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What Value Do Attack Helicopters Provide?
Thus far, the discussion centered on whether attack helicopters can survive in today’s threat environment. Yes, technically, as part of an integrated package, they could survive; but the more important question for military planners is whether they still serve a valuable role. Is there a net-benefit?
In July 2023, British intelligence reportedly assessed that while Russia’s attack helicopters were still suffering losses, they were playing a key role in mitigating Ukraine’s counter-offensives. The Ka-52, armed with SOWs, was giving Ukrainian armour difficulty in penetrating into Russia’s key positions. However, the Ka-52’s advantage in this context was conditional on the fact, at the time at least, of Ukraine maintaining limited airpower within those contested areas it was trying to breach. The War Zone’s (TWZ) assessments around that time offered a similar picture, but with an additional condition, i.e., Russia’s suppression and destruction of enemy air defence (SEAD/DEAD) strategies also improved. Thus, in addition to maintaining air control over its positions, the Russians were also deprecating Ukraine’s integrated air defence systems using fixed-wing fighters armed with SOWs. Thus, effective attack helicopter use is still conditional (like it was in the Cold War) on air control.
The recurring trend from Russia’s experience is that attack helicopters can be effective, but it is always conditional on a factor external to the helicopter. The main factors are, among others, interoperability with drones, connectivity to off-board sensors such as radars onboard other platforms, deployment of EW, and SEAD/DEAD through fixed-wing combat aircraft. So, the logical question from this is, ‘what unique value does an attack helicopter offer in this integrated system?’ In other words, what role does a modern attack helicopter play in this system that no other asset within it can replace it?
Expectedly, much of the attack helicopter’s unique value comes from its design. The ability to vertically take off and land from unprepared and relatively rough conditions, fly low and slow, hover, use terrain as cover, and use SOWs all-in-one enables them to fill a niche that cannot readily be fulfilled by any other asset in the chain, at least not individually. In theory, a rotary drone could achieve many of these goals, but until there is a robust autonomous flight agent, that drone would rely on long-range communications links. In today’s environment, such links will be under stress from EW and, as a result, at risk of failure. Thus, both the gunship and its crew play a sort of ad hoc, malleable role within the low-level air operations picture. Through real-time situational awareness, for example, the attack helicopter could rapidly identify and pick off a high-value target within a live combat setting (e.g., forward infantry or armour find an enemy counter-artillery fire control radar). They can act more responsively than loitering munitions swarms (as those may rely on pre-defined targeting information).
In the near future, the gunship aircrew could – like their counterparts in fixed-wing combat aircraft – be the command nodes of a manned-unmanned teaming (MUM-T) formation, except at low altitude and closer to tactical maneuvers on the ground. Thus, they might play a role in commanding loitering munitions, ISTAR drones, and FPVs.
Pakistan Army Aviation Got a Multirole Aircraft in Z-10ME-2
In a way, the attack helicopter has evolved from being an anti-armour or infantry suppression system into a multirole platform with air-to-surface and air-to-air capabilities. However, this multirole platform would not be a ‘gamechanger’ in of itself; rather, a country procuring modern attack helicopters today is forming new offensive and defensive postures.
In the PAA’s case specifically, the Z-10ME-2 would not be used in the manner the AH-1F/S were used through the latter’s decades of service. Pakistan’s Cobras were basically used as they were designed to be used, i.e., Cold War-era direct fire support. They were procured in the 1980s to provide anti-tank and anti-infantry fire support, and in the 2000s and 2010s, the PAA used them as a counterinsurgency and counter-terrorism (COIN/CT) asset.
However, it was clear that the original Cobra itself was designed for an environment with limited anti-air threats, so its use near its targets would generally be fine. But when it came to conventional warfare, that assumption of limited anti-air threats mostly eroded. Now, the PAA has to think about how gunships would operate in a contested environment against MANPADS and other SAM threats, including short-range air defence systems (SHORAD) that can reach out to 15 km in most cases, if not farther.
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