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It’s Not Just About the Jet: The Real Reason Indonesia Chose Turkey’s KAAN Quwa Premium
The Indonesian government has finalized its contract with the Turkish government and Turkish Aerospace Industries (TAI) for the procurement of 48 TAI KAAN fifth-generation fighter aircraft (FGFA) for the Indonesian Air Force (TNI-AU), marking the next-generation’s platform’s first export success and a continuation of Jakarta’s mission to modernize its air force.
The finalization of the USD $10-plus billion deal on July 28, 2025, was confirmed by high-level officials from both nations and represents a significant deepening of defense and industrial ties between Jakarta and Ankara. The contract, which also includes major technology transfer and co-production clauses, offers Indonesia to join several Southeast Asian (notably Singapore and Australia) in inducting FGFAs in the coming years.
Turkish Aerospace KAAN Specifications
The KAAN is TAI’s flagship program, representing Ankara’s ambition to join the elite club of nations that can produce a stealth combat aircraft.
- Length: 20.3 m (66 ft)
- Height: 5 m (16 ft)
- Wingspan: 13.4 m (44 ft)
- Wing Area: 71.6 m² (771 ft²)
- Maximum Takeoff Weight (MTOW): 34,750 kg (76,500 lb)
- Thrust: 2 x 13,150 kgf (2 x 29,000 lbf)
- Maximum Speed: Mach 1.8
- Service Ceiling: 16,764 m (55,000 ft)
- G-Limits: +9 / -3.5 G
- Key Capabilities: The design features supercruise , high maneuverability , and an extended combat radius
The KAAN is a twin-engine, heavyweight stealth fighter, which, with a length of 20.3 meters and a wingspan of 13.4 meters, is closer in size to the F-15 Eagle than to most other NGFAs, like the South Korean KF-21 or Chinese J-35AE. This larger airframe and high maximum takeoff weight suggest the KAAN has the underlying capacity for the deep-strike role, analogous to the F-35, a unique characteristic among many emerging fifth-generation platforms.
TAI builds the KAAN’s capabilities around a multirole profile for both air-to-air and air-to-ground missions. The design features internal weapon bays to preserve its stealth profile and enables the employment of both within-visual-range and beyond-visual-range missiles. This allows for a flexible loadout focused on either air superiority or precision strikes. For missions not requiring stealth, the KAAN provides external hardpoints, significantly expanding its payload.
How the KAAN Could Shape Indonesia’s Air Power
The KAAN’s large size makes it a well-suited platform for Indonesia’s geo-security environment, which involves securing Indonesia’s maritime interests as much as its territorial integrity. In fact, the TNI-AU could leverage the KAAN for a variety of roles, from long-endurance operations at sea to, potentially, projecting a measure of power via a potential deep-strike role. For the latter, the TNI-AU could use the KAAN to hold high-value targets at risk from a distance, a significant advantage that was largely restricted to platforms like the F-35.
TAI also designed the KAAN to support next-generation air warfare concepts, like manned and unmanned teaming (MUM-T). With MUM-T, a single KAAN could direct a swarm of unmanned systems for reconnaissance or strike missions, dramatically expanding its situational awareness and combat reach across the vast Indonesian archipelago.
Overall, acquiring 48 TAI KAAN fighters alongside 42 Rafales represents the TNI-AU’s most significant modernization in its history. This future force will provide a formidable counter to the growing capabilities of regional actors like Singapore and Australia, both F-35A operators.
When measured against the TNI-AU’s current fleet, adding nearly 100 4.5 and 5th-generation fighters constitutes a radical transformation.
In terms of the KAAN, the 48 units allow the TNI-AU to stand up three to four full squadrons of 12-16 aircraft each, providing a viable fleet size for meaningful operations. This is not a token purchase but a serious fleet investment, with local production through PT Dirgantara Indonesia being critical for long-term sustainability.
This procurement roadmap should be contextualized by Indonesia’s past procurement benchmarks. Indonesian acquisitions had often been smaller and more fragmented. In contrast, the combined orders for the Rafale and KAAN demonstrate a key departure from this piecemeal approach towards a more deliberate, large-scale recapitalization of the combat fleet.
Turkey's Export Model is Built on Building Partnerships With Customers
In a major milestone, an Indonesian Air Force test pilot successfully flew a KF-21 prototype in South Korea in late June 2025, demonstrating continued, albeit altered, cooperation. This was the first time an Indonesian pilot sat in the front seat during a flight test.
The partnership also weathered a diplomatic incident in which Indonesian engineers were accused of attempting to steal KF-21 technical data. The engineers were eventually cleared, which helped ease tensions and allowed the revised funding agreement to be finalized.
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While the financial disagreements have been formally resolved through a new agreement, Jakarta’s extensive commitments to other foreign fighter programs cast considerable doubt on the ultimate size of its KF-21 fleet.
On the other hand, Indonesia’s domestic aerospace industry is poised to experience significant involvement in the TNI-AU KAAN program.
While the specific workshare agreements are still being detailed, the involvement of Indonesian industry, led by the state-owned aerospace firm PT Dirgantara Indonesia (PTDI), is expected to be substantial and progressive.
The collaboration is likely to unfold in several phases:
- Component Manufacturing: Initially, Indonesian industry will likely begin by manufacturing less complex components. This could include parts such as tail assemblies, pylons, control surfaces, or landing gear components. This approach builds technical capacity and familiarity with TAI’s manufacturing standards.
- Local Assembly: A key objective for Indonesia will be to establish a Final Assembly and Check Out (FACO) line. This would mean that a significant portion of the 48 aircraft ordered for the Indonesian Air Force (TNI-AU) would be assembled in Indonesia by Indonesian technicians, with Turkish supervision.
- Maintenance, Repair, and Overhaul (MRO): A critical and long-term benefit for Indonesia will be the establishment of a domestic MRO hub. This would give the TNI-AU self-sufficiency in sustaining its KAAN fleet and could potentially serve other regional KAAN operators in the future, generating further revenue and expertise.
- Systems Integration: In the long term, as Indonesian capabilities mature, PTDI could become involved in integrating specific sub-systems, particularly those of Indonesian origin, such as local communication or data-link systems.
In effect, a sizable portion of the total cost of the TNI-AU KAAN program could be reinvested back into Indonesia, supporting local jobs, integrating Indonesian producers into the wider TAI supply chain, and, potentially, drive foreign-currency gains through exports to TAI customers in other parts of the world, especially fellow KAAN customers.
This arrangement is the latest and most significant example of Turkey’s highly effective defense export strategy, which often succeeds where more traditional methods fail.
This model is built on four key pillars:
- Co-Production and Partnership: Unlike many Western or Russian suppliers who prioritize direct sales, Turkey actively offers co-production. This transforms a customer into a partner, giving them a tangible stake in the program’s success.
- Technology Transfer: Ankara has proven willing to share significant and sensitive technology. For nations like Indonesia, which harbor ambitions of building a self-sufficient defense industry, this is a far more attractive proposition than simply buying a “black box” system.
- Strategic Flexibility: Turkey provides a high-tech, NATO-standard alternative for nations seeking strategic autonomy. It allows countries to acquire advanced capabilities without the stringent political conditions often attached to purchases from the United States (via FMS) or the risk of sanctions associated with Russian hardware (under CAATSA).
- Customization and Offsets: Turkish firms are known for their flexibility in integrating a customer’s existing or preferred subsystems and offering meaningful industrial offsets that directly benefit the local economy.
Relevance to Pakistan and Other Potential Buyers
The Indonesian KAAN deal holds significant strategic relevance for other potential export partners, most notably the Pakistan Air Force (PAF). As a close defense partner of Turkey, the PAF now has a clear-eyed view of a real-world KAAN export agreement, providing a benchmark for its own future fighter considerations.
This deal effectively moves the KAAN program from a theoretical concept to a tangible export product with established parameters. For the PAF, the key takeaways from the Indonesian agreement include:
- Costing and Contractual Transparency: The Indonesian contract provides the first concrete data points on unit cost, long-term support packages, and the financial terms required for partnership in a fifth-generation fighter program. This allows Pakistani defense planners to model their own potential procurement with a much higher degree of accuracy.
- Co-Production and Offset Model: The PAF can now analyze the specific workshare and technology transfer benefits TAI has granted to Indonesia. This serves as a template for what Pakistan Aeronautical Complex (PAC) could expect in a similar partnership, from component manufacturing to the potential for a local final assembly line and MRO hub.
- De-risking a Future Decision: By observing the trajectory of the TAI-Indonesian partnership over the next few years – including its industrial successes and challenges – the PAF can make a more informed and lower-risk decision about its own engagement.
While the PAF has expressed interest in the KAAN, its participation has always been contingent on a critical factor: the development of an ITAR-free variant. The current KAAN prototypes are powered by American General Electric F110 engines, which are subject to U.S. export controls, making a sale to Pakistan highly problematic.
Therefore, the PAF’s interest remains a long-term option, viable only once TAI integrates a domestically produced engine, such as the planned TF35000. The Indonesian deal provides a crucial waiting-period advantage; the PAF can observe, plan, and prepare, positioning itself to engage decisively once an ITAR-free KAAN becomes a reality.
However, it should not be too slow in making a decision. While there is a measure of risk in joining the KAAN at this stage, the potential industrial and technology sharing benefits are also higher now than they would be if the PAF were to wait for the ITAR-free variant. If it waits until that stage, TAI could have enough other customers and partners to build a consortium around the KAAN and generate sufficient initial economies of scale. The PAF would lose its leverage.
Moreover, the PAF must not assume that its contributions to the KAAN would be too limited or non-existent. Pakistan can effectively compete on cost when it comes to supply chain inputs, so its integration could help make the KAAN more competitive from a lifecycle cost standpoint. The Pakistani defence industry could also contribute towards the MUM-T aspect of the KAAN; major state-owned entities (SOE) like NESCOM have a strong grasp of drones and munitions, so they can actively participate in unmanned combat aerial vehicle (UCAV) and decoy programs.
Finally, TAI is already nurturing a base of skilled Pakistani engineers in its current office located in the country. While modest in scope, this team is making crucial progress in projects, such as the IQBAL technology demonstrator. A KAAN purchase would incentivize TAI to invest in these Pakistani facilities and, as importantly, provide a major conduit to channel Pakistani graduates and even seasoned expatriate engineers back into the Pakistani economy.
