Nigeria Takes Delivery of 3 JF-17 Thunder Fighters

On 21 May 2021, the Nigerian Air Force (NAF) received three JF-17 Thunder combat aircraft from Pakistan Aeronautical Complex (PAC). The NAF celebrated the induction as part of its 57^th anniversary.

Nigeria announced that it would acquire the JF-17 in 2016. Since 2016, the Nigerian government has been allocating payments for the fighter purchase as part of its annual budgets.

It appears that the price of the current JF-17 order is $184.3 million US.[1] In 2018, PAC told the Pakistani cabinet’s Economic Coordination Committee (ECC) that the Nigerian does not involve loans or financing.

Since Nigeria is paying for the aircraft in cash, it seems that it is ordering the JF-17s incrementally based on available funding. Thus, it is likely that Nigeria will follow up its order with additional batches, possibly of the JF-17 Block-III and JF-17B dual-seat variants.

Interestingly, NAF pilots mentioned the use-cases of the Aselsan ASELPOD advanced targeting pod. Based on this information, it seems that the NAF’s JF-17s are configured along identical lines as the Pakistan Air Force’s (PAF) JF-17s and, potentially, may benefit from the same update track in the coming years.

In this case, one can expect that the NAF’s JF-17s are also capable of using the SD-10 beyond-visual-range air-to-air missile (BVRAAM), PL-5E within-visual-range air-to-air missile (WVRAAM), C-802 anti-ship cruise missile (ASCM), the CM-400AKG air-launched rocket, and the Indigenous Range Extension Kit (IREK) stand-off-range precision-guided bomb (PGB) kit. PAC could be supplying the IREK to the NAF directly.

Overall, the JF-17 employs a compact inventory of munition types, but they check all of the main boxes in terms of capabilities. For example, the above offer long and short-range air-to-air capabilities, long-range anti-ship and surface attack coverage, and both satellite-aided and laser-guided bomb compatibility.

The ASELPOD also shows the importance of third-party weapons integration for potential export users. If, for example, Azerbaijan orders the JF-17, it may want to integrate the Roketsan SOM air-launched cruise missile (ALCM) to the platform. Moreover, PAC may bill Azerbaijan for the integration work, but may later make the SOM ALCM compatibility available to PAF and NAF JF-17s.

Finally, it seems that the PAF could upgrade the JF-17 Block-II and possibly Block-I with some of the Block-III’s subsystems, namely the KLJ-7A active electronically scanned array (AESA) radar. PAC is setting up an assembly line for the KLJ-7A, which suggests that the PAF could acquire the radar in sizable numbers for its older fighters. If the upgrade track for the PAF and NAF is similar, then the NAF could also receive the AESA radar and, possibly, other additions, such as helmet-mounted display and sight (HMD/S).

Based on these elements, the NAF may have received one of the most capable weapon packages available in Sub-Saharan Africa. Granted, the JF-17 may have some legacy design attributes (e.g., aerodynamically stable design), but the sum of capabilities (e.g., BVRAAM, ASCM, PGB, etc) is contemporary, and will see additional advancement on top of the Block-III program.

Not only that, but it seems that there are fewer end-user ‘strings’ and costs tied to the JF-17 than other platforms, especially when it comes to accessing sensitive munitions such as long-range air-to-air missiles and cruise missiles. If China and Pakistan can deliver on the promise by providing these benefits to a range of countries across different regions, the JF-17 could potentially line-up a respectable number of buyers.

For the NAF, the next step would be to gradually build-up a sizable number of JF-17s. The next focus area could be to build the training infrastructure for the JF-17. The PAF had cited that one of the major reasons why it greenlit the development of the dual-seat JF-17B was that potential customers had requested it as a conversion platform. The PAF is also positioning the platform as a lead-in-fighter-trainer (LIFT), giving it an additive utility atop of simply a conversion aircraft for the JF-17.

Thus, the NAF could next look towards the JF-17B as both a conversion aircraft for its JF-17 pilots, and a LIFT for its new pilots. The JF-17B is also combat-ready, so acquiring it would also add to the NAF’s overall operational readiness with additional fighter assets. In the long-run, the NAF could look to replace the F-7 and Alpha Jet with the JF-17 Block-III and JF-17B, respectively. One element that could accelerate these plans could be the availability of financing or credit from China.

In a follow-up to the Argentinian negotiations, there are reports that the China National Aero-Technology Import & Export Corporation (CATIC) presented its offer to Buenos Aires. The current offer is made up of 12 JF-17 Block-IIIs – i.e., 10 single-seaters and two dual-seaters. The package is reportedly valued at $600 million, but it includes the aircraft as well as 48 BVRAAMs and WVRAAMs. The pricing aligns with the NAF order, though the latter was slightly higher on a per-unit-cost basis, but there were fewer aircraft involved – in other words, there may have been a higher fixed overhead in the Nigerian purchase.

Interestingly, the report – which is second-hand information – claims that the RD-93MA turbofan engine is also on offer. If this information is accurate, it would imply that the RD-93MA could be available to the JF-17 Block-III.[2] The PAF did not indicate that it would switch to a new powerplant, rather, it suggested that it was satisfied with the RD-93. That said, the PAF only has 30 (of the originally planned 50) JF-17 Block-III on order; it is possible that the PAF is deferring the remaining 20 as part of an engine switch.

In addition, an offer of the RD-93MA would also suggest that Russia is onboard with supporting a sale of JF-17s to Argentina. This would be interesting because Russia is also competing for Argentina’s fighter bid with the MiG-35. One could have expected Moscow to withhold the RD-93MA in order to promote MiG-35s, but if the local report is correct, then that conflict is no longer a factor. Granted, the threat of possible US sanctions or reprisals would predispose Argentina to favour a Chinese solution over a Russian one.

Overall, aside from the technical value and benefits of the JF-17 to the end-users, a larger customer base could also enable the PAF to partner and collaborate with more air forces. For example, there is a prospect for multinational exercises (e.g., Indus Viper) involving the air forces of Nigeria, Argentina, or Malaysia. In return, these air forces could draw on the work the PAF is doing in key areas such as data-link development or electronic warfare and countermeasures deployment, among other areas.

Basically, a fighter acquisition is only one step towards building a credible air warfare capability. However, continuous exposure to the practices of other air forces, training, and access to new technologies is critical for long-term success. In this respect, the PAF offers prospective JF-17 users a unique avenue to build such capabilities with minimal financial and/or political cost.

[1] Zafar Bhutta. “ECC okays sale of JF-17 to Nigeria for $184.3m.” The Express Tribune. 24 October 2018. URL: https://tribune.com.pk/story/1832482/2-ecc-okays-sale-jf-17-nigeria-184-3m

[2] Marcelo R. Cimino. “Proposal for FC-1 / JF-17 aircraft to Argentine Republic.” Full Aviacion. 22 May 2021. URL: https://www.fullaviacion.com.ar/2021/05/22/propuesta-por-aeronaves-fc-1-jf-17-a-la-republica-argentina/?fbclid=IwAR2U8X0KsWNf1XJ3fqoDhny7wkSHOv_uw4s0UTtqRB_LwVnevVqEeFXVtdM