Analysis: Pakistan’s VT4 Acquisition

Author Profile: Usman Ansari is a journalist specializing in defence issues and presently based in Pakistan. He is Pakistan Correspondent for the US media group Defense News, and Chief Analyst for the British naval news monthly Warships – International Fleet Review. He has a BA in International History and International Politics, and MA in Global Security, both from Keele University, UK.

By Usman Ansari

Pakistani MBT modernization programs since the 1980s successfully focused on countering India’s T-72M1. While India’s Arjun MBT program is largely irrelevant and had a negligible impact on further Pakistani developments, T-90MS purchase dictated a stopgap counter acquisition due to Pakistan’s MBT upgrade program running behind schedule.

Pakistan’s MBT modernization program involved incremental Type-59 upgrades culminating in the Al-Zarrar, an opportunistic stopgap T-80UD acquisition, and localized Type-69II and Type-85APII production leading to the development and manufacturing of the Al-Khalid-series.

The Al-Khalid is based on the NORINCO Type-90II, but customized in line with Pakistan’s requirements. Its more advanced variants, namely the Al-Khalid I and Al-Khalid II, should have met Pakistan’s future MBT needs. In fact, the ongoing Al-Khalid II development indicates that this program is still active.

The VT-4 purchase is purely a stopgap measure dictated by the investment shortfalls that stymied Al-Khalid production[1], and therefore, its continued development.

While the T-80UD and Al-Khalid had varying degrees of parity with India’s T-90S, the considerably better protected T-90MS demanded a counter response the cash-starved Al-Khalid program could not readily provide.

While Ukraine’s Oplot-P has comparable protection to the T-90MS, questions over Kiev’s ability to basically deliver an order (as proven with the Thai contract[2]), ultimately decided the competition in favour of the VT-4.

However, as a counter to the T-90MS, the VT-4’s effectiveness is debatable.

In the triad of armour, mobility, and firepower MBT design characteristics, Pakistan values firepower and mobility over protection. This approach is partially dictated by the weight limits of bridge and road infrastructure.

From what is known of the Thai Oplot and VT-4 experience, the VT-4 has reasonable firepower and mobility characteristics.[3]

With respect firepower the VT-4 benefits from some of the latest Chinese APFSDS-T/kinetic round developments[4], and possibly existing BK-27 triple HEAT round or BK-29 HEAT-MP that adds a hard penetrator. These would likely penetrate the T-90MS glacis plate, but the ability to penetrate the advanced ERA, composite armour, and steel of the turret is wholly unknown. The adoption of gun launched ATGMs is also a possibility, but these are expensive and not presently the ‘silver bullet’ they are promoted to be.

The VT-4’s mobility is probably comparable to the Al-Khalid and may therefore have an advantage over the T-90MS.

In protection terms however, the VT-4 offers no substantial baseline improvement over Pakistan’s existing Al-Khalid and Type-85APII MBTs due to sharing the same turret design and relies entirely on FY-IV ERA to increase protection.

Any round that can defeat the ERA therefore may destroy the tank as the composite armour module gives incomplete coverage vertically and over the frontal arc. Incoming rounds from a horizontal 30-degree angle from the front will bypass the composite armour module to penetrate the unprotected cheeks or vertically could penetrate the sloping roof.

With no internal armoured stowage for extra rounds, the VT-4 (like the Al-Khalid and Type-85APII) will suffer the same catastrophic ammunition cook off and detonation synonymous with the T-72 irrespective any fire suppression systems.

An ERA-reinforced armoured side-skirt has also not been adopted (likely to save weight), therefore like the Al-Khalid and Type-85APII is vulnerable to infantry anti-tank weapons and the hull side is wholly unprotected against tank rounds.

In protection terms, therefore, the VT-4 does not fare well against the T-90MS, and the Oplot-P was the far better protected option.[5]

The Oplot-P houses extra ammunition in armoured lockers, and the layout of the turret composite armour is at least equal to the T-90MS giving maximum protection over the frontal arc.

The Nozh Built-in Anti Tandem Warhead ERA (BATW-ERA) is believed to at least be comparable to the latest Russian Relikt ERA, and effective against both HEAT and kinetic energy rounds.

However, Ukrainian sources claim the Nozh ERA imposes a weight penalty of two tonnes, and this is clearly sufficient to impose a marked reduction in mobility, hindering its ability to handle gradients and side slopes[6]. If the claims of its unimpressive firepower characteristics are accurate,[7] the Oplot-P was ultimately not a viable option.

Impact on Future Upgrades

Strictly in terms of probable, rather than possible developments, what the VT-4 purchase means for the existing Pakistani MBTs is unclear. However, any upgrades will only apply to the T-80UD, Type—85APII, and Al-Khalid. The Al-Zarrar is now obsolete as a gun tank.

Unless the VT-4 features a new generation of composite armour justifying replacing the existing Al-Khalid and Type-85APII modules, upgraded protection will likely be limited to fully or partially adopting FY-IV ERA, which will also replace the T-80UD’s Kontakt-5.

Whether this will impose a weight penalty sufficient to affect mobility is uncertain, but longstanding plans for a 1,500hp powerpack for the Al-Khalid could mitigate this shortfall.

The Type-85APII and T-80UD have each undergone pilot rebuilds by HIT, to be followed by a general rebuild program. They have not yet actually been upgraded.

Some elements such as gunner’s sights, fire control system, communications equipment, and other electronics, may be upgraded simply by acquiring by drop-in replacements if not using the same sub-systems from the VT-4 to increase commonality.

If foreign systems are required, these will likely be provided by China or Turkey, or European countries such as Italy.

However, delivering an effective 24-hour hunter/killer capability may not be so straightforward. Trying to install a third-generation commander’s thermal imaging sight will only be possible if it does not compromise turret roof armour integrity.

Some T-72 upgrades achieve this by installing the commander’s independent panoramic thermal sight on his hatch (notably the Leonardo TURMS –T applied to some Syrian T-72s), bolting it on to the side of the turret, or by having him share the sight on a remote weapon station.

These are viable options for the Type-85APII and T-80UD, with perhaps the TURMS-T approach being the most straightforward.

Longer term upgrades for the Al-Khalid could still mirror the approach taken by the T-90MS.

An internal spall liner and additional composite, or at least a NERA layer between the turret and ERA arranged in a wedge on the turret cheeks, would considerably improve protection.

An extended bolt-on turret bustle housing additional ammunition would simultaneously help retain turret balance affected by the additional armour to the front and prevent catastrophic ammunition cook-off/detonation in case of turret penetration.

A combination of ERA, armoured side skirts and bar/slat armour would increase protection to the hull.

There would be a certain weight penalty from even modest increases in ERA coverage. However, short of redesigning the turret this is the only alternative to maintaining the present inadequate protection levels.

Further ammunition developments may increase lethality. However, the length of existing APFSDS-T/kinetic energy penetrators (length is generally proportional to penetrative capabilities) is dictated by the need to fit inside the ammunition carousel and be manipulated by the autoloader. The physical limits of the existing system appear to have been reached.

Therefore, increased barrel length from the existing L48 calibres to L55 to increase muzzle velocity of kinetic energy rounds is perhaps the only way forward without an entirely new turret and associated autoloader design.

Conclusion

The VT-4 allows Pakistan to maintain an element of parity with the T-90MS, but not in protection levels. Whether it also has a hard-enough punch to effectively deal with the T-90MS is also questionable.

Realistic options for future Pakistani MBT upgrades are constrained by limited finances hindering the option of a wholly new approach and dictating the need to upgrade/further develop serving designs.

These are reaching the end of their developmental potential. However, the vast majority of Indian MBTs will remain upgraded T-72M1s and T-90S MBTs, and unless a wholly new MBT generation is introduced in South Asia, Pakistan’s current approach and options may still meet its needs to maintain an element of technological parity with India.

[1] Press Release. “Senate Standing Committee on Defence Production in its Meeting on Thursday has appreciated the Achievements and Projects.” Senate of Pakistan. 30 November 2017. URL: http://www.senate.gov.pk/en/news_content.php?id=2611

[2] Charlie Gao. “China Is Selling a New Tank. Could It Beat the M1 Abrams in a Fight?.” The National Interest. 10 February 2018. URL: https://nationalinterest.org/blog/the-buzz/china-selling-new-tank-all-over-the-world-could-it-beat-the-24428

[3] Ibid

[4] Ibid

[5] Product Profile: BM Oplot. State Enterprise Kharkiv Design Bureau of Engineering. URL: https://morozov.com.ua/en/bronetankovaya-tehnika-i-vooruzhenie/tanki/razrabotki/oplot/

[6] Ibid.

[7] Charlie Gao. The National Interest