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Deterrence at Scale: Inside China’s 2025 Military Logic Quwa Premium
The pageantry of China’s 2025 military parade had familiar tones: rows of goose-stepping troops, formations of armored vehicles, and columns of missiles rolling through Beijing. But beyond the optics, the event carried a deeper significance: a projection of China’s worldview.
To outside observers, the sheer mass of weapons China revealed – i.e., hypersonic glide vehicles (HGV), new-generation fighters, long-range rocket launch systems, and directed-energy weapons – seemed to suggest that Beijing is claiming the mantle of a “superpower.”
Yet, read carefully, the display was not a bid to mimic the United States as a global hegemon. Rather, it was a statement of deterrence and resilience: that the “Middle Kingdom” intends to lead in Asia, sit as a peer at the world’s highest decision-making tables, and never again allow hard-earned economic advantage to be undermined by outside coercion. Indeed, President Xi Jinping articulated as much, stating: “The Chinese nation is a great nation that does not fear violence and that stands independent and strong.”
History as Strategic Memory
For centuries, China regarded itself as the Middle Kingdom – the center of the civilized world, surrounded by natural buffers that made it both secure and inward-looking. Its goods – silk, tea, porcelain – were prized in Europe, and by the late 18th century Britain’s appetite for them was insatiable. Yet the Qing court permitted foreign merchants only limited access through Canton, and had little interest in British products. The imbalance was settled in silver, and Beijing steadily amassed vast reserves.
This “favourable” position, however, created hostility in London. For Britain, hemorrhaging silver while being excluded from China’s market was intolerable. Unable to sell legitimate goods, British merchants turned to opium smuggling from India. Addiction spread, and when Chinese authorities confiscated and destroyed opium stockpiles, Britain retaliated with warships.
The First Opium War (1839–42) ended with the Treaty of Nanjing, which forced China to cede Hong Kong, open new ports, and accept humiliating concessions. The Second Opium War (1856–60) went further: European powers seized Beijing, burned the imperial Summer Palace, forced China to legalize opium, and expanded their privileges under “extraterritoriality” – foreigners in China were no longer subject to Chinese law.
For a state that had for millennia seen itself as the pinnacle of civilization, the humiliation was profound. It was compounded by further defeats, from losing Korea and Taiwan to Japan in 1895, to the Boxer Rebellion of 1900, when an eight-nation force marched into Beijing itself. The lesson for China was stark: economic advantage without military strength invites coercion, disunity invites exploitation, and resisting modernization ensures defeat. This became known as the Century of Humiliation, a phrase still invoked in Chinese political discourse today.
It is here that Xi Jinping stands apart from his predecessors. Mao Zedong secured China’s sovereignty but left its economy and society devastated. Deng Xiaoping initiated modernization and opened the economy, but kept military development modest and the Party’s legitimacy anchored in growth. Jiang Zemin and Hu Jintao oversaw steady material progress, but their focus was incremental. Xi, however, has elevated historical trauma into a governing principle. His “China Dream” is not only about prosperity, but about ensuring that the humiliation of the 19th and early 20th centuries can never be repeated.
This outlook explains the three pillars of his governance. First, unity under a single leadership, with Xi consolidating power to prevent factionalism and paralysis reminiscent of the late Qing. Second, a disciplined populace and society, with the Party exercising tight control through surveillance, censorship, and ideological campaigns – tools to ensure cohesion against external manipulation. Third, unrelenting industrial growth, not just in consumer goods but in advanced sectors – artificial intelligence (AI), semiconductors, aerospace, naval construction – so that China’s economy is never again at the mercy of outsiders.
Thus, the parade was more than a show of weapons. It was a demonstration of how Xi has internalized China’s past defeats and harnessed them to drive policy today. Hypersonics, stealth fighters, and ICBMs are not only instruments of war – they are the visible proof that China will not lose its economic and political sovereignty to foreign coercion again.
Weapons of a Regional Leader and a Global Great Power
Strategic Weapons: Deterrence Against Coercion
The centerpiece of the parade was China’s strategic missile arsenal. Systems like the DF-5C liquid-fueled ICBM, with its multiple reentry vehicles, the DF-61 road-mobile ICBM, and the JL-3 submarine-launched ballistic missile, are not battlefield weapons.
They exist for one purpose: to make it resoundingly clear that no existential threat against China can be contemplated without incurring reciprocal destruction.
This is deterrence in its purest form. Where geography once insulated China – the Gobi Desert, the Himalayas, the South China Sea – today the protective barrier is technological. By unveiling a credible nuclear triad, Beijing is demonstrating that nuclear coercion, a tool wielded by Washington and Moscow for decades, is now neutralized when aimed at China.
More importantly, this deterrence posture underscores Beijing’s demand for respect and recognition. China is not seeking to replace the United States as the global hegemon or focal point of a unipolar order, but rather, it will not accept a subordinate position. The implicit message is that China cannot be threatened into compliance or sidelined into irrelevance. In strategic terms, the nuclear triad is the guarantee that Beijing’s voice at the global table cannot be silenced.
Land Forces: From Lumbering Army to Responsive Spearhead
Equally significant was the transformation on display in China’s land forces. For much of the 19th and 20th centuries, China’s armies were large but unwieldy – reactive, fragmented, and slow. Foreign powers exploited this. In the Opium Wars, Britain used mobility by sea to land where it chose, forcing the Qing to fight on terms it could not manage. During the Boxer Rebellion, the speed and coordination of European forces overwhelmed disorganized Chinese defences.
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