Pakistan Has a Smart & Scalable Strike Capability it is Not Using Quwa Premium

Boots Theory is an economic concept. It argues that buying cheap boots saves money in the short term, but because they wear out quickly, the buyer ends up replacing them more often. Over time, this costs more than investing in durable boots from the outset. The lesson is about sustainability and lifetime cost, not immediate savings. Quwa analyst Aseem ul-Islam drew a parallel between land-based precision-strike and airborne precision-strike that echoes these key lessons.

In military planning, the same trade-off appears in the choice between SSMs and fighter-delivered precision-guided bombs (PGBs). The ARFC fields the Fatah-1 (301 mm guided rocket), the Fatah-2 (600 mm ballistic missile), and the Fatah-4 ground-launched cruise missile (GLCM). These systems provide immediate, high-volume strike power. But like cheap boots, they are finite. Once a stockpile is fired, it takes years of industrial effort to replenish it. Propellant production, guidance units, and precision machining are all bottlenecks. Wartime demand – as seen in Ukraine – can run into the thousands of rounds within weeks. For Pakistan, a purely SSM-based strategy is not sustainable.

Fighters armed with PGBs represent the “durable boots” side of the theory. The upfront cost is higher: aircraft procurement, maintenance depots, spares pipelines, simulators, pilot training, and integration into an airpower doctrine. These costs make fighter-based strike unaffordable for many countries. But once those investments are made, the aircraft can be used repeatedly. Each sortie can deliver precision stand-off effects so long as bombs and kits are replenished. The platform is not expended like a missile – it returns to base, is rearmed, and flies again.

This distinction was discussed on Defence Uncut. Guided missiles like Fatah-1, Fatah-2, and Fatah-4 are faster to deploy, simpler to mobilize, and can be launched in salvos with minimal exposure to personnel. They give the Army immediate responsiveness on the escalation ladder – a critical factor in May 2025, when India’s forward deployment of BrahMos compressed Pakistan’s decision time. But missiles alone cannot sustain attrition warfare. Once stockpiles run down, the Army’s ability to deliver pressure fades.

This is where Pakistan’s fighter option is unusual. In most air forces, the cost of flying fighters makes repeatable strike prohibitive. The PAF’s JF-17, however, was designed from the start to be affordable and to integrate seamlessly into Pakistan’s doctrine. Unlike the F-16 or Rafale, it does not impose a foreign logistics model or unaffordable operating costs. 

Historian Usman Shabbir noted that the PAF logged over 100,000 sorties by 2023 – a tempo that would not have been possible if the JF-17’s cost-per-flight-hour was anywhere near the F-16’s $22,000–23,000 band. Conservative extrapolations place the JF-17 at $4,000–6,000 per flight hour, roughly comparable to the Gripen and FA-50, but offset further by Pakistan’s cheaper labor and the lower input costs (resulting from Chinese and Pakistani suppliers).

Loadouts reinforce the value. A JF-17 can carry at least two REK glide-bomb kits on 500 kg-class bombs, or up to four with lighter 250 kg-class weapons. Every sortie thus delivers multiple precision stand-off effects at costs far lower than an equivalent salvo of Fatah-series missiles. The limiting factor is not the aircraft, but the stockpile of REKs and bombs – both of which Pakistan can produce domestically at scale.

For Pakistan, the conclusion is clear. The Fatah-series gives the Army immediate salvos and deterrence credibility at the start of a conflict. The JF-17 with REKs gives the Air Force a repeatable strike arm that can be flown every day of a war. Together, they embody the Boots Theory: missiles provide the quick, necessary punch, but the durable value comes from a fighter fleet that can keep striking long after the magazines are empty.