An Engineer’s Breakdown of China’s Most Terrifying New Military Tech

China’s 2025 Victory Day parade was more than pageantry – it was an overt statement of deterrence built around new classes of missiles, air-defence systems, and autonomous platforms. In this Defence Uncut episode, the Quwa team parse what matters for Pakistan and where procurement logic may shift in the coming years.

The New SAM Paradigm: HHQ-9C

The conversation opened with the HHQ-9C, a system that, even from visuals alone, signalled a generational change. The panelists observed that the missile appears slimmer than the HQ-9B and potentially sized for vertical-launch quad-packing – a form factor aligned with modern density and salvo requirements.

Aseem drew a firm line between the older “flagpole” interceptors and newer, compact effectors riding large boosters. “You see a smaller missile paired with a big, fat booster,” he said. He pointed to “a ring of dots near the nose” – small attitude-control thrusters – and explained why they matter: fins impose lag under high aerodynamic loads, but thrusters deliver near-instant end-game authority for tighter terminal manoeuvres. The design logic implies two things. First, accuracy and agility are displacing sheer range as the decisive metric for layered air defence, especially against cruise missiles and manoeuvring targets. Second, hit-to-kill or near-hit profiles allow for smaller warheads, which, in turn, support slimmer, more agile missiles – and higher packing density in VLS cells.

The panelists’ takeaway was straightforward: this is the kind of missile architecture Pakistan should prioritise next – agility and end-game control will decide outcomes.

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PCL-191 and Production Reality – Through a Fatah Lens

The discussion then shifted to China’s PCL-191. Aseem framed it as conceptually akin to Pakistan’s Fatah family – a truck-mounted launcher concept built for long reach while retaining mobility and magazine depth – but scaled to China’s longer-range problem set. He contrasted the PCL-191’s payload and range with Pakistan’s nearer adversary and implied that China’s requirements demand a “beefier” architecture.

For Pakistan, the industrial lesson dominated. Quwa’s analysts argued that Islamabad will likely expand final-assembly capacity at home and import core components at volume – “import all the core inputs… in large stockpiles and just rapidly assemble” – to keep magazines full through a short, intense conflict cycle. The aim is to avoid a brittle posture where local bottlenecks or wartime logistics collapse magazine depth when it matters most.

That approach dovetails with a broader vision: leveraging prospective Chinese manufacturing options in Pakistan to feed not only Fatah-class munitions but also boosters and sub-assemblies for future SAM projects. In practical terms, Beijing’s willingness to offload portions of production – even at export-grade levels – would harden Pakistan’s supply chain without waiting on deep localisation of every core.

For background on Pakistan’s programme, see Quwa’s coverage of the Fatah guided surface-to-surface missiles and the Fatah-4 land-attack cruise missile reveal.

Directed-Energy and HPM – What’s Realistic

China also showcased a layered counter-UAS stack built around lasers and high-power microwave (HPM) emitters. Aseem walked through three visible tiers – a large LY-1-class laser adapted from naval work to a truck, a smaller truck-mounted unit, and a 4×4 system – and assessed their likely target sets. The LY-1-scale system, he said, is not limited to small drones and could credibly engage bigger missiles and UAVs. Export access, however, is doubtful.

On HPM, his caution was direct. These emitters promise sector-wide effects on FPV swarms, but “look at the microwave in your kitchen – there’s a Faraday cage,” he said. Larger drones can harden electronics and decouple propulsion from vulnerable electric motors, making HPM more of a niche counter-swarm tool than a universal solution.

The panelists added that both the Pakistan Navy and Pakistan Air Force have signalled interest in high-energy lasers and HPM. While LY-1-class exports are unlikely, China’s parallel message is that its ability to export advanced systems – or to support Pakistani projects with optics, sensors, and sub-systems – is expanding. The practical near-term outcome could be export-grade directed-energy tiers tailored to Pakistan’s cost-per-kill requirements.

FK-3000 and the SHORAD Refresh Pakistan Actually Needs

The FK-3000 drew attention for fusing a gun turret with dense packs of small, agile missiles – a design meant to hard-kill munitions at scale. Quwa’s analysts used the moment to underline a long-running gap: Pakistan’s short-range air-defence layer is overdue for renewal. Both the Army and the Air Force have leaned on Koral/Krotale-lineage systems for decades, and the need for an overhaul is clear. The implication is to field dense, mobile SHORAD around manoeuvre units and high-value sites, while the PAF focuses on medium-to-long-range coverage and the wider territorial envelope.

Hypersonics: From Concept to Magazine Depth

Among the parade’s headline capabilities, the YJ-19 hypersonic cruise missile stood out. “This is the system I’m most excited about… hypersonic cruise missiles are super difficult to get right,” Aseem said, before outlining the scramjet’s fragility – balancing interdependent shock structures to avoid “unstart” events that can flip and destroy the vehicle. If China has operationalised a reliable hypersonic cruise missile for shipboard use, it would be strategically consequential.

The panelists’ strategic read was equally blunt: Beijing appears confident enough to produce such weapons at scale, positioning hypersonic cruise missiles as a conventional deterrent tool to break sensors and air-defence cohesion across the first and second island chains. They contrasted that stance with France’s strategic-deterrent framing, which implies limited annual output. China’s posture suggests the YJ-19 is designed for real magazine depth – several dozen per year, not a token stockpile – to stress adversary defences through repeated, time-on-target salvos.

The implication for Pakistan is indirect but important. If hypersonic cruise missiles mature into repeatable, high-volume tools for a major power, then regional air and naval defence architectures will be designed around surviving mixed-profile salvos that combine HGVs, supersonic cruise, ballistic systems, and hypersonic cruise. That, in turn, pushes Pakistan to invest in sensor diversity, network resilience, and rapid-cueing kill chains rather than relying on a single class of interceptor.

Platforms and Enablers: J-35 and Y-20

Serial-production J-35s – in air-force and naval forms – signal pragmatic readiness and, eventually, export intent. The J-35’s naval prototype details, including a forward-fuselage bay that may imply a retractable probe on carrier variants, raised questions about export and configuration splits down the line. For Pakistan, the near-term relevance is less about acquisition and more about how the regional air picture will change as China fields a new stealth fighter in numbers with modern networking and sensor fusion.

On tankers and airlift, Quwa’s analysts relayed long-standing conversations within the PAF about replacing IL-78s – aircraft acquired in “as-is” condition as a stopgap to learn aerial refuelling. The most direct fit, several officers noted, would be the Y-20, which could cover both transport and tanker missions. The barrier is availability – Beijing must fill its own requirements first – but once China begins exporting strategic-impact systems at scale, Y-20 access becomes a logical Pakistani ask. Until then, options remain constrained by availability and cost, with incremental improvements likely to come from upgrades to existing assets and limited new-build acquisitions.

What This Means for Pakistan

Four through-lines emerge from the parade and the discussion.

1) Pivot interceptor design. New-build air defence should move to HHQ-9C-style architecture – compact, highly agile effectors with end-game control – and densify the short-to-medium layer where saturation attacks will be decided. The FK-3000’s mixed-armament logic is a useful pointer for SHORAD refresh and counter-drone density.

2) Stock for a short, intense fight. Magazines matter more than rhetoric. Pakistan’s near-term reality is to assemble fast from imported cores while scaling final assembly at home. When feasible, Islamabad should channel Chinese factory support into dual-use propulsion and booster lines that serve both Fatah-class rockets and SAM projects – a hedge against wartime logistics shocks. This is a realistic path to sustaining volume without overpromising localisation timelines.

3) Buy directed-energy by economics. Directed-energy and HPM should be judged by cost per kill, not hype. Exportable, supportable tiers – paired with optics and sensing – can push down the cost of defeating drones and loitering munitions, while larger lasers remain aspirational in the near term.

4) Plan for hypersonic salvos. Treat hypersonic cruise missiles as the pacing threat shaping regional air and naval defence design. If Beijing is comfortable demonstrating a system it believes it can build in numbers, Pakistan must assume the region will see more frequent, mixed-profile salvos designed to exhaust layered defences and blind critical nodes. That assumption should drive sensing resilience, networking, and kill-chain redundancy in every major procurement over the next decade.