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Swift Retort: How Pakistan Adapted in the Last Six Years

Following its skirmish with India in February 2019, the Pakistani military, particularly the Pakistan Air Force (PAF), initiated a major modernization drive. The brief clash – which saw the PAF implement its own retaliatory strike via Operation Swift Retort – underscored a need to expand the procurement pipeline across previously less developed areas, notably in terms of unmanned aerial vehicles (UAV), surface-to-air missiles (SAM), electronic warfare and electronic support measures (EW/ESM), and ‘smart munitions’.

Over the past six years, the PAF pursued a procurement strategy involving new multirole combat aircraft, medium-to-long-range SAMs, precision-guided munitions (PGM), EW and ESM systems, medium-altitude long-endurance (MALE) and high-altitude long-endurance (HALE) drones, and loitering munitions. 

Collectively, these new acquisitions set the groundwork for an evolved offensive strike strategy that aims to engage a larger assortment of targets, reach targets further into enemy territory, and, not least, be as prepared as possible for a comparable, if not more extensive, adversary response.

Background: The 2019 Skirmish and Operation Swift Retort

On 26 February 2019, the Indian Air Force (IAF) conducted a cross-border strike using its Mirage 2000H multirole fighters armed with SPICE-2000 precision-guided glide bombs, targeting Balakot in Pakistan. 

In response, the PAF carried out Operation Swift Retort, its first large-scale air operations involving many modern assets, namely: 4th-generation fighters in the form of the JF-17s and F-16s; strike aircraft via the Mirage III/5-based Retrofit of Strike Element (ROSE); PGMs via the H-4 and Range Extension Kit (REK), which offer a range of 120 km and 60-100 km, respectively, and special mission aircraft such as the Saab 2000-based Erieye airborne early warning and control (AEW&C) and Falcon DA-20-based EW system.

Operational Swift Retort resulted in the confirmed downing of an IAF MiG-21bis and a Mi-17 helicopter (which was mistakenly shot down by an IAF SAM). However, what made Swift Retort significant was that it represented the PAF’s first network-enabled large-force engagement, demonstrating a clear ability to integrate multiple platforms and capabilities in a coordinated offensive operation.

This operational success was not merely coincidental but the result of years of training through exercises like Red Flag and Anatolian Eagle, as well as bilateral exercises with China in the Shaheen series.

Swift Retort showcased several key operational elements that would influence the PAF’s development:

  • First, the operation demonstrated the effective integration of various air assets into a cohesive strike package. The strike element utilized Mirage III/5 and JF-17 aircraft equipped with the H-4 and REK, respectively, while F-16s and JF-17s provided top cover. The AEW&C platforms extended situational awareness deep into Indian territory, while EW assets disrupted enemy communications systems.
  • Second, the PAF’s employment of REK and H-4 stand-off weapons showed its capability to reach targets without penetrating heavily defended airspace. This approach minimized risk to crewed aircraft while still demonstrating offensive capability.
  • Third, the operation proved the value of network-centric warfare to the PAF. The Saab 2000-based Erieye AEW&C aircraft reportedly directed and controlled at least 12 to 18 fighters during the operation, offering real-time battlefield awareness and tracking the location of IAF assets.
  • Fourth, Swift Retort underscored the critical importance of maintaining technological parity in air-to-air missiles. The PAF’s employment of BVR missiles created a sufficient buffer to negate some of India’s numerical and qualitative advantages.

India Moves to Plugin Gaps and Qualitatively Pull Ahead

The IAF has significantly strengthened its position through several key acquisitions and upgrades that would complicate any future Swift Retort-type operation.

Most notably, India has inducted the Dassault Rafale multi-role fighter, equipped with the MBDA Meteor beyond-visual-range air-to-air missile and SCALP cruise missiles.

The Meteor reportedly offers a range that exceeds 150 km and, potentially, reaches 200 km. It also uses a ramjet engine to leverage several advantages over solid-fuel rocket motor-based AAMs. These include throttling its engine to cruise at a slower speed en route to a target or rapidly accelerate as it nears its target. It has a greater No-Escape Zone without losing energy, thereby greatly limiting the target’s defensive maneuvers or capacity.

The introduction of the Rafale-equipped Meteor alone would greatly complicate, if not jeopardize, any Swift Retort-type operation. However, the IAF is also embarking on a large-scale upgrade program of its Su-30MKIs, which form the mainstay of its fighter fleet.

These ‘Super Sukhoi’ fighters will be configured with active electronically scanned array (AESA) radars and improved electronic countermeasure (ECM) systems. These additions would allow the upgraded Su-30MKIs to detect targets farther, operate in more dense EW environments, and, potentially, carry out radar jamming/spoofing. The Super Sukhoi will also leverage new LRAAMs, further extending the IAF’s air-to-air reach.

The IAF has also fortified its ground-based air defence network with the induction of the S-400 Triumf long-range surface-to-air missile system and continued deployment of Israeli Spyder and indigenous Akash medium-range systems.

Combined with upgraded tactical data-link systems that enable better integration between fighters and ground control, these improvements create a much more challenging operating environment for any potential Pakistani air operation

Given these developments, any future PAF operation similar to Swift Retort would face considerably greater risks and probable attrition. 

Pakistan’s Procurement Since 2019

To the PAF, Swift Retort also revealed several key vulnerabilities. Despite its tactical success, Swift Retort exposed the PAF to significant risk in terms of potential aircraft losses. Had India been better prepared or equipped with more advanced SAMs and fighters in the vicinity, the outcome may have been different. 

In addition, the PAF’s inability to respond quickly enough to the IAF’s initial airstrikes also shed light on the limitations of strictly relying on fighters to intercept high-altitude air threats. These realizations appear to have driven many of Pakistan’s subsequent capability investments.

New AESA Radar-Equipped Fighters

The centerpiece of Pakistan’s post-2019 air power modernization has been the acquisition of fighters equipped with AESA radars. This technology offers significant advantages in dense EW environments, including greater resistance to jamming, lower probability of intercept, and the ability to switch rapidly between air-to-air and air-to-ground modes.

The PAF inducted 20 Chengdu J-10CE fighters beginning in March 2022, completing deliveries at a fairly rapid pace, i.e.,  within eight months of contract signing. This accelerated induction timeline suggests an urgent operational requirement, likely driven by the lessons of Swift Retort. 

The J-10CE comes equipped with an AESA radar and, crucially, the PL-15E long-range air-to-air missile with a reported range of 145 km. This missile, with its active radar seeker and dual pulse motor, provides Pakistan with a credibly analogous match to India’s Meteor-equipped Rafales.

In parallel, the PAF introduced the JF-17 Block-III (designated JF-17C), equipped with the KLJ-7A AESA radar capable of tracking 15 targets simultaneously and engaging four at once. 

With an initial order of 30 aircraft (over 20 of which have been delivered), the JF-17C represents the evolution of Pakistan’s workhorse fighter into a genuinely formidable platform. The aircraft features an indigenous helmet-mounted display and sight (HMD/S) system paired with high off-boresight (HOBS) air-to-air missiles, as well as integrated ECM systems.

These acquisitions provide the PAF with a credible high-low mix of 4+ generation fighters capable of operating effectively in contested electromagnetic environments.

Medium-to-Long-Range SAMs

Perhaps the most significant shift in the PAF’s doctrine has been the induction of medium-to-long-range SAM systems. Historically, the PAF relied primarily on fighter aircraft to defend its airspace and intercept incoming air threats, with surface-based systems limited to point defence of critical installations.

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