U.S. President Donald J. Trump began 2018 with a tweet accusing Pakistan of duplicity with regards to the ongoing – and over 16-year-long – U.S.-led military campaign in Afghanistan.[1] Trump reiterated how the U.S. provided Pakistan with $33 billion U.S. in funding since 2002-2003, accused Pakistan of acting against U.S. interests and then concluded with, “No more!” On January 04, the U.S. announced that it will freeze the originally planned flow of all financial security aid to Pakistan – reportedly up to $1.1 billion – unless Pakistan ceases its support to the so-called Haqqani-network, which the U.S. alleges is responsible for orchestrating and organizing attacks in Afghanistan using Pakistani territory.[2] This follows an earlier decision in 2018 by the U.S. to freeze a transfer of $255 million in funding to Pakistan (totalling a potential freeze of $1.3 billion).[3] However, the U.S. emphasized that it only froze the transfer, it did not scrap the aid program – “Pakistan has the ability to get this money back in the future, but they have to take decisive action,” said Heather Nauert, the spokeswoman of the U.S. State Department.[4]
The U.S. had hinted to taking this course towards the end of 2017. By that point, the U.S. had spent $13.9 billion under the Coalition Support Fund (CSF)[5] (which Pakistan sees as a reimbursement for its campaigns in its Tribal Areas) and $14.1 billion in non-security aid, such USAID programs.[6] The current crisis started in late 2017 with Trump releasing his National Security Strategy, regarding which he stated, “We have made clear to Pakistan that while we desire continued partnership, we must see decisive action against terrorist groups operating on their territory. And we make massive payments every year to Pakistan. They have to help.”[7] However, following an exchange of bluster from both sides, the U.S. and Pakistan proceeded to resolve the issue. In October, the U.S. Secretary of State Rex Tillerson visited Pakistan while Pakistan’s Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Committee, General Zubair Mahmood Hayat, visited the U.S.[8] In November, the U.S. Congress approved $700 million in CSF to Pakistan, of which $350 million was conditional to certification from the Secretary of Defence of Pakistan acting against Haqqani et. al.[9]
On its surface, Trump’s statement seemed to have quickly pivoted from the track laid at the end of 2017. It was also met with severe criticism in Pakistan from both within and outside Pakistan’s government. On January 04, Pakistan’s Foreign Minister Khawaja Asif stated, “United States is not our friend, its behaviour towards Pakistan is neither that of friend nor an ally.”[10] In the opposition, the Chairman of Pakistan Tehreek-e-Insaf (PTI), Imran Khan released this official statement: “It is time for Pakistan to delink from the US especially after the new National Security Strategy announced by Trump in December 2017…”[11]
Based on the furor, which appears to exist in both Pakistan and the U.S., one might imagine that U.S. and Pakistani defence relations will halt. However, Trump’s statement, while harsh and undiplomatic in its wording, reflected the substance of U.S. foreign policy with regards to Pakistan since the administration of President Barack Obama. Imran Khan and the PTI had rightly identified the outcome of the underlying policies – i.e. “…which [the U.S. National Security Strategy] again targets Pakistan while emphasizing the need to give India an increasing strategic role in Afghanistan and the region…” – but the U.S.’ policies of downplaying Pakistan’s concerns regarding India, supporting India’s stature (e.g. backing India’s entry into the Missile Technology Control Regime: MTCR) and having Pakistan focus its national security priorities to counterinsurgency (COIN) and counter-terrorism (CT) on its western flank has been in motion prior to Trump. Even the latter aspect – i.e. conditioning U.S. security funding transfers to Pakistan to COIN/CT – has been evident prior to Trump assuming office.
One need only refer to 2016 when the U.S. Congress prohibited the use of Foreign Military Financing (FMF) support to subsidize Pakistan’s purchase of eight new-built Lockheed Martin F-16 Block-52+ fighters as an example (the justification for the block on FMF was that Pakistan was ‘not doing enough’ against the “Haqqani-network”).[12] In fact, the lead-up to the process Congress debating the prospective sale, the Chief of Air Staff (CAS) of the Pakistan Air Force (PAF), Air Chief Marshal (ACM) Sohail Aman, connected the F-16 purchase to Pakistan’s CT and COIN efforts. He confirmed this in April 2017 to Bol Narratives, stating, “These F-16s had to be purchased on shared funding. Operation Zarb-e-Azb remains our war, but the Americans had been asking for a North Waziristan operation for years … American funding for F-16s would have been a win-win situation.”[13] Prior to this Congress blocked the transfer of ex-U.S. Navy Oliver Hazard Perry (OHP)-class frigates to the Pakistan Navy (following the successful sale of the ex-USS McInerney, now PNS Alamgir) in 2014. Pakistan sought these ships in its capacity as a Major non-NATO Ally (MNNA), which – on paper – entitled it to procuring surplus/used U.S. arms stocks at low-cost (basically the cost of refurbishing and delivering the equipment). This block occurred in an effort by Congress to condition military assistance to Pakistan.[14] Thus, this issue of the U.S. conditioning military assistance to Pakistan with specific – and U.S.-mandated – objectives is not a recent occurrence or a result of Trump, nor should it be a surprise to Pakistan’s leaders, be it those in the government or the armed forces.
With the U.S. speaking against Pakistan, attention is now on Pakistan’s response. In the aftermath of Trump’s statement, Pakistan’s National Security Council – a committee headed by the Prime Minister, but also including the armed forces leadership – issued the following statement:
“The Committee reached a consensus that despite all unwarranted allegations Pakistan cannot act in haste and will remain committed to playing a constructive role towards an Afghan-led and Afghan-owned peace process, not just for the sake of its own people, but also for the peace and security of the region and international community.”[15]
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