Moving Forward With the MILGEM-J Corvette/Frigate

On 09 June 2020, Karachi Shipyard & Engineering Works (KSEW) cut the steel for the Pakistan Navy’s (PN) second (of four) MILGEM corvettes. During the steel cutting ceremony, KSEW displayed an impression or illustration of the corvette that showcased a number of reported changes in the PN’s MILGEM design.

The most notable of these changes was the inclusion of 16 vertical-launch system (VLS) cells towards the bow and a dual triple-cell configuration for anti-ship cruising missiles (ASCM) and/or land-attack cruising missiles (LACM). The hull of the PN’s MILGEM also seems longer than the standard Ada-class corvette.

Based on its weapon systems configuration alone, the PN MILGEM corvette is more capable than the PN’s currently serving F-22P frigates. However, the PN is still referring to the MILGEM as corvettes, though the displacement of this design exceeds that of older frigates, such as the Type 21.

In line with the original contract, which was signed in 2018, the PN was to receive three corvettes and a frigate – the latter would be a joint-design. The implication was that the fourth ship would be different in specifications and capabilities to the preceding three vessels. This made sense as the MILGEM Ada lacked several key features, such as VLS. But this is not the case with the PN MILGEM design.

In fact, the PN MILGEM ‘corvette’ design is already similar in size and capability to the I-Class frigate (the latter has a larger ASCM/LACM load-out). It is unclear how much farther the PN or the main contractor – Turkey’s Military Factory and Shipyard Corporation (ASFAT A.Ş.) – can stretch the design without basically duplicating the I-Class. Thus, the PN may have opted to standardize the ‘frigate’ design on all four ships.

Standardizing one design for all four ships makes sense in that the alternative would have had KSEW build a one-off of two highly customized ships. Producing a one-off MILGEM Ada while starting a new line for a frigate was plausible because the Ada was an existing design, so KSEW could simply acquire the material kits (KoM) from Turkey and assemble the ship (as it had with other vessels in the past).

But if the ‘corvette’ is a custom design, then it would mean two sets of non-recurring engineering (NRE) costs for development and testing work. It is unlikely the PN would duplicate this overhead. It would either take three Ada corvettes as-is and add a new ship design, or spread the overhead of developing the frigate to the first three ships as well. The PN may have opted for the latter route.

Committing to the Design and Expanding the Fleet

The PN MILGEM design will deliver modern anti-ship warfare (AShW), anti-submarine warfare (ASW), and anti-air warfare (AAW) capabilities. The design fulfils current and future naval needs. Thus, it would make sense for the PN to acquire additional vessels of this class after the first four ships.

Ideally, the PN would have standardized its modernization plans on this design (i.e., pursue eight MILGEMs instead of splitting the requirement with four Type 054A/P frigates from China). Such a move would have driven economies-of-scale for the project and distribute the design/development overhead across more units sooner. The PN could have also allocated part – or most – of the shipbuilding contract to the private sector. The opportunity to build the PN’s future mainstay ship might have incentivized the private sector to buy into initiatives such as Gwadar Shipyard (which the government is trying to get off the ground) and, possibly, lead to investment in ship inputs such as steel, composites, electronics, weapons, etc.

That said, the Type 054A/P frigate likely came as a result of flexible financing/credit resources from China, and an expedited delivery schedule. But if the move was made to supplant the Type 21 and maintain the PN’s sea-control/sea-policing capability in peacetime, then it could have sought more commercial-grade offshore patrol vessels (OPV) instead. These OPVs would have come at a lower cost ($60-70 million US per ship) and maintain that baseline capability as the MILGEMs roll-out. Likewise, the PN could have tied an OPV requirement of six to eight ships to offsets and local manufacturing, i.e., encourage the private sector.

Expecting a Domestic Anti-Ship/Land-Attack Cruising Missile

KSEW’s illustration/impression of the PN MILGEM indicates that the ship will not carry C-802/Exocet-sized ASCM, but rather, it will use larger missiles, such as the Harbah sub-sonic ASCM/LACM.

The front cover of the MILGEM’s launch canisters are squarish, while the Harbah launchers the PN uses from the last two Azmat-class fast attack craft (FAC) use circular covers. If these are the actual designs of the new cannisters, these could point towards the use of a new missile type in addition to the Harbah. It may be for the forthcoming supersonic-cruising ASCM as well.

It would be interesting to see if the PN can develop a standard launcher design for the Harbah and its new supersonic-cruising ASCM. Doing so would allow for a greater degree of flexibility in that each ship of the class can carry either type of missile (or both) with minimal modifications. If armed with both missiles, the single ship can carry out a more varied set of attacks against targets on land and at sea.

Selecting an Effective Surface-to-Air Missile (SAM)

Earlier reports indicated that the PN would select the Chinese LY-80N surface-to-air missile (SAM) for the MILGEM. However, it is unclear it the PN finalized a system.

If KSEW’s illustration/impression is close to the finalized design of the PN MILGEM, then it shows a unique VLS. The uptake was not seen in earlier models or impressions, though it could be due to a lack of space in the hull. But the cannister covers do not point to a Chinese, European, or American VLS suite.

It is possible that KSEW used a stand-in to indicate the presence of VLS, but without pointing to a particular make or model. However, KSEW’s impressions have generally been close to the final design (e.g., the third and fourth FAC images had shown the exact dual-triple cell launchers found on the real-world vessels).

Besides the LY-80N, the PN’s leading alternative SAM options would likely be MBDA Italy’s CAMM-ER and the South African Denel Dynamics Umkhonto EIR. The CEO of MBDA Italy had personally visited NHQ and the PN Chief of Naval Staff (CNS), Admiral Zafar Mahmood Abbasi, in October 2019. It is unlikely the CEO of MBDA Italy would have made such a visit for a small proposal; the only big-ticket item of relevance to the PN would be the CAMM-ER. In 2016, Adm. Abbasi’s predecessor, Admiral Muhammad Zakaullah Khan, had requested information from Denel Dynamics about the Umkhonto.

With the CAMM-ER or Umkhonto EIR, the PN has the option to select a SAM with a terminal-stage seeker. It can use that SAM to complement the semi-active radar-homing (SARH)-based LY-80N (which will come through the Type 054A/P) and, in turn, diversify its AAW coverage. SAMs with terminal-stage seekers rely on data-link for mid-course guidance, while SARH-based SAMs need an off-board illuminator radar to keep a lock on the target from launch to proximity explosion. However, SAMs with terminal-stage seekers can rely on their onboard seekers once they are in close proximity to the target.

The CAMM-ER (Common Anti-Air Modular Missile-Extended Range) offers a range of over 40-45 km. It is a longer-ranged variant of the CAMM, but the Italian government is the main funding source for this new version. Italy is also looking to replace its Spada SAM units with the CAMM-ER. Pakistan is reportedly one of the countries interested in the CAMM-ER.[1] The CAMM-ER uses an active radar-homing (ARH) seeker.

On the other hand, an advantage of selecting the Umkhonto EIR could be transfer-of-technology (ToT). In 2017, South Africa and Pakistan had signed a memorandum-of-understanding (MoU) to support ToT and joint weapons collaboration. Denel Dynamics completed the development of the Umkhonto EIR in 2017, so the system is available for sale. The Umkhonto EIR uses an imaging infrared (IIR) terminal-stage seeker and offers a range of 30-35 km. Denel is also developing a longer-ranged version of the Umkhonto with a range of 60 km. This variant will use an ARH-based terminal-stage seeker.

The PN may have the option to extend the MILGEM project’s developmental track to also include AAW – i.e., add to its ship design learning and ASCM/LACM technology. It can acquire the Umkhonto EIR in the short-term, but support the development of the 60-km Umkhonto-ER/LR for use in the future. The key is getting the Navy, Army, and Air Force to collectively support a common SAM development project and, in turn, leverage their combined orders to build economies-of-scale and regularly iterate the technology.

Investing in Design and Indigenizing Inputs

The advantage of designing a ship and owning its intellectual property (IP) rights is that the leading/main contractor can select the inputs of the vessel. It exerts more control over the subsystems and weapons, and it can control the cost of the final system. However, the designer may still rely on foreign inputs.

While engaging in ship design work through the MILGEM could be a major step forward, the PN ought to set a track for indigenizing some of the core inputs. It may be able to drive investment in some areas (e.g., steel) before others (e.g., engines), but a firm commitment to buy ships from local entities that honour an indigenization clause could spur industry support for such development.

With its earlier ToT projects – e.g., the F-22P frigate and Agosta 90B submarine – the PN did not commit to follow-on orders, nor did it open enough of the production activity to the private sector. While locally building ships with indigenous inputs is far from a trivial effort, the lack of investment and incentivization in these areas will leave Pakistan repeating its high-cost, inefficient procurement practices.

So, for example, the PN can formally commit to procuring 12 of these ships over the long-term. It can also reserve contracts for eight ships to the private sector. It can break-up the procurement into phases, with each subsequent one setting specific localization requirements. To help localization, it can set-up shared equity initiatives to jointly develop specific inputs in collaboration with the domestic private sector as well as foreign companies. Finally, the private sector can use the capacity it built for supporting navy contracts to drive high-value exports – it can generate employment, further investment, and foreign currency gains.

[1] Pietro Batacchi. “The CAMM-ER Starts Again.” Rivista Italian Difesa. 20 June 2019. URL: https://www.portaledifesa.it/index~phppag,3_id,3109.html