequent refuelling cycles. Basically, a frigate operating on its gas turbine can consume fuel at a rate three to five times higher than when cruising efficiently on its diesel engines.

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