On 20 April 2018, IHS Jane’s reported that the Indian Air Force (IAF) had formally ended its involvement in the Fifth Generation Fighter Aircraft (FGFA) it had started with Russia in 2007.[1] Official confirmation has yet to come from New Delhi, but reports of the IAF’s discontent with several key aspects of the Sukhoi T-50/Su-57 PAK-FA – i.e. the platform from which the FGFA was to be derived – had trickled through the past year. The IAF’s concerns include dissatisfaction over the PAK-FA’s radar cross-section (RCS)-reduction work (i.e. stealth) and the quality of its onboard electronics, most notably the radar.[2]
This is a significant event in that it alters the long-term value of bilateral Indian-Russian defence relations. Granted, there are still numerous big-ticket programs poised to reach fruition, not least a joint-production program involving the Kamov Ka-226T and continued cooperation on T-90-series main battle tanks (MBT). The continuation of the IAF’s Su-30MKI program – i.e. ongoing support and potentially upgrades – is also a potential area of interest between Moscow and New Delhi.
However, fighter aircraft are arguably the biggest-ticket items in that they not only have to be bought in sizable numbers, but will amount to several hundred million dollars – each – in acquisition and long-term support costs. By closing the door on the FGFA the IAF has effectively closed the door on Russia securing a new wave of fighter orders – and in turn, a leading revenue-generator for Moscow – in India.
India signed onto the FGFA in 2007. Pegged as the “largest joint project” in the history of Russia and India’s defence relations, the FGFA’s development alone was to reach a cost of $8 to $10 billion US. In 2010, both India and Russia signed a $295 m preliminary design contract. This was joined in 2013 with a contract to formally develop the FGFA as a variant of the PAK-FA – i.e. tailor the PAK-FA to the requirements of the IAF.[3] It was thought that the IAF would gradually supplant its Su-30MKIs with the FGFA, benefitting from both a deep level of transfer-of-technology (ToT) and economies-of-scale through leveraging the fighter requirements of both countries. In totality, the FGFA would have arguably dwarfed all prior Indo-Russian defence programs in its scale and cumulative economic value.
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[1] Rahul Bedi & Reuben F. Johnson. “India withdraws from FGFA project, leaving Russia to go it alone”. IHS Jane’s Defence Weekly. 20 April 2018. URL: http://www.janes.com/article/79457/india-withdraws-from-fgfa-project-leaving-russia-to-go-it-alone (Last Accessed: 22 April 2018).
[2] Ibid.
[3] Press Release. “The contract to develop a sketch and technical project of the Russian-Indian 5th -generation fighter was completed”. Sukhoi. 10 April 2013. URL: https://web.archive.org/web/20130503002346/http://www.sukhoi.org/eng/news/company/?id=5125 (Last Accessed: 22 April 2018).
