Can Pakistan Mirror Turkey’s Drone-Use Strategy?

Turkey has drawn attention for both its development and deployment of unmanned aerial vehicles (UAV), notably the Bayraktar TB2. Designed and built by Baykar Defense, a private sector company in Turkey, the Bayraktar TB2 saw significant action in Libya, Syria, and Azerbaijan through 2019 and 2020.

The Bayraktar TB2’s usage in Libya and Syria was notable because Turkey showed that UAVs could be an effective tool against non-state actors and conventional assets alike. In terms of the latter, the Bayraktar TB2 had reportedly destroyed a number of Pantsir short-range air defence (SHORAD) systems.

In an earlier article, Quwa had noted that Turkey used its UAVs to drive a hybrid war against conventional and unconventional targets alike. It enabled Turkey to affect other state actors in contested regions like Syria and Libya without escalating the conflict against the likes of Russia or the United Arab Emirates.

However, the Nagorno Karabakh conflict between Azerbaijan and Armenia had apparently shown that the Bayraktar TB2 – and UAVs of its size and capability in general – could play a valuable role in a conventional conflict between two military forces. Azerbaijan reportedly used the Bayraktar TB2 to damage or destroy a number of Armenia’s main battle tanks (MBT), infantry fighting vehicles (IFV), and artillery.[1]

The caveat in the case of Azerbaijan and Armenia is that Turkey and Russia may have exerted a high level of influence with their respective partners. Thus, there may have been an escalation cap or limit ensuring that both sides limit their air power usage, hence leaving more space for drone usage.

Simply, it is not yet clear if a full-scale conventional conflict (e.g., one between Pakistan and India) could allow as much room for drone usage as Turkey’s experiences have permitted thus far. However, if specific tactical situations within a wider conflict mirror Turkey and Azerbaijan’s experiences, then in those cases, there may be an argument to prioritize drone usage over other air power options.

To achieve that outcome, a drone deployment strategy would need to rest on a number of conditions.

First, the main UAV system of use should be inherently low-cost to produce and deploy. Cost is important because the Turkish experience shows that the end-user will certainly lose drones in combat. Indeed, that is the benefit of using drones as losses do not result in the loss of human resources or high-cost platforms, such as manned fixed-wing fighters or attack helicopters. That ability to absorb losses frees the end-user to deploy drones in high-risk scenarios. Moreover, it allows the end-user to iterate on deployment much faster (as it is easier to replace drones) with revised tactics, potentially within hours of an attrition.

Second, the UAV must be immune from foreign supply-side restrictions or pressures. Ideally, a UAV of the size and capability of the Bayraktar TB2 should draw on a turn-key domestic base. By virtue of lower costs and expansive production (a necessity to sustain operations at-scale and higher attrition rates), one could scale the overhead of developing the aerostructure materials, engine, subsystems, and onboard weapons.

Moreover, the cost to develop inputs for a Bayraktar TB2-class drone will be substantially lower than that of a complex manned fighter aircraft. In fact, one may even be able to scale the core technologies – e.g., the gas turbine for a miniature turboprop engine – across multiple areas, such as cruise missiles (by using the gas turbine to develop a miniature turbofan for cruise missiles or even jet-powered drones).

The obvious risk of foreign supply-side influence is that an outside country could exert influence to stop or at least temper one’s drone usage. Turkey had run into this exact problem when Canada opted to stop the sale and transfer of L3Harris WESCAM electro-optical/infrared (EO/IR) turrets for use on the Bayraktar TB2. Canada blocked the sale due to the drone’s use by Azerbaijan against Armenia.[2]

Third, the end-user must have the right type of munitions. With a Bayraktar TB2-type UAV, it appears that lightweight (i.e., 10 to 25 kg) laser-guided air-to-surface missiles are the munition of choice. Like the UAV, the key is controlling the cost. In this respect, end-users may not be able to feasibly utilize active-homing seekers like active radar-homing (ARH), at least at a low enough cost. Likewise, small munitions could also have range limitations, but the low-cost of the UAV (and ability to sustain the loss) can offset that issue.

Pakistan has an active drone program. In fact, it seems (via Project Azm) that the Pakistan Air Force (PAF) is working towards an indigenous design, development, and manufacturing base for its UAVs. It also seems that the PAF is moving towards building a large force of tactical drones similar to the Bayraktar TB2.

Thus, the facts indicate that Pakistan is at least moving towards building the capacity to carry out similar drone operations as Turkey. The question is whether it can develop the expertise and doctrines to execute such operations in a conventional conflict against India.

Currently, any potential drone usage by Pakistan would not occur outside of a declared conflict with India. In other words, Pakistan may not be able to get away with using drones as a means to avoid a war (be it a large-scale conflict or a limited engagement like Kargil). The crux of their conflict is Kashmir, and it seems that each time the two fight over Kashmir, there is always a risk of a general war. Basically, Pakistan does not have the benefit of a buffer to wage a proxy or hybrid fight like Turkey does in Syria and Libya.

Pakistan’s use of drones would occur as part of a wider conflict. Basically, drones would likely be a tactical instrument (among many), not a tool to achieve strategic effects (like limiting a conflict to one region). At this point, only the Pakistani military can accurately judge whether it can use drones in tactical scenarios.

Entities such as Combat Commanders School (CCS) and the Airpower Centre of Excellence (ACE) ought to take the lead in studying the matter and, in turn, developing the doctrines for employing it.

Reflecting on Swift Retort, for example, the PAF could use tactical UAVs to remove risks against its manned fighters, such as enemy SHORAD assets. It may also be able to use them to augment its electronic warfare (EW) and electronic countermeasures (ECM) activities, build more situational awareness (through EO/IR), and deflect attention from its manned fighters.

There are many potential opportunities, but the underlying concern is whether Pakistan is actually eager enough to study these avenues. For example, another emerging area that should be of interest are joint or combined air-and-land operations against enemy air defence units.

In an earlier article, Quwa suggested the following:

Pakistan could also look at using HAPS (high-altitude pseudo-satellite) unmanned aerial vehicles (UAV). In fact, the Pakistani company Integrated Dynamics is working on a design (STRATOS) that could stay in the air for four months at a time and carry a payload of up to 12 kg. This could be enough for a SAR payload.

In turn, the HAPS UAV could operate from within Pakistan, but take imagery of across the border at long-range. Combined with the PRSS-O1, Pakistan can use a HAPS UAV fleet to build a comprehensive IMINT library for long-term analysis so as to understand India’s S-400 deployments and movements.

Building on this approach, a tactical drone force can augment artillery and stand-off range weapons (SOW) as an attack option against radar and missile units. Not once would Pakistan need to use a high-cost asset like a manned fighter to deprecate a long-range anti-air warfare (AAW) threat. There is potential.

The good thing about these concepts is that they are not abstract. If it does not already, Pakistan will be able to procure the necessary technologies in the near-term. Rather, it is unclear if the Pakistan Army (PA) and PAF are interested in even jointly planning and executing operations of this nature. Only time will tell if Pakistani defence planners are taking these developments seriously.

[1] Joseph Trevithick and Thomas Newdick. “Everything We Know About The Fighting That Has Erupted Between Armenia And Azerbaijan.” The Warzone. The Drive. 28 September 2020. URL: https://www.thedrive.com/the-war-zone/36777/everything-we-know-about-the-fighting-that-has-erupted-between-armenia-and-azerbaijan

[2] Burak Ege Bekdil. “Canadian block on drone parts shows Turkey’s defense industry still not independent.” Defense News. 13 October 2020. URL: https://www.defensenews.com/global/europe/2020/10/13/canadian-block-on-drone-parts-shows-turkeys-defense-industry-still-not-independent/