Report: How the Z-10ME Requires the Pakistan Army to Adopt a Low-Level Air Power Strategy Quwa Premium

When thinking about a comparatively slower-flying, lower-altitude air combat system, is it still feasible employing this high-cost asset in combat environments laden with fairly capable anti-air warfare (AAW) systems with surface-to-air missiles (SAM), anti-air guns (AAG), or even first- person view (FPV) drones? Could they survive and, more importantly, provide a credible edge against a well-equipped adversary from a land warfare perspective?

If one had asked Russia at the start of its invasion of Ukraine in early 2022, the answer would have been a resounding “no.”

In 2022, based on Oryx’s data, Russia lost more than 50 attack helicopters to Ukraine. These helicopters generally flew at low altitudes and, in turn, became susceptible to Ukraine’s man-portable air defence systems (MANPADS), anti-air guns (AAG), and, to an extent, even small arms fire. Although the lack of modern countermeasures on the attack helicopters were a factor, the main driver for those losses had arguably been Russia’s operational employment at the time. Russia did not achieve air superiority in the areas those helicopters were deployed in, forcing them to fly low and be susceptible to Ukrainian fire.

In effect, Russia’s rotary losses in Ukraine could be attributed to applying the wrong doctrine, especially for conventional warfare scenarios. It is clear that attack helicopters would not succeed at the heart of a contested environment where the enemy maintains high -to-medium-altitude and low-level air coverage of its own. Russia losing modern Ka-52 and Mi-28 attack helicopters in relatively high numbers is the proof.

This is why Russia pivoted from using its helicopters for direct fire support to, instead, low-level stand-off range strike assets. By 2023, the Russians began using its Mi-28s and Ka-52s as essentially stand-off range strike platforms, with munitions like the Vikhr and Izdeliye 305 enabling those platforms to fire at ranges of 8 km to 15 km. This shift helped keep the attack helicopters away from the reach of Ukraine’s low-level air defence coverages while still enabling them to be effective close air support (CAS) assets.

Thus, in a sense, instead of operating in the proximity or ‘over’ the combat engagement point, the Russian attack helicopters were deployed from ‘behind’ to fire stand-off range weapons (SOW). In addition, Russia also began assigning numerous Mi-8MTPRs to its rotary attack groups; these Mi-8s were configured with EW equipment for interfering with radars and communications, allowing the attack helicopters to navigate more safely in contested areas. Finally, Russia also incorporated drones to serve as forward targeting scouts, improving both the accuracy and the responsiveness of attack helicopters against targets and changing conditions, in real-time.

Yes, the Mi-28s and Ka-52s were both reconfigured with more modern subsystems, but really, the greatest improvement came from the change in deployment modes. Now, the Russians are employing their attack helicopters as part of integrated formations comprising of special mission – e.g., EW – helicopters, drones, and other ISTAR (i.e., intelligence, surveillance, reconnaissance, and target acquisition) nodes rather than standalone support assets for armor and/or infantry.

In practical terms, the Russians would use their attack helicopters in ways where they can ‘pop up, fire, and scoot’ – i.e., briefly expose their presence long enough to fire SOWs and then, very quickly, move back into safety behind terrain or away from enemy anti-air fire reach. As a result, the helicopters were used to carry out specific tasks, like neutralizing a particular target, instead of being tasked to work under a broad mandate like ‘support the troops on the ground.’

In other words, the modern attack helicopter is less of a CAS asset in itself and more of a node in an integrated, low-altitude airpower capability. This doctrinal change led to a 52%+ reduction in attack helicopter losses from 2022 to 2023, with Oryx tallying about 30 units lost that year. In 2024, Russia’s attack helicopter losses apparently fell to less than 10 units.

However, while the doctrinal shift played a role, there were a few key caveats to account for when discussing Russia’s success. These caveats were discussed in detail by Perun, an analyst who has closely followed the evolving technology and doctrinal trends of this conflict from its beginning. First, Ukraine also became more effective in targeting forward bases via long-range guided rockets like the ATACMS. As a result, Russia could not deploy its attack helicopters as closely to its frontlines in some areas as it had in the earlier periods of the war. Second, one cannot definitely conclude if the drop in losses were solely because of an improvement in doctrine or a reduction in Russian attack helicopter usage resulting from Ukraine’s more assertive posture.