Pakistan Air Force Capability Additions for This Decade

The Pakistan Air Force (PAF) will undergo significant capability growth through this decade. Headlined by the induction of the JF-17 Block-3 and the apparent order of J-10CEs, the PAF will add a line up of new air-to-air missiles, air-to-surface munitions, and other systems that may stir major tides in regional dynamics, but through many smaller, subtle moves rather a big sweeping act.

However, there is no doubt that the results of Swift Retort left an impression on the PAF leadership, with Air Headquarters (AHQ) looking to build upon what worked, but at scale. In other words, the goal is likely to deploy a Swift Retort-like response across several fronts and, potentially, with greater individual impact compared to the operation the PAF had carried out in February 2019.

Overall, a look at the PAF’s procurement pipeline for this decade shows it is concentrating on three fronts: i.e., extending its air-to-air engagement reach, expanding its strike capacity, and intensifying its electronic warfare element. This article will examine each of these domains.

Extending Air-to-Air Reach

The PL-15E beyond-visual-range air-to-air missile (BVRAAM) is the likely cornerstone of the PAF’s efforts to improve its engagement capabilities. The PL-15E reportedly has a range of 145 km, a major increase to the 70-100 km-range SD-10.[1] However, range would only be one of its improvements over the SD-10. The PL-15E leverages China’s technology advances from the past decade, so it likely has improved defensibility to electronic countermeasures (ECM) (i.e., electronic counter-countermeasures or ECCM).

The PAF will induct the PL-15E alongside the KLJ-7A active electronically scanned array (AESA) radar, which it is integrating to the JF-17 Block-3 and Block-2. In terms of range, the KLJ-7A reportedly offers up to 170 km of coverage against a target with a radar cross-section (RCS) of 5m² [2]

The KLJ-7A comprises of at least 1,000 transmit/receive modules (TRM), enabling it to emit in different frequencies in a single pulse as well as maintain a higher level of defensibility against radar jamming.

In theory, the KLJ-7A should enable the Block-3 and Block-2 to take full advantage of the PL-15E’s range if need be. Moreover, the PAF is also procuring the J-10CE, which could mean it is getting an even larger and higher-output AESA radar. In other words, the PAF’s fighters could have a relatively long radar range. For the PAF, this is an important gain because it wants to maintain a credible “first-look, first-shoot” capability.

Finally, it seems that the PAF’s efforts to induct a true high off-boresight (HOBS) capability are progressing after a decade-plus long struggle. A recent report claimed that the JF-17 Block-3’s helmet-mounted display and sight (HMD/S) kits are in production (and custom-fit for each pilot).[3] The PAF will pair the HMD/S with a HOBS air-to-air missile (HOBSAAM), thereby greatly improving the within-visual-range (WVR) capability of the JF-17 (and likely J-10CE). It is unclear if the HMD/S is configured as one helmet-integrated kit, or as an add-on module. The HMD/S is likely Chinese.

Overall, the PAF is attaining both a vertical capability jump through the PL-15E, KLJ-7A, and HOBS, and horizontal growth by distributing these capabilities through many aircraft. By the end of this decade the PAF could potentially field as many as 200 fighters equipped with AESA radars, HOBS, and the PL-15E.

The capabilities on paper merit attention, but the underlying factors driving them are equally important. China’s technology research and development (R&D), especially in electronics and rockets, are translating into a growing roster of modern conventional solutions. These weapons are not a generation behind the mainstay weapons on offer from the West. For the PAF, things have come a long way since the days when it had to buy F-7PGs in lieu of new F-16s or Mirage 2000s because it could not access or afford the latter.

The only limiting factors are Pakistan’s finances and China’s willingness to release its new technology. But, for the most part, China has regularly been releasing export-grade items based on its some of its cutting-edge work. The HQ-9BE, a long-range surface-to-air missile (SAM) with a range of 250 km, is an example, as are the many medium-altitude, long-endurance (MALE) drones in China’s export catalog.

Interestingly, China Electronics Technology Group (CETC) highlighted that it transitioned many of its land-based radars to gallium nitride (GaN)-based TRMs. GaN run on a higher voltage, thereby enabling higher output. In a compact application like the JF-17, this would be a significant capability gain, and the PAF can potentially be getting this from the onset. If not, then certainly within this decade.

The PAF is also simplifying, or at least shortening, the induction cycle by single-sourcing its hardware. Yes, it comes at the cost of losing customization and control, but it accelerates capability acquisition. So, in all likelihood, the KLJ-7A and PL-15E pairing is straightforward (and managed by the Chinese). Likewise, the PAF is probably getting a stock configuration of the J-10CE (i.e., no major customizations).

Expanding Strike Capacity

The PAF is seemingly adding more strike-capable assets through the JF-17. To be more specific, the PAF is basically integrating various stand-off weapons (SOW) to the Thunder. In fact, the JF-17 is already capable of deploying certain SOWs, namely the C-802A anti-ship cruising missile (ASCM), CM-400AKG rocket, and Indigenous Range Extension Kit (IREK) precision-guided bomb (PGB) kit. However, the PAF may be looking to add heavier air-launched cruise missiles (ALCM) like the Ra’ad-series and supersonic-cruising HD-1A.

While the JF-17 has its own range and payload limitations, the PAF can use SOWs to offset those gaps. For example, a long-range SOW like the Ra’ad ALCM could make up for the range deficit. Moreover, while the JF-17 would be limited to carrying two major SOWs, that would still be an improvement over the Mirage III/5, which are the PAF’s mainstay SOW-carriers. It can leverage a larger number of aircraft to ensure it is able to engage all of its pre-determined high-value targets (HVT).

Like the air-to-air capability growth, the air-to-surface efforts will result in both vertical advancements – e.g., giving the JF-17 longer-ranged SOWs – and horizontal expansion by having more aircraft capable of the strike role. In the future, the PAF would likely transition this role to a larger aircraft, potentially a next-generation fighter aircraft (NGFA). In 2019, the PAF said it was looking for a twin-engine NGFA design.

Intensifying Electronic Warfare

The PAF is also investing in its EW, especially self-protection jamming via ECM. The JF-17 Block-3 will have an integrated ECM suite. The PAF also inducted a new dedicated self-protection jamming pod – reportedly named “Panjnad” – for use on the Block-2. Using spoofing and other techniques, ECM help protect aircraft from enemy radar threats, such as missile seekers.

Like its air-to-air and air-to-surface improvements, the PAF is adding EW with both vertical and horizontal growth aims. In addition to the JF-17 Block-3/Block-2 and J-10CE, the PAF’s F-16s also have use ECM, such as the ALQ-211(v)9 and, potentially, the ALQ-131 or ALQ-184 for the F-16 Mid-Life-Update (MLU) aircraft.

By the end of this decade, the majority of the PAF’s mainstay fighters could have access to some form of ECM, either integrated/internal or through a special mission pod.

Finally, to support its ECM, the PAF will likely double-down on electronic intelligence (ELINT) and signals intelligence (SIGINT) as well. It would need to continue building its threat-library by monitoring electro-magnetic emissions in the region. The PAF could invest in more drones for the task as those would allow it to maintain pervasive SIGINT/ELINT activity at a lower cost per sortie than manned aircraft.

One area worth watching for is the PAF’s investment in electronic attack (EA), especially a stand-off range jammer. This would be a major net-new capability gain for the PAF and, in all likelihood, something it will package with its offensive attack packages.

[1] Richard Fisher Jr. “The Air Balance on the Taiwan Strait.” International Assessment and Strategy Center. 21 February 2010. URL: https://www.strategycenter.net/research/pubID.224/pub_detail.asp

[2] Henri Kenhmann. “Airshow China 2016: KLJ-7A AESA radar.” East Pendulum. 01 November 2016. URL: http://www.eastpendulum.com/airshow-china-2016-radar-aesa-klj-7a

[3] Sqn. Ldr (ret’d) Fahad Masood. “Roar of the Thunder.” AirForces Monthly. February 2022.