Report: Industrial Reality Will Dictate Pakistan’s Conventional Deterrence Credibility Quwa Premium

Pakistan’s new Army Rocket Force Command (ARFC) is a logical doctrinal step after the May 2025 crisis: build a clear, conventional deep-strike option that deters near-border BrahMos salvos without triggering nuclear ambiguity. But a command is not a capability. Credibility hinges on magazines, production cadence, and targeting, none of which exist at scale today. For the broader context of how ARFC underpins a conventional deterrence posture, see this analysis.

This report quantifies what “credible” looks like. For a two-week, high-intensity fight focused on counterforce and air-defense suppression, Pakistan would need on the order of 5,600–7,000 guided rockets and 200–450 land-attack cruise missiles, with the ability to replenish at tempo. Those numbers are conservative relative to Russia–Ukraine consumption and expose the core reality: Pakistan must shift from lab-scale strategic production to factory-scale conventional output.

We map three industrial pathways that can get ARFC there. Option A leverages Chinese subassemblies for import-fed final assembly to achieve mass fast. Option B standardizes around two “stacks” – GMLRS-class ballistic rockets and subsonic LACMs (e.g., Fatah-2/Fatah series, Harbah/Babur derivatives) – to unlock learning-curve economics. Option C moves non-sensitive airframes and mechanics to vetted private suppliers while NESCOM/SPD retain energetics, guidance cores, and system integration. The viable path is a deliberate mix of all three.

Targeting decides outcomes. With PRSC-EO1/PRSC-S1 SAR now on orbit, Pakistan is assembling the ISR backbone needed for time-sensitive fires: SAR change detection, EO validation, SIGINT/ELINT geolocation, and UAV/loitering terminal prosecution. The question is whether that picture can be fused and tasked into repeatable, ISR-cued salvos at scale.

Sanctions and machine-tool access are the binding constraints. Our case study tracks how Russia kept CNCs and spares flowing through China, Türkiye, Central Asia, and the Gulf, and why controllers, encoders, ball screws, spindles, and metrology become the true choke points. We then assess whether the apparent U.S.–Pakistan thaw changes the export-control math: it may ease civilian licenses at the margin, but missile-relevant equipment remains under tight end-use scrutiny and expanding EU/U.S. enforcement, meaning, third-country procurement will face more friction, not less.

For decision-makers, the report closes with concrete program signals to watch: contracting footprints for subassemblies, acceptance-test cadence for Fatah/Harbah-class systems, private-sector awards for aerostructures and actuators, and ISR-fires exercises that explicitly rehearse counter-BrahMos playbooks. These reveal whether ARFC is becoming a magazine-fed, factory-sustained capability – or staying on paper.