Pakistan’s Anti-Access/Area-Denial Options (Part 1): Fast Attack Crafts Plus

In an analysis of the Pakistan Navy’s plans to expand its surface fleet (most notably through the purchase of four Type 054A multi-mission frigates from China), Quwa concluded that the effort – though poised to relatively improve the Pakistan Navy (PN) fleet – is likely to be insufficient for building credible sea-control capabilities for blocking the sea-lines-of-communication (SLOC) that India relies on from the Arabian Sea.

Rather, the Type 054A purchase aims to strengthen the existing effort of building credible anti-access and area-denial (A2/AD) capabilities by providing the PN’s anti-ship cruising missile (ASCM)-equipped fast attack crafts (FAC) (and to a lesser extent, its submarines) with another anti-air warfare (AAW) layer – i.e. a medium-altitude element to augment existing very/short-range air defence systems (V/SHORADS) and the Pakistan Air Force’s (PAF) combat aircraft-based coverages.

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Though the A2/AD effort betrays the reality of Pakistan’s economic – notably its fiscal – limitations, it need not be a non-factor in shaping the naval security dynamics between India or Pakistan. Indeed, the inability to muster enough assets for total sea-control does not necessarily mean losing the ability to deter naval activity along one’s own maritime constraints (i.e. the SLOCs affecting Karachi and Gwadar).

In fact, the PN’s ability to construct a credible A2/AD profile, at least in terms of having the right suppliers, has not been better. Firstly, the Chinese have succeeded in developing a spate of long-range munitions, including two supersonic-cruising ASCM designs – i.e. the CM-302 and CX-1 – that are now available for export, albeit under the Missile Technology Control Regime’s (MTCR) 300 km range restriction. Secondly, the PN can procure contemporary deployment platforms from its suppliers, be it China or Turkey.

In terms of deployment platforms, the forthcoming FAC project – i.e. FAC-55 – under Turkey’s Savunma Teknolojileri Mühendislik ve Ticaret AŞ (STM) stewardship is notably interesting. Unveiled during the 2016 International Defence Exhibition and Seminar (IDEAS) in Karachi, Pakistan, the FAC-55 is a 535-ton design capable of reaching a top speed of 55 knots.[1] In comparison, the PN’s Azmat-class FAC has a top speed of 30 knots.[2] Besides a faster top speed, the FAC-55 evidently exhibits better concealment and reduction of its radar cross-section (RCS), thus making it a stealthier FAC design than the Azmat-class FAC.

The PN could have the option of combining the two – i.e. FAC-55 FAC and CM-302 ASCM – to significantly bolster its A2/AD capabilities such that it can credibly deter unwanted surface vessel activity in Pakistan’s excusive economic zone (EEZ) and SLOCs. Granted, the option would not be a low-cost route in absolute terms, but the relative gains could greatly outweigh the costs, thus making the deal a plausible outcome.

The Case for New Fast Attack Crafts

During IDEAS 2016, a PN official had told local media that the PN was seeking “a squadron” of new FACs, and that a squadron “may have four to six warships.”[3] The official had reportedly added that talks were underway with China and Turkey for the new FACs. There has not been an update to the matter since, but if the PN’s acquisitions to-date are of any indication, the service arm tends to pursue a stated requirement to its fruition. In its course, there is certainly opaqueness and, due to Pakistan’s fiscal constraints, the need to temper expectations and compromise in some respects.

It would be surprising to see the PN abandon a follow-on FAC program. Granted, the STM FAC-55 certainly represents the upper-end of the PN’s spectrum of options, while the current Azmat-class FAC would be a baseline option in case all other avenues are untenable. However, there is a spectrum of options available in the middle from a technology standpoint, notably a design that is faster and stealthier than the Azmat-class FAC. That can be achieved if the new design focuses on concealing munitions, incorporating a heavy use of composite materials in the superstructure and utilizing higher-output engines.

It should be noted that the Azmat-class FAC was sought in-lieu of the PN’s first attempt to acquire MILGEM Ada-class corvettes from Turkey. In fact, Karachi Shipyards & Engineering Works (KSEW) describes the FAC as a “multi-mission corvette”, indicating the ship’s broader mission-profile than simply a missile platform.[4] Although focusing the follow-on FAC for A2/AD only could potentially yield upfront cost-savings (against a larger, patrol-capable miniature corvette), the PN could be concerned about sunk-costs.