7129Views
Pakistan Could Prioritize New COIN/CT Purchases
From 18 to 25 January, Pakistan’s security forces carried out at least seven major counter-insurgency (COIN) or counter-terrorism (CT) operations in specific areas of the provinces of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa (KP) and Balochistan. Since the start of this month, Pakistani authorities stated that they carried out 15 COIN/CT operations, with Kacchi and Zhob districts being key focal points in Balochistan, and Kurram, Karak, and Khyber being hot zones in KP.
Once again, Pakistan’s western hinterlands have begun flaring into low-intensity, non-conventional conflict zones. However, unlike the COIN/CT operations of the early-to-mid 2010s, which focused on the Tehreek- e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP), the current bout is seeing Pakistan confront both the TTP and Baloch separatist groups, such as the Baloch Liberation Army (BLA), among others.
If left to expand or escalate, these conflicts could have a significant impact on the procurement priorities of the Pakistan Army (PA) and, potentially, the Pakistan Air Force (PAF) in the next 3 to 5 years.
Revisiting Pakistan’s COIN/CT History
Prior to 9/11 and subsequent U.S. invasion of Afghanistan, COIN/CT was not a primary area of focus for the Pakistani military. Aside from sporadic, small-scale operations, each of the tri-services had operated upon the assumption that their main security threat was India.
Following America’s entry into Afghanistan, insurgencies started flaring up in Pakistan’s border regions, especially the Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA). However, the early campaigns against these threats, such as Operational al-Mizan (2002-2006) exposed significant gaps in equipment, training, and doctrine, leading to high casualties of both civilians and security personnel.
Moreover, local populations felt a sense of alienation due to the punitive responses of the military, which relied on poorly targeted air and artillery strikes at the time. In general, Pakistan’s COIN/CT efforts up to this point were largely ineffective and led to peace deals with the TTP.
However, it was around the mid-2000s that the PA and PAF both made COIN/CT a key priority in their respective modernization roadmaps. By 2009, the PA began implementing small-unit tactics while also providing its infantry with better personal protective gear and small arms. The PAF acquired intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) assets and precision-strike capabilities.
Collectively, these changes helped Pakistan’s security forces reverse TTP and other militant gains in the Northern Areas and, in turn, contain the threat to FATA. By 2014, Pakistan’s COIN/CT capacity matured to a point where it entered and fought the TTP in the latter’s strongholds in South and North Waziristan.
By the late 2010s, Pakistan had hoped that it could move beyond COIN/CT and refocus on conventional threats. Indeed, the 2020s saw Pakistan focus on procuring conventional arms, such as new main battle tanks (MBT), advanced fighter aircraft, and warships.
However, with COIN/CT resurfacing as a threat once again, the PA and PAF may once again be poised to adjust their respective procurement plans, at least in the short-term.
Evolving Defence Industry Dynamics
In Pakistan’s previous COIN/CT chapter, the country’s local defence industry was not a factor in terms of supplying weapon systems or other specialized solutions. In fact, much of the PA and PAF’s capabilities were acquired off-the-shelf, mostly from the United States and, to a lesser degree, Europe.
Today, the Pakistani defence industry is a more active player, with an apparent capacity to supply drones, loitering munitions, precision-guided bombs (PGB), electro-optical and infrared (EO/IR) turrets, and other COIN/CT-relevant solutions to both the PA and the PAF.
However, while all these original projects promise competitive features and capabilities, most of them are untested. Hence, it is unlikely many of them would factor into the PA and PAF’s procurement plans for the near-term, at least in terms of immediate COIN/CT requirements.
Hence, the PA and PAF could favour off-the-shelf systems, at least over the next 12-18 months. Overall, it is likely that established industry players providing drones, loitering munitions, and armoured vehicles will benefit from the near-term COIN/CT needs.
Drones
The domestically produced Shahpar-III is unlikely to be a factor as it must undergo testing. This process would stretch the Shahpar-III’s timelines past the 12-month timeframe the PA and PAF would be aiming towards for their current COIN/CT requirements.
Therefore, if the PA and/or PAF are looking for drones similar in size to the Shahpar-III, they will prioritize a cost-effective import, likely from China. Moreover, these platforms would likely be based on the drones the PA and/or PAF are already operating, such as the CH-4 and Wing Loong 2.
The smaller drone segment could be more competitive. The PA and PAF have both inducted Shahpar-IIs, for example. So, for drones in this size category, the Shahpar-II may be prioritized as the infrastructure for operating it is already present, and it has, by this stage, been qualified as a tested/matured system.
That said, Pakistan’s relatively limited production capacity could still push the PA and/or PAF to look at an import. This factor would depend on whether the COIN/CT situation escalates to the point where a larger number of drones become necessary (e.g., for more persistent surveillance coverage), an import will be sought. In this sense, existing platforms – such as the Bayraktar TB2 – could be favoured.
Current operational needs could drive immediate purchases, especially if the supplier can deliver quickly. However, foreign vendors would likely keep an eye on the longer term trend, which is Pakistan’s growing preference for homegrown original solutions.
In this respect, foreign vendors would typically entertain transfer-of-technology (ToT) discussions with one of the armed forces’ production entities, like Pakistan Aeronautical Complex (PAC). However, some might pursue a more proactive approach of signalling ToT interest in other ways.
Turkiye’s Baykar Defense, for example, partnered with the National Aerospace Science and Technology Park (NASTP) following the PAF’s Bayraktar TB2 and Bayraktar Akıncı acquisitions. It has seemingly been marketing the forthcoming Kızılelma unmanned combat aerial vehicle (UCAV) to the PAF.
The issue of Baykar’s activities is not that it is marketing the Kızılelma in of itself, but that it is expressing a major signal to Pakistani defence planners. This signal is basically an apparent willingness to provide ToT or, potentially, engage in advanced collaborative work with the production entities favoured by the user.
So, in the PAF’s case, Baykar Defense is signalling to Air Headquarters (AHQ) that it wants to enter into a long-term partnership with NASTP, which is a creation of the PAF. As the PAF has an incentive to promote NASTP, Baykar Defense is strategically showing support for the initiative.
Hence, when it comes to the question of importing drones for short-term needs, one can see that Baykar Defense created an advantage. It can draw on the PAF’s existing use of Bayraktar drones and, potentially, “sweeten the pot” by increasing its investment in NASTP.
While not engaged in NASTP, the Aviation Industry Corporation of China (AVIC) arguably has a structural ‘advantage’ in the PAF. AVIC is not concerned about losing drone contracts to the PAF as it understands it will secure far more lucrative J-10CE and, possibly, J-35AE deals.
However, for the Chinese drone makers operating under AVIC, the approach taken by Baykar Defense could be a potential avenue to open talks or at least attract PAF interest in their systems.
The PA, on the other hand, does not have an aviation or aerospace-focused industry interest like NASTP. Thus, a more straightforward approach involving shorter delivery timelines and attractive pricing will work, especially if a previous induction (e.g. CH-4) was already in place. One can expect AVIC to fulfill the PA’s short-term drone contracts, potentially an additional purchase of CH-4 systems.
Loitering Munitions
The loitering munitions (LM) space could see a more active Pakistani industry. While the bulk of Pakistan’s LM solutions are new and untested, these are generally low-cost, low-risk weapons.
Therefore, the PA and PAF could both begin acquiring domestic LMs relatively soon so as to deploy and test them in the field.
But as with most of Pakistan’s manufactured solutions, production output is unlikely to be sufficient for the scale of the armed forces’ near-term needs. Hence, if the PA and/or PAF are interested in deploying LMs, they will likely seek foreign solutions in large numbers for their immediate COIN/CT needs.
End of excerpt (1,378/2,268 words)
Existing Quwa Premium members can log in below
Note: Logged in members may need to refresh the article page to see the article.
