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Is Pakistan Close to Finally Securing a Strike Fighter?
In the mid-1970s, the Pakistan Air Force (PAF) sought to strengthen its offensive strike capabilities through a significant procurement initiative: the acquisition of the LTV A-7 Corsair II.
By 1974, the PAF formally approached the United States, aiming to acquire as many as 110 A-7s. This move signaled a clear strategic shift, showcasing Pakistan’s intent to field a sizable strike fleet capable of both close air support (CAS) but also long-range strike missions.
What made the A-7 particularly attractive to the PAF was specially designed for the strike role. The Corsair II had a robust airframe combined with advanced, albeit attack-oriented, avionics, such as head-up display (HUD), an integrated navigation suite, and terrain-following radar.
Additionally, its payload capacity of approximately 6,800 kg allowed for carriage of a diverse range of air-to-surface munitions, including the AGM-65 Maverick air-to-ground missile (AGM), AGM-45 Shrike anti-radiation missile (ARM), and the Paveway series of laser-guided bombs (LGB).
With such capabilities, the A-7 was well equipped for the evolving air combat environment of the 1980s and 1990s, where precision-guided munitions (PGM) and survivability against increasingly sophisticated air defenses was of growing importance.
Finally, the scale of the PAF’s intended acquisition – i.e., 110 units – reflected its goal to build a relatively large and qualitatively modern strike capability. Besides a small number of early Cold War-era bombers, like the B-57, the PAF did not have dedicated strike aircraft in large numbers – and none that could use LGBs, AGMs, and/or ARMs. In that era, the PAF’s vision likely involved using the A-7 across both CAS (for supporting the Army’s ground operations) and more strategically focused strikes against high-value installations and enemy air bases, building on two of its three areas of impact in Pakistan’s past (and, at that time, recent) wars with India (with the third area being air-to-air engagements).
However, geopolitical concerns, particularly from the then Carter administration – which wanted to curb nuclear proliferation and ensure regional stability – led to the abrupt termination of the A-7 deal in 1977. Basically, the U.S. government determined that an A-7 sale could escalate an arms race in South Asia and, more importantly, wanted to discourage Pakistan from its nuclear weapons program.
The U.S. brought the A-7 back to the table in the 1980s when the PAF sought new multirole fighters, such as the General Dynamics F-16. While the PAF ultimately favoured the F-16, it still wanted a new dedicated attack platform to complement its new multirole mainstay fighter.
However, funds were limited, and buying both the F-16 and A-7 together was likely beyond the means available to the PAF at the time. Hence, the PAF bought the Nanchang A-5 from China to partly address the requirement, at least the CAS portion.
By the late 1980s, the PAF likely placed its hopes in leveraging the F-16s for the strike role, potentially by equipping it with stand-off range weapons (SOW). However, this would not come to pass as Washington once again placed restrictions on the sale of arms to Pakistan on account of the latter’s nuclear weapons program. The PAF’s plans to make the F-16 its mainstay fighter – and whatever hopes it had of utilizing such a large F-16 fleet for the strike role – did not materialize.
Use of Stand-Off Weapons (SOW) to Bridge Gaps
The Pressler Amendment and its resulting sanctions prevented the PAF from acquiring additional F-16s, forcing it to rethink on how to build its offensive capabilities. With its options limited, the PAF looked to the French company SAGEM to upgrade its existing fleet of Mirage III/5 alongside a number of second-hand aircraft from Australia and Libya. These upgrades, designated as the Retrofit of Strike Element (ROSE), were aimed at providing the aging fighters guided air-to-surface strike capabilities using modern avionics, integrated navigation systems, and, critically, compatibility with stand-off range weapons (SOW).
Through the ROSE upgrades, the PAF’s Mirage III/5s evolved into a specialized strike asset, one that had been uniquely capable of delivering long-range PGMs from the late 1990s to the early 2010s. The South African-origin H-2 and H-4 SOWs were the Mirage ROSE’s primary strike munitions, providing a range of 60 km and 120 km, respectively. This was later complemented with the Ra’ad air-launched cruise missile (ALCM), the initial variant of which offered a range of 350 km.
License-built versions of the Denel Raptor I and Raptor II, the H-2 and H-4 were tactical attack assets. Not only did they offer relatively long reach for the time, but the H-2/H-4 leveraged heavyweight munitions (600 kg). On the other hand, the Ra’ad ALCM formed the PAF’s strategic deterrence element, giving it a means to strike deep in enemy territory (via the ALCM), despite inherent range limits of the Mirage III/5 platform.
With the ROSE upgrade, the Mirage III/5s evolved into indispensable strike assets, providing the PAF with attack reach that it cannot achieve through the F-16s (albeit due to supply-side restrictions from America, which either refused to supply SOWs or would not allow third-party weapons integration).
In February 2019, the PAF put the Mirage ROSE into action as a key strike asset as part of Operation Swift Retort. Four aircraft were deployed, with two launching an H-4 SOW each, while the other pair of aircraft were responsible for guiding the H-4s via data-link.
However, with both the Mirage ROSE and H-2/H-4 aging, the PAF spent the period following Swift Retort to commission the development of new strike munitions, like the Rasoob 250, AZB-81LR, and the wider series of AZB range-extension kits (REK), like the AZB-82, AZB-83, AZB-83LR, and AZB-84.
On one end, SOWs like the AZB-83 and AZB-84 aim to offer (or even exceed) the heavyweight warhead payload of the H-2/H-4, but at a lower cost by repurposing MK-83 and MK-84 general purpose bombs. In addition, they offer comparable range, with the AZB-83LR exceeding it with a reach of up to 250-280 km.
On the other end, the Rasoob 250 and AZB-81LR indicate an interest to invest in smaller ‘smart munitions’ that provide extensive reach (in excess of 200 km). Being more compact designs, these munitions deliver much lighter payloads than the H-2/H-4 or AZB-82/83/84. However, by using new technologies, including artificial intelligence (AI) and machine learning (ML)-based autonomous targeting, they are also supposed to be much more accurate. The idea is to leverage accuracy to successfully neutralize a target rather than a large explosive yield (via a heavy warhead).
End of excerpt (1,077/2,246 words).
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