Analysis: The BrahMos-Mian Channu Incident

On 09 March 2022, an Indian Air Force (IAF) BrahMos supersonic land-attack cruise missile (LACM) crashed in Mian Channu, an area located in Khanewal District in Pakistan’s Punjab province.

In a press conference, the Director General of Inter-Services Public Relations (DG ISPR), Major General Babar Iftikhar, said that the Pakistan Air Force (PAF) monitored the BrahMos’ flight path from its apparent launch point near Sirsa, India, to its impact point in Pakistan.

On 11 March 2022, India’s Ministry of Defence (MoD) disclosed that the BrahMos missile crashed because of an “accidental firing” resulting from “a technical malfunction.”

The incident may not have escalated into an official row, but its impact could start – or potentially accelerate – Pakistan’s efforts to grow its early-warning and land-based air defence capabilities. Pakistan would aim to build a better deterrence element to thwart such activity. However, in the absence of strong foreign relations maneuvering, a robust air defence set-up may not form the deterrence element alone.

The Challenge of Intercepting Cruise Missiles

Jointly developed by India and Russia, the BrahMos is a supersonic-cruising LACM capable of reaching top speeds of around Mach 4. Its weight and range vary based on the specific model. For example, the newest version, i.e., the air-launched BrahMos, can reach a range of over 400 km.

In 2017, Quwa had assessed that the BrahMos would generally present a defensibility challenge. Basically, its high-speed nature (which can reach 1 km per second) would drastically cut the reaction time available to Pakistan to track and intercept the missile. While Pakistan should (and likely will) invest in neutralizing the BrahMos, its true deterrence element would come through analogous capability.

Indeed, Pakistan already built an inventory of modern subsonic-cruising LACMs, such as the Babur/Harbah and Ra’ad series. Moreover, the Pakistan Navy (PN) inducted a supersonic-cruising LACM through its Type-054A/P frigate program, i.e., the CM-302. It seems that the PAF could pursue its own supersonic-cruising LACM, potentially the HD-1A, which China marketed as an option for the JF-17.

Ultimately, Pakistan’s near-term recourse against the BrahMos was to bank on the inherent difficulty of intercepting such missiles. If Pakistan will have trouble stopping the BrahMos, then India should also have difficulty stopping the CM-302 and HD-1A. In other words, Pakistan would build its own inventory. It would not be surprising if Pakistan accelerates its supersonic LACM acquisitions in response to this situation.

In any case, the notion that Pakistan did not stop this specific BrahMos is not surprising. Furthermore, the PAF’s Air Vice Marshal (AVM) Tariq Zia, stated that the BrahMos’ flight path cut into the vicinity of two civilian airliners. In other words, even if the PAF had the material means to potentially stop the BrahMos, it likely did not have the option due to the presence of passenger airliners.

For Pakistan, the real problem was not the fact that a BrahMos hit its territory. Rather, the real problems for Pakistan are that its capabilities did not deter the activity, and that Pakistan’s post-incident responses may not have set a deterrence element for the future.

Further Air Defence Investments

Interestingly, on 11 March 2022, the PAF released a promotional video featuring its newly acquired J-10CE multi-role fighters. However, in that same video, the PAF also hinted at additional acquisitions, including new Chinese and Turkish drones as well as long-range, high-altitude air defence assets.

In terms of the latter, the PAF indicated that it will acquire the Chinese YLC-8E ultra-high-frequency (UHF) radar and the HQ-9 long-range surface-to-air missile (SAM) system. One should note that these programs would likely have been in the procurement pipeline for several years. In fact, some of these programs may still be some years away from materializing. However, the PAF might have disclosed the existence of these programs – especially the long-range, high-altitude air defence programs – in response to this situation.

That said, if the PAF was already procuring the YLC-8E and HQ-9 before this incident, then the current row may prompt the PAF to invest more in this area. For example, the PAF could seek additional early warning radars, new medium and long-range SAMs, and, potentially, point-defence missile systems. Interestingly, Pakistan can look into several options from China and Turkey across each of these areas. Availability is not the issue; rather, the main constraint will be Pakistan’s fiscal capacity.

However, does the material capability create the deterrence element? New air defence systems will likely contribute towards it, but they do not define deterrence in its totality. To achieve complete deterrence, Pakistan must pay careful attention to its maneuvering and messaging from a foreign relations standpoint.

Pakistan’s Political Response

Pakistan’s messaging on this matter centered on the following points: First, India did not maintain proper control over its strategic assets. Second, India was irresponsible in how it employed its strategic weapon. Third, Pakistan showed restraint in a bid to maintain stability in South Asia.

However, that third aspect of its messaging may not have been the optimal route to establish deterrence against a future episode of this nature. It is surprising that Pakistan did not aggressively push for a hard-coded agreement to manage test-firings and address “accidental firings.”

Pakistan certainly had the prerogative and, potentially, the leverage to demand it. For example, Pakistan could have anchored the incident to the reality that its civilians were under threat by a strategic weapon.

Whether the BrahMos firing was accidental or even intentional is irrelevant. In reality, a military weapon could have killed Pakistani civilians on Pakistani soil, and that too unprovoked. The narrative should have been less on India’s apparent inabilities and, instead, upheld Pakistan’s right to respond.

Basically, Pakistan could have argued for moral authority to materially respond regardless of intent. Doing so could have bought Pakistan leverage which it could use to establish favourable conditions. These new conditions could center on stricter rules on reporting peacetime testing or utilization, for example.

Instead, it seems that a Pakistani response would still be framed as a ‘destabilizing’ action, which weakens Pakistan’s deterrence stance. In such cases, Pakistan would show restraint, but not fundamentally weaken India’s ability to instigate. Thus, India came away from this incident with leverage, i.e., the knowledge that Pakistan’s hands are tied, and the license to maintain its existing approach.

Ultimately, Pakistan was always weak in terms of maneuvering from a foreign relations standpoint. There are few cases where the ‘Pakistani narrative’ won out in any major incident or situation involving India (or Afghanistan for that matter). This capability gap is not surprising. It seems that Pakistan’s political and military leadership are generally tied into domestic issues more so than addressing foreign affairs. Hence, one should expect a structural inability and/or disinterest in steering issues of this nature.