In 2021, the Pakistan Army (PA) began adding to its stand-off range precision-strike capability by inducting the Fatah-1, an indigenously produced surface-to-surface missile (SSM) with a range of 140 km. Before the Fatah-1, the PA’s primary guided rocket was the A-100, a 100 km-range multiple-launch rocket system (MLRS) acquired from China and locally produced under license. In 2024, Pakistan inducted the Fatah-2, a larger SSM with a range of 400 km. It also announced that the Fatah-3 and Fatah-4, with ranges of 450 km and 700 km, respectively, were also under development.
In effect, the PA has inducted a new family of ballistic missiles under the “Fatah” designation, and this family appears to be a key piece of Pakistan’s efforts to build its land-based precision-strike capabilities.
Background: Fatah-Series of Ballistic Missiles
Pakistan revealed the Fatah-1 in 2021 as an indigenously developed MLRS. It was likely a result of a program disclosed by the Ministry of Defence Production (MoDP) in 2017 to develop an “extended range” MLRS. When it announced the Fatah-1, the Army remarked that the missile gives it the ability to precisely engage targets “deep in enemy territory,” thus signaling its intent to develop stand-off range capabilities.
In 2023, Global Industrial and Defence Solutions (GIDS), the conglomerate representing Pakistan’s state-owned defence enterprises, revealed an improved variant of the Fatah-1 called the Fatah-2. It had seemed that this missile was a direct evolution of the Fatah-1, i.e., it had the same diameter (likely 300 mm) and used an eight-cell launcher. However, it offered a range of 250 km.
Towards the end of 2023, Pakistan announced that it test-fired the Fatah-2, but this missile differed from the “Fatah-2” GIDS showed earlier. This new missile was larger in diameter (possibly 400 mm), requiring a two-cell launcher rather than the eight-cell launcher of the Fatah-1. It also announced that the Fatah-2 had a longer range – i.e., 400 km – than originally announced. According to GIDS’ CEO, Asad Kamal, the Fatah-2 fields a “supersonic glide vehicle” that separates from the propulsion system in the upper atmosphere. This alludes to a maneuvering warhead capability.
The forthcoming Fatah-3 will likely be based on the Fatah-2 as its range increase is relatively modest (from 400 km to 450 km), but the Fatah-4 – which will have substantially more range at 700 km – could be a larger missile, possibly with a diameter of around 600 mm. With the Fatah-series’ roadmap involving significant range improvements, one should not discount the possibility of longer-ranged missiles that can reach or exceed 1,000 km.
Ukraine’s effective use of the High Mobility Artillery Rocket System (HIMARS) generated significant interest in both the concept and, in particular, the system. Pakistan likely studied the HIMARS’ use and saw the benefits of deploying a land-based strike capability, especially through a ‘shoot-and-scoot’ system that can launch a munition and quickly relocate to a different location to avoid enemy return fire.
However, while the Pakistan Army is working to emulate the general capability (i.e., land-based precision strike), its approach is different from the HIMARS. The HIMARS is not just a system, but a concept.
The idea behind the HIMARS is to leverage a rapidly deployable system that can quickly fire its munitions, relocate, and reload with fresh missiles via preloaded containers.
The container is a key feature as it makes HIMARS units compatible with different munition types, from 122 mm to 610 mm rockets and niche munitions, such as the Ground-Launched Small Diameter Bomb (GL-SDB). This technical versatility is paired with a capacity for high-intensity long-range strikes. When the HIMARS exhausts its munition stores, it rapidly ejects the canister and relocates to a different area where it can re-arm and resume firing. For this capability to work, the end-user would have to develop a doctrine where it leverages preloaded canisters and places those stores in different locations for launch vehicles to relocate to after firing.
Hence, while the rockets are the central assets, there are many other parts to the HIMARS design that one does not see in Pakistan’s strategy as it is currently constructed. For example, there is no sign that the Pakistan Army is interested in rapidly ejectable preloaded canisters. Hence, the Army’s focus is on acquiring long-range strike capabilities, but not necessarily HIMARS-type high-intensity or mobility.
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That said, the ingredients to achieve an analogous capability could already be in place. Interestingly, the original “Fatah-2” GIDS had shown (before the test of the larger “Fatah-2”) hinted at a direct evolution of the Fatah-1, i.e., a similarly sized missile that could use the same eight-cell launch system.
Perhaps there is a scenario where Pakistan could design a high-intensity guided MLRS system centered on the 140 km-range Fatah-1 and a longer range 240 km-range variant (e.g., “Fatah-1B”). The container could pack both types of missiles and, potentially, be further developed for rapid ejection and re-arming. This tactically-oriented high-intensity strike system could pair up with Fatah-2/3/4-armed units focused on more strategically relevant targets.
Necessary Next Steps
With the Pakistan Army deploying land-based strike capabilities, it will need to induct additional assets for supporting this doctrine: improved targeting with quicker responsivity, enhanced electronic warfare, and air defence focused on counter-unmanned aerial systems (C-UAS).
Targeting
To improve its intelligence, surveillance, reconnaissance, and target acquisition (ISTAR) capabilities, the Pakistan Army will likely invest in both drones and new sensors.
In terms of drones, Pakistan could look to vertical take-off and landing (VTOL) systems, such as the locally developed Ranger, to improve its forward observation capabilities. The early iterations of this drone would involve personnel in the loop to identify and relay targets. However, in the long term, Pakistan may utilize technologies like artificial intelligence and machine learning (AI/ML) to make these drones identify targets and relay location information to firing units automatically. Pakistan can leverage expertise from Turkiye’s Bayraktar Group or others to achieve this capability.
As its artillery capabilities expand, Pakistan may deploy additional weapon-locating radars (for finding the originating source of artillery fire by tracking incoming strikes). Pakistan’s domestic radar programs, such as the ‘short-range air defence radar’ (SRAD) and ‘multi-function air defence radar’ (MFADR) could form the basis of these weapon-locating radars.
Electronic Warfare
As the Pakistan Army deploys these strike assets, it will require new assets to protect them. For example, the Army must expect India’s air assets to seek out Fatah-equipped units. Hence, the Army could procure electronic warfare (EW) and electronic countermeasures (ECM) systems to shield and augment its attack assets.
The Army may seek solutions like the Chinese CHL-906, which offers comprehensive EW and ECM capabilities, including electronic attack (EA) for jamming and electronic intelligence (ELINT) to monitor radar and communications signals. This could provide several key benefits for the Army’s strike units.
First, the EA/ECM capabilities could help protect Fatah-equipped units by interfering with Indian Air Force (IAF) radar and communication activity. The Army would use ELINT to monitor the space for Indian radar and communications activity, thereby recording their transmissions and feeding that information to a threat library for jamming purposes. Second, the Army may use ELINT as part of a land-based suppression and destruction of enemy air defence (SEAD/DEAD) strategy. ELINT could help identify enemy radar activity, which the Army would target using its Fatah-equipped units.
Air Defence
In addition to EW/ECM, the Pakistan Army would also need to lean on its integrated air defence system as a means of defending against IAF and/or Indian Army (IA) air attacks. The PA already operates long-range and medium-range surface-to-air missiles (SAM) via the HQ-9/P and LY-80/LY-80EV. However, it still has a gap in terms of C-UAS capabilities, which will be important as India invests more in loitering munitions.
To scalably address loitering munitions, the Army may invest in directed energy weapon-based C-UAS systems. The Pakistan Air Force (PAF), for example, is acquiring high-energy laser (HEL) and high-powered microwave (HPM)-based solutions. The Army may follow suit so as to better protect its Fatah-equipped strike units.
The Rise of Integrated Strike Units?
Overall, one can foresee that the induction of Fatah-equipped units will give rise to integrated strike units. These units will be built on a family of systems designed to protect and augment the Fatah.
Though it would necessitate a significant investment, the Army likely weighs the benefit in terms of its ability to reach HVTs located deep in enemy territory. For example, the Army could measure the possibility of neutralizing a long-range air defence unit through a Fatah-centric strike unit as a highly valuable benefit, one that outweighs the cost of raising these integrated strike units.
Moreover, these integrated strike units may incorporate more than just the Fatah series. The Army may equip these units with cruise missiles – such as the Babur/Harbah series – and loitering munitions as well so that they can undertake strikes in a greater variety of ways.
However, this approach would also signal another issue: Pakistan is likely moving further away from combined arms maneuvers. It seems that each service arm will possess independent long-range strike, anti-air warfare (AAW), and EW capabilities. Though this does not preclude the possibility of combined arms maneuvers in itself, the Pakistani military is not currently engaging in inter-services exercises and other joint operations to support such a doctrine. Thus, while each service arm is accumulating assets, it may not be synergizing them in cohesive ways, thereby leaving more valuable capability gains (borne via training and organization) on the table in favour of acquiring assets in silos.
