Pakistan’s Rationale for Nuclear Weapons Plus

The starting-point for understanding Pakistan’s rationale for having nuclear weapons is to visit the history of its foreign relations and security efforts. Naturally, one might view India’s underground nuclear tests in 1974 – i.e. Smiling Buddha – as the cause. However, Smiling Buddha was merely the trigger that initiated Pakistan’s efforts to acquire nuclear weapons in earnest, the causes were structural and had emerged far earlier than 1974 or 1971 (i.e. when East Pakistan seceded and became Bangladesh).

Simply put, the cause is the substantiated belief among Pakistan’s decision-makers that nuclear weapons are the only guarantor of Pakistan’s sovereignty and territorial integrity. In a sense, the trigger for these beliefs was the 1965 War; the US refused to support Pakistan’s war effort and, in turn, blocked military aid and spare parts for Pakistan’s military equipment (the vast majority of which was American-made). In addition, Pakistan felt that the international community (e.g. the United Nations) was not conducive for supporting Pakistani interests, such as inflicting substantive penalties on New Delhi.

In Eating Grass, retired Pakistan Army Brigadier General Feroz Khan stated, “Pakistan found international institutions capricious and alliances unreliable.”[1] However, this conclusion – though inherently correct – had come following a prior Pakistani misreading of US interests in South Asia.

Prior to 1965, Pakistan had believed that its status as a US ally would provide it with the requisite weight to pursue its interests vis-à-vis India (i.e. Kashmir). In the lead-up to the 1965, Pakistan was certainly receiving the material fruits to justify its beliefs, i.e. US economic and military aid, comparatively new weapons and a surge in status through membership in the Southeast Asia Treaty Organization (SEATO).

However, none of that support was intended to be used against India. Rather, Washington did not intend to antagonize India at all, be it directly or through Pakistan. In fact, much like Pakistan, the nucleus of the Indian nuclear program could also be traced to US support through the 1950s and 1960s – i.e. the Atoms for Peace Plan.[2] Granted, New Delhi did not sign onto Washington’s efforts to pressure Moscow, but not once did Washington enable Islamabad to penalize India. Pakistan failed to acknowledge this reality.