Pakistan’s Air Warfare Goals for the Decade are Taking Shape

In 2022, the Pakistan Air Force (PAF) started inducting two major weapon systems: the J-10CE Dragon multi-role fighter aircraft and the Bayraktar Akıncı high-altitude, long-endurance (HALE) unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV). The PAF has also hinted at potentially acquiring the HQ-9 long-range surface-to-air missile (SAM) system. Overall, these systems – along with the much-anticipated JF-17 Block-3 – form the core of the PAF’s air modernization efforts for the rest of this decade.

For the 2020s, the PAF is firmly focusing on fully transitioning its fighter fleet to the fourth-generation and fourth-generation-plus standards. In addition, it is inducting a HALE UAV capability, a significant addition considering that relatively few countries in the world that have access to such solutions.

A Multi-Role Fighter Fleet

Basically, the outcome of transition to a fleet of 4/4+ generation fleet is that the PAF will phase out most of its legacy generation fighters. In fact, the F-16 and JF-17 Block-1 and Block-2 have largely replaced the F-7P and Mirage III/5s in frontline roles, especially in the air-to-air domain.

However, once its transition is complete, the baseline fighters of the PAF fleet will consist of 4^th-generation platforms, i.e., non-upgraded JF-17 Block-1/Block-2s and F-16A/B Block-15-based Mid-Life Update (MLU).

Granted, some platforms may soldier on in niche areas (e.g., the Dassault Mirage III/5s in the strike role), but its general fighter fleet, the PAF will transition to multi-role fighters across the chain, be it lightweight or medium-weight platforms. Not only that, but a substantial portion of these fighters will essentially be 4+/4.5-generation platforms equipped with active electronically scanned array (AESA) radars, integrated electronic countermeasures (ECM) suites, and advanced long-range air-to-air missiles (LRAAM).

When viewed in the context of having close to 20 fully-equipped squadrons of multirole fighters, this will be a significant evolution for the PAF. Several years ago, the PAF had remarked on becoming a true “next-generation” force, and fully retiring F-7P/PGs and Mirage III/5s from frontline roles is the first step.

The next step would likely involve bringing all multirole fighters to the same general standards – i.e., fourth or fourth-plus generation. From at least a supply standpoint, this will be easier to achieve through adding more J-10CEs and/or JF-17 Block-3s. In fact, as Quwa noted earlier, the PAF only inducts a net-new fighter platform when it intends to acquire at least 90 units of that type. Thus, Quwa expects that the PAF would induct a total of at least 90 J-10CEs by 2030. Funding would be the main constraint. However, the PAF can spread its procurement throughout the decade via small batch purchases.

However, the JF-17 Block-3 gives the PAF a lower cost alternative to the J-10CE. In fact, it seems that the PAF worked to standardize the J-10CE and Block-3 in terms of LRAAM configuration (i.e., via the PL-15 and PL-15E). Thus, should the PAF lean on more Block-3s in lieu of J-10CEs, it can still deploy the latter fighter’s marque weapon systems. Overall, the PAF has an avenue to acquiring net-new 4+/4.5-generation fighters.

The bigger question is whether the PAF can augment its F-16 fleet. Having built decades of experience and extensive infrastructure to operate this fighter, upgrading it would be ideal. The market has a number of upgrade packages available, but it is unclear if these are available to the PAF in any form.

That said, if there was an avenue to upgrade the F-16s, the PAF would start with its 18 F-16C/D Block-52+.

These are the PAF’s newest airframes and have substantial life in them – they will fly in Pakistan for many decades to come. This is especially true if the PAF can put these birds through the 5,000-hour service-life-extension program (SLEP) available on the market. While the PAF is inducting the J-10CE, it would not be surprising if Air Headquarters (AHQ) is still reaching out to the U.S. about both upgrading the Block-52 and potentially acquiring the Block-72. If an avenue opens to expand the F-16C/D fleet, the PAF will take it.

The more intriguing side of this question is what the PAF can do with its F-16A/B fleet. Not only are these the bulk of the PAF’s F-16 fleet, but used or mothballed aircraft on the market could give the PAF a notably cost-effective way to grow its inventory. One interesting avenue for these F-16s would be to carry out the Turkish ÖZGÜR upgrade. This upgrade would provide these F-16s with a Turkish AESA radar and, possibly, compatibility with Turkey’s forthcoming air-to-air and air-to-surface weapons. If anything, it would offer the PAF a third stream of advanced air combat capabilities (alongside Chinese and American streams).

In the absence of an upgrade, the PAF’s F-16s would be among the older fourth-generation fighters from both an age and technology standpoint. However, these are still credible air combat assets, especially in South Asia where there still be fighters like the MiG-29 and Mirage 2000 to counter.

Starting 2030, the PAF will likely shift to actively pursuing a next-generation fighter aircraft (NGFA). Given that the J-10CE offers a credible single-engine, medium-weight capability, the NGFA will likely be a larger twin-engine design. The PAF is likely aiming to start replacing the F-16A/Bs with the NGFA.

HALE UAVs

Thus far, the Bayraktar Akıncı is the second of the PAF’s major new inductions in 2022. With its first drone operators qualifying in Turkey in October, it seems the PAF will start procuring the Akıncı soon, potentially in the coming months, if not sooner.

With a maximum take-off weight (MTOW) of six tons, the Akıncı is a large drone. In fact, the Akıncı sits in a similar size and specifications range as the General Atomics MQ-9 Reaper. The U.S. would never release a capability of that caliber to Pakistan; thus, the Akıncı acquisition is quite significant.

The PAF is likely planning to use the Akıncı to cost-effectively scale-up ISR (intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance) coverages. Basically, the PAF can expand its ability in the ISR space (from monitoring the ground in real-time to tracking radar transmission/signals) without acquiring manned aircraft. The Akıncı should offer a long-endurance, readily deployable, and safer (by eliminating the risk of crew fatigue) way to expand ISR coverages. In enough numbers, the Akıncı could make the PAF situationally aware at a level very few countries in Asia (outside of the U.S. and China) could match.

Combined with an all-multirole 4/4+-generation fighter fleet, this level of situational awareness is a major leap. For the PAF, these ‘visible’ assets should set the groundwork for a potent network-enabled capability in the near future. What matters beyond the machines are the PAF’s less visible qualities, such as training and, as importantly, an ability to manage and use the data these new assets will generate. The latter will eventually impact the nature of the PAF’s training and recruitment, especially as data and automation will play growing roles in the PAF’s future.