Is Ukraine’s Use of the HIMARS Making the Case for Land-Based Strike Capabilities?

In September, Ukraine announced that it was undertaking counteroffensive operations across its southern areas. Thus far, those operations have culminated in the recovery of key territory, notably Kharkiv, which had been under Russian occupation since the early stages of this war.

There is no doubt that Ukraine’s reclamation push is geo-politically significant. This is the first-time today’s world is seeing a country reverse the military occupation of another country through a conventional war. It is unclear if Ukraine will succeed, but its current push is not an event to ignore or overlook.

But in its fight, Ukraine is also writing a playbook of how other countries might employ their conventional warfare capabilities, especially against a larger and better-equipped foe.

One of the key assets Ukraine has been using in its bid to reclaim territory has been the U.S-supplied M142 High Mobility Artillery Rocket System (HIMARS). While a multiple launch rocket system (MLRS) at its core, the HIMARS is functionally a stand-off range precision-strike asset.

Background: HIMARS

The end-user can configure the HIMARS with different types of guided rockets. Its load-out can comprise of either six 227 mm rockets or a single 610 mm rocket.

The go-to for the 227 mm option is the Guided Multiple Launch Rocket System (GMLRS), which offers a range of 92 km. The solution for the 610 mm option is the Army Tactical Missile System (ATACMS), which has a range of up to 300 km. There is also an intermediary option in the 150 km-range GMLRS-ER.

Both the GMLRS and ATACMS leverage GPS-aided inertial navigation system (INS) guidance suites. These rockets are effective against fixed installations. However, it seems the U.S. is making efforts to add a real-time targeting capability, e.g., connecting the F-35 Lightning II sensor feed to the HIMARS.

The HIMARS runs with a crew of three operators. Once the HIMARS expends its rocket pod, the crew can replace the cannister pod (either of six GMLRS or one ATACMS) in four minutes or less.

Finally, the HIMARS can under a “shoot-and-scoot” maneuver by relocating to a different location after it expends its rocket cannister. The HIMARS’ base platform is the five-ton Family of Medium Tactical Vehicles (FMTV), the mainstay logistics vehicle of the U.S. Army.

Analysis: Ukraine’s Experience Using the HIMARS

According to Gen. Mark Milley, the Chairman of the U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, Ukraine has successfully hit more than 400 targets using the HIMARS, and to “devastating effect.”

The HIMARS is not the panacea solution that will win the war for Ukraine. However, like the Bayraktar TB2 drone, the HIMARS is proving to be a markedly effective asset for specific, but high-value operations. Like the TB2, Ukraine has been using the HIMARS to stop Russia from consolidating its territorial gains.

In its counteroffensive, Ukraine had focused on targeting Russia’s logistics, ammunition supplies, fuel, and other infrastructure for sustaining the occupation. Obviously, when Russia loses these assets (apparently over 400 examples of such), its ability to hold territory erodes. In a way, Russia was in a constant state of fighting off anti-access and area-denial (A2/AD) pressure from Ukraine.

Firstly, Ukraine’s usage of the HIMARS shows that this type of asset works.

Thus far, only eight HIMARS units were involved in Ukraine’s counteroffensive. However, Ukraine is clearly showing that the combination of accurate intelligence (for target acquisition), guided rockets, and ‘shoot-and-scoot’ maneuver warfare can have tactical and, potentially, strategic impacts.

Now, for the HIMARS to work, Ukraine needs access to accurate targeting information, which would come from intelligence, surveillance, reconnaissance, and target acquisition (ISTAR). This could be coming from Ukraine’s use of the Bayraktar TB2 drone and human intelligence (HUMINT).

However, Ukraine is getting additional ISTAR support from the U.S. and other Western allies. This may be through the latter’s intelligence work, satellite-based imaging intelligence (IMINT), and other assets. That said, this intelligence support must be extensive to keep accurately tracking Russia’s real-time maneuvers.

So, in a sense, the HIMARS is simply the “front end” of the support Ukraine is getting from the West; there is much more at play from an ISTAR perspective. However, because the HIMARS and ISTAR pairing seems to work, the world may see more countries heavily invest in these areas.

Secondly, Ukraine is showing that “shoot-and-scoot” is a genuine capability.

Reportedly, Russia is having trouble locating the HIMARS firing units. The rapid mobility capability seems to be aiding Ukraine. However, Ukraine is also using dummy HIMARS as decoys to entice Russia to expend its resources, like cruise missiles, against false targets.

However, it is not solely the mobility aspect of the HIMARS that makes its ‘shoot-and-scoot’ effective. The rapidly expendable rocket cannister and ability to quickly configure new cannisters is critical.

In legacy MLRS systems, the rocket cannister is permanently attached to the vehicle. So, once it expends its munitions stock, the end-user has to reload the system one-by-one. While an older generation system can move after firing its rockets, the end-user cannot quickly reload that specific vehicle. It would have to re-load each cell individually.

In contrast, the HIMARS takes a modular approach where once it expends the cannister, the end-user can replace the cannister within four minutes. Not only that, but the end-user can choose between different types of cannisters, e.g., it can use a single-cell ATACMS instead of a six-cell GMLRS/ER suite.

So, within the same mission context, the end-user can switch between different types of munitions – and in quick succession. This capability unlocks a range attack possibilities. For example, the end-user can fire six GMLRS, and then switch to basically a small short-range ballistic missile (SRBM) minutes later.

Interestingly, the end-user could store (or hide) the munitions cannisters in different areas. Hence, when the main firing unit goes on the move, it could go another munitions store, re-arm, and then move again. Thus, understanding where each HIMARS unit could go and again fire from is difficult to decipher.

In effect, the HIMARS is a force multiplier, which explains why only Ukraine is achieving so much with just eight units (out of a promised allotment of twelve).

That said, one should not give all of the credit to the HIMARS. In fact, one can argue that Ukraine is having an easier time preserving its HIMARS because of its other efforts. Ukraine, for example, has put up a strong resistance to Russian air power through its own air defence systems and fighter aircraft.

Lessons for Other Countries

Ukraine’s experience with the HIMARS could drive other countries to acquire a HIMARS-like capability (if not the HIMARS itself). Pakistan, for example, is already investing in guided MLRS, like the Fatah-1 and A-100E. However, the modular firing cannisters unlock additional operational flexibility, so Pakistan (as well as other countries) could now adapt their MLRS programs in that direction.

Strategically, the benefit of a HIMARS-type system is that it provides another precision-strike deployment asset. In fact, a HIMARS firing unit can cost less to acquire and operate than a fighter aircraft. Hence, the end-user can carry out critical tactical strikes using the HIMARS and, in turn, free up its fighters for the air-to-air role. This creates a ‘positive’ ripple effect where one has more assets available to deny the enemy air superiority yet, at the same time, still have a potent strike capability (but from the ground).